“American aircrews soon found themselves flying against some of the most intense anti-aircraft and ground fire they’d faced in Southeast Asia.”
By Larry Freeland
IN 1967, the noted American novelist John Steinbeck was sent by Newsday to cover the war in Vietnam. On Jan. 7 of that year, he was at Pleiku, where he flew aboard a UH-1 Huey helicopter with D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry.
He wrote the following about helicopter pilots:
“I wish I could tell you about these pilots. They make me sick with envy. They ride their vehicles the way a man controls a fine, well-trained quarter horse. They weave along stream beds, rise like swallows to clear trees, they turn and twist and dip like swifts in the evening. I watch their hands and feet on the controls, the delicacy of the coordination reminds me of the sure and seeming slow hands of (Pablo) Casals on the cello. They are truly musicians’ hands, and they play their controls like music and they dance them like ballerinas and they make me jealous because I want so much to do it. Remember your child night dream of perfect flight, free and wonderful? It’s like that, and sadly I know I never can. My hands are too old and forgetful to take orders from the command center, which speaks of updrafts and side winds, of drift and shift, or ground fire indicated by a tiny puff or flash, or a hit, and all these commands must be obeyed by the musician’s hands instantly and automatically. I must take my longing out in admiration and the joy of seeing it. Sorry about that leak of ecstasy, Alicia, but I had to get it out or burst.”
Helicopters were a vital component in America’s overall military strategy in Vietnam. Over the 13 years that Americans served and fought in Southeast Asia, approximately 12,000 helicopters from all services saw action with the U.S. Army being the main operator of them. A total of 5,086 helicopters were destroyed – a loss rate of 42 per cent. Many of the rest were damaged in action. More than 40,000 helicopter pilots and 60,000 crew members served in Vietnam. During the war, 2,165 pilots and 2,712 crew were killed. Many more were wounded. When totalled, the number of pilots and crew members killed represents over 8 per cent of the men and women whose names are inscribed on the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D.C.
Vietnam helicopter pilots and their crews were a special breed. They risked their lives every day, often to save men they did not know, and in most cases would never meet.
“The grunt (infantrymen) is the true reason for the existence of the helicopter,” pilots would often tell one another. “Every helicopter that flew in Vietnam had one real purpose: To help the grunt.”
Flying dangerous and deadly missions was the daily routine. In fact, the average life expectancy of a helicopter pilot and crew in Vietnam was just 30 days; during a major battle or when flying into or out of a hot landing zone that time-frame might drop to mere minutes. And combat wasn’t the only danger chopper crews faced; mechanical failures, human error and even poor flying conditions also cost lives.
In February and March of 1971, the U.S. military conducted Operation Lam Son 719 in the northwest corner of South Vietnam
It would prove to be the costliest period in the Vietnam War for American helicopter crews.
I was there and flew CH-47 Chinooks, as part of the 101st Airborne Division Combat Aviation Group.
Lam Son 719 was organized to stop the flow of men and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos. The job of the 101st Airborne’s helicopter force, numbering over 600 machines, was to support the South Vietnamese ARVN forces operating in Laos.
The American helicopters were augmented by other U.S. aviation units in South Vietnam. ARVN armour and infantry, numbering over 20,000 men, were to advance along Route 9, a narrow dirt road in Laos. Along the way, South Vietnamese forces established several firebases and landing zones (LZs) on the highest ridge lines and peaks in the area. Their purpose was to guard the flanks of the advancing ARVN units along Route 9 as they pushed deeper into Laos and engaged the enemy. In essence, South Vietnamese forces did the groundwork and fighting inside of Laos, and the Americans provided air support. Lam Son 719 was supposed to last 90 to 120 days. It was to be the first real test of Vietnamization, the Nixon Administration plan to turn the war over to South Vietnam. The campaign ended in failure after only 60 days.
During Lam Son 719, U.S. planners believed that any North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces opposing the incursion would be caught in the open and destroyed by the application of American airpower, specifically tactical airstrikes and air mobility. Although U.S. planes and helicopters played an important role in the operation, their contribution would not be decisive. It would however prevent the South Vietnamese defeat from becoming a complete disaster. Despite this, American helicopter crews would pay a terrible cost. Many of them who flew in and out of Laos estimated their odds of survival were little better than 50/50.
After entering Laos, ARVN forces faced heavy enemy resistance. American aircrews soon found themselves flying against some of the most intense anti-aircraft and ground fire they’d faced in Southeast Asia. During their missions, they flew through machine gun, small arms and RPG fire. Their LZs were frequently targeted by enemy mortar rounds and artillery shells, and in some cases were threatened by enemy tanks.
Both crews and aircraft took heavy losses. After America’s six years of combat operations in Southeast Asia, no one wanted to be the last man to die in Vietnam.
The operation was officially called off April 7, 1971, having fallen well short of its objectives. Despite this, that same day, President Nixon appeared on television to declare victory for his administration’s strategy.
“Tonight, I can report that Vietnamization has succeeded,” he proclaimed.
South Vietnamese President Thieu echoed Nixon’s sentiments. While addressing the survivors of Lam Son 719 at Dong Ha, he claimed that the operation in Laos was “the biggest victory ever.”
More than 750 American helicopters took part in Lam Son 719, flying 160,000 sorties. Most of the choppers came from the 101st Airborne. The division lost 84 machines in the campaign, with another 430 damaged. A fifth of those were rendered inoperable. Combined helicopter losses totaled 108 machines destroyed and 618 damaged. During the two months of flight operations, 72 helicopter aircrew members were killed, 59 were wounded and 11 were missing.
The United States military was shocked and unprepared for the staggering loss of men and equipment. The toll was so heavy, advocates of U.S. Army aviation were forced to re-examine the basic air mobility doctrine and tactics. Particular attention was directed toward the combat survivability of helicopters in hostile environments.
Although the campaign did set North Vietnamese supply operations in southeastern Laos back for a time, truck traffic on the trail system increased almost immediately. Washington and Saigon’s claims of success rang hollow, the operation having exposed grave deficiencies in ARVN “planning, organization, motivation, operational expertise, and most importantly leadership.”
For the North Vietnamese, Lam Son was viewed as a complete victory. The military expansion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the west, which had begun in 1970, accelerated. The area that the trail passed through in southeastern Laos expanded from 60 miles in width to 90 miles.
The victory also convinced Hanoi to plan for an invasion across the DMS into South Vietnam’s Quang Tri province in early 1972, known in the west as the Easter Offensive.
Had it not been for massive amounts of American airpower deployed in the defense of the South, the 1972 invasion might have ended the war that year, with a complete victory for Hanoi. It would take another three years to achieve final victory.
It is against the backdrop of Operation Lam Son 719, I chose to write a novel about American helicopter pilots at war in the later part of the Vietnam conflict.
About the Author: Larry Freeland is the author of Chariots in the Sky: A Story About U.S. Assault Helicopter Pilots at War in Vietnam. A veteran of the war in Southeast Asia, he served with the 101st Airborne Division as an infantry officer and CH-47 helicopter pilot. He has been a banker, financial consultant, college instructor. He is retired and lives in Georgia. He is currently working on a historical fiction Trilogy about one family’s three generations of men who serve in the military starting with WWI to the present. You can visit his website at larryfreeland.com.
Did the US fixed-wing aircraft took part in Lam Son 719 suffer the same level of casualties as the helicopters?
The helicopters to the worse of the war in Laos. Read the book The Price They Paid Enduring Wounds of War. Author Michael Putzel. About a Cavalry Troop C Troop 2/17th Cavalry 101st Airborne Division. This troop was not under the 101st control during Lam Son719. General in Arvns and CIA gave out the orders for entire Lam Son 719
Did the US planes that took part in Lam Son 719 have the same level of losses as the helicopters?
No, there was only three reported KIA’s suffered by the 7th Air Force, no WIA’s or MIA’s. The US Air Force provided tactical air support, B-52’s for Arc Lights, AC-119 and AC-130 gunship support and troop and cargo transports for support into Khe Sanh, SVN. It was a major helicopter operation which involved flying close to the ground for over 60 days. Hope this helps.
My husband was a Sgt. & there for Lam Son 719 Khe Sahn 101st Abn 2/17 Cav They were overrun mar23/24 1971 . One of 7 left standing after the fun. Firefight started at midnight and went all night long until approx 6-7 am
Robin, I was there the night of Apr 23/24. I had been there throughout all of Lam Son 719 as an air traffic controller guiding all the sircraft in and out of Khe Sanh that Feb through the end of the operation. In fact when we evacuated Khe Sanh, we had, on our C-130 some of the PSP runway aboard. We weren’t leaving anything behind.
I recall the whole night, when I got hit by shrapnel from an exploded rocket which whizzed overhead due to the NVA getting into the ammo dump and setting off sachel charges which made the ordnance uncontrolled as it went airborne. I also recall how my group (1st Mob, [First Mobile Comm. Group]) were tasked with walking the full length of the runway, morning of 24th, looking for any sachel charges that may have been planted under the PSP (Perforated Steel Planking) which could explode from any movement of the PSP, ie C130 landing or taking off, helicoptrrs landing on the runway, etc. I mourn for all those men of that night, and for some reason this morning (before your post was discovered) I am saddened by many memories of watching, helplessly, as some of our men were killed. I do hope that your husband is not living with horrors. I don’t typically, but once in a while a dark cloud zips through my mind leaving my hands shaking and a mournful, depressed feeling of the longest two short months I have spent.
I’m on Instagram as #heritagehandiwork.
I was there also, the NVA that got in side the wire were special troops, dressed in shorts. Sort of reminded me of Boy Scouts uniforms. They came through an unguarded sector, still a couple running on the airstrip at say light. Lots of 122 rockets coming in when the fog was covering the mountains.
I only found out, Sept 2022, that WO John F. Hummel, pilot, and WO William Patrick Milliner, copilot of Cobra gunship, no radio comm, was flying wing with lead Cobra, who I picked up on GCA radar and safely brought in to Khe Sanh on March 6, 1971. Within moments after landing, the lead pilot came into my GCA Rdar unit, very anxious and concerned about whether his wingman made it down okay too. As we sat there, face-to-face, we talked a moment about where his wingman was. I don’t recall the entire very brief conversation before he left.
Now fifty one years later I find that the Pilot and copilot, above, broke off from the lead before entering dense cloud cover. I had assumed all these years that they flew to a safe landing at another airstrip, or other friendly camp. Now all the information I have is that WO Milliner may have been sighted in a Laotian POW camp in the 90’s, yet the gov’t has officially taken their hands off rescuing our patriots and have classified them from MIA to deceased. Little less hopeful information is available on WO Hummel, yet he too could have been sighted by another POW at that time on a march, as a POW, to a prison camp in North Viet Nam. This POW only had a brief description which resembled MIA Hummel.
I will work to my last day to do whatever it takes to bring our own back to their families. I call for any patriot to join me in this quest, especially anyone who may know how to navigate through the bureaucratic system to engage services to help provide details and paths to pursue. These men deserve our support of their six. Also if anyone who has first hand knowledge of any family, friends, hopefully maybe the name of the lead pilot I talked in that night.
Please send me anything available for me to try to bring the men home. I will most willing accept help from anyone to partner with me.
My email address: owen.maier@gmail.com
I was there beginning to end; combat engineer 2ent tour 101st airborne I remember the rockets flying all around thay would hit the burm around our hole in the ground next to the air strip and fly overhead “ ,hell we were lucky enough to get out of there alive “ many of our brothers did not 🥲I came home after that I knew the war was lost What a waste
Hi Jim Learnahan. Combat Engineer I was there beginning to end. Sky boy’s never gave up even after being shot down,rescued got another chopper and up they go again . So proud of my brothers ! Can’t say that for the Arvins thay lost the war here.
This is too long for a quick research report. Just have maybe a summary of the whole thing at the start. But overall, I like this website.
Hi, Tony Lolas, pilot. I flew 0-2Bs out of DaNang In I-Corps prior to the beginning, during, and just after Lam Son 719. My areas of operation were primarily in Laos and Cambodia, and especially along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. My observation of events differ from the history recount. During my missions, I would drop leaflets, and deliver loud speaker missions designed to get the NVA troops to “Chieu Hoi” (Open Arms), switch sides with “open arms” and join forces with their SVN friends to drive the Communists out of VN. During my third mission, I was directed to rendezvous with a special forces unit in Laos. When I went over the mountains and flew over the rendezvous point, there was an army jeep with two special forces personnel and two NVA prisoners. The special forces member told me that the two NVAs found one of my leaflets and they indicated they were from a company of sappers and after discussing it with their comrades they decided that they would “Chieu Hoi”. So they killed their commander and political officer and they all wanted to “Chieu Hoi.” Since they were holed up in a ridge line and they wanted me to deliver a loud speaker mission over the ridge line to get the members of the NVA sapper unit to come down in twos with their weapons and equipment and they would be met with “open arms”. My 9th Special Operations unit required all new O-2B pilots to fly their first 3 missions with an Instructor Pilot and on the 3rd mission, he was only to act as an observer. When I arrived at the ridge, there was a cloud cover at 700 feet and above. My Command requirement was that we were not allowed to fly loud speaker orbits below 2000 feet as an AK47 could chew an O-2 to bits. So, I told the special forces person that I wasn’t allowed to fly an orbit below 2000 feet. The special forces person came unglued and started yelling over the radio that the NVA knew that they had lost contact with this sapper company and that they had already sent a unit to try to regain control. AND, “if they do, do you know how many Americans will die all because you are afraid to fly below 700 feet!” :
Well, being an USAF Academy grad, that comment touched a nerve. So, I said I would do it. Just then, the instructor pulled out his pistol and said he would shoot me if I disobeyed a command directive, especially with him on board. I told him this was too significant and sometimes one had to do what was important despite normal operating directives. I told him that if he shot me, I would put the aircraft in a death dive and we would both die. This way, we had at least a chance of survival. So, he put his pistol away. I, then told the special forces person to put one of the NVA sappers on the radio and to shout several times as we descended over the ridge line, “Don’t shoot at this aircraft” and to identify himself each time he said it. My thought was they would think he was onboard the aircraft and wouldn’t shoot. Then, he was told to tell them to come down the ridge and follow the stream holding their weapons up in a non threatening manner. when the first 8 came down, I told the special forces guy that I didn’t want to press my luck. He said that it appeared that they had gotten the message and that all of them would be coming down. With that I signed off and headed back to DaNang.
As we approached DaNang, the Instructor pilot contacted out command post and asked that our commander and operations officer to meet us at the aircraft and to get 2 MPs to also be there. When we landed and I drove my aircraft to the revetment at the end of the runway, there was the commander’s jeep and the MP jeep. The IP jumped out of the aircraft before I had even shut the engines down. I took my sweet time doing my post flight and both jeeps drove up to my aircraft and watched me do my post flight. As I was finishing, there was a commotion coming down the flight line. Two half tracks followed by a jeep with a 3 star flag on it and another 2 half tracks following. They drove straight at my aircraft and stopped. The general jumped out and said he was the “I Corps Army Commander” and asked who was in command of this aircraft. To which I said, “I was.” He, then said, “Congratulations! What you did was very brave and quite successful! So far, 56 sappers have turned themselves in and they are bringing in maps of staging areas and ammunition dumps all along the trail and into NVN. We are already planning on sending in the bombers. To that, my commander dismissed the MPs. Nothing was said about the mission for the next few days. The bombers flew night and day against the targets identified by the members of the NVA sapper unit and they indicated tremendous success in the number of secondary explosions. When the DaNang Gunfighter Gazette came out a few days later, there was this picture on the front page of the IP in front of an O-2B describing this mission and the subsequent bombing campaign throughout Laos and Cambodia. My name was not mentioned at all!! I was in the command post at the time and I received a call from our headquarters in Phan Rhang. They wanted the specifics of that captain IP so that he can be put in for a “Silver Star”. I became a “bit” angry and went into the commander’s office and told him that “I didn’t care about myself, but he better not get a silver star!” Sometimes one says the wrong thing, especially when one is emotional. What I should have said, “you know what went on aboard that aircraft, we both should get a silver star, but it should reflect that I was in command and I made the decisions!”
A few weeks later, it became apparent that the bombing missions had destroyed a lot the the NVA capabilities. So, Lam Son 719 was planned and executed. Although the ARVN combat units were the spear head, the US provided a lot of air cover, Initially, there was a lot of resistance and a lot of US helicopters were shot down. I flew special ops and reconnaissance missions in front of the advancing ARVN in Laos. My primary purpose was to spot evidence of NVA massing to counter attack the advancing ARVN. On none of my missions did I spot any evidence of the NVA planning to mass for a counter attack. Although there was a lot more NVA resistance than what we appeared to have planned, the ARVN did quite well. For example, they faced a lot more tanks than what we had envisioned. Before we could get them anti-tank weapons from the US, someone decided to offer that if any ARVN soldier “killed a tank, they would get a huge monetary bonus!” With that, a lot of tanks were destroyed by hand grenades! After a lot of success in moving forward along the trail, some ARVN were even discussing the possibility of attacking North VN. They said who said uniting VN couldn’t be done with SVN doing the “uniting”! On one of my missions, I witnessed very little NVA resistance and I saw no evidence of NVA troops massing ahead of them. When I returned to base, I even put in my report that I thought the reason the NVA were not appearing to mass to counter the ARVN advance was that they couldn’t! With that, I wrote that it appears WE HAD WON THE WAR!!
Since the ARVN lead units seemed to be becoming more aggressive, I witnessed of what I thought was a very stupid thing! Although the lead units were nearly all ARVN, there were several American advisors along with them primarily as contacts for American air support. I think someone at US headquarters was getting concerned that as the ARVN advanced toward the NV border, they might go into the North in an attempt to reunite under the South. In not willing to risk possible Russian and/or Chinese involvement, certain policy makers decided to stop the ARVN advance, but couldn’t as the ARVN were becoming more confident of their abilities. Then, it appeared to me that someone decided the way to get the ARVN to stop advancing along the trail was to pull out the American advisors!!
So, I watched as helicopters flew in to pick up the American advisors. I really thought this was stupid as it was pulling out the contacts for the American air support. And, I watched as the lead units started to withdraw and they left a lot of American equipment behind in their haste to withdraw. The American press had a field day as the way they reported the ARVN “withdrawal” as a NVA victory and an ARVN defeat! No, I think it was the American press that lost the NV war, not the American and ARVN militaries!
Although I am still very angry about the result, I am proud of my service and those of my brothers and sisters at arms during the VietNam conflict.
Hi, Tony Lolas, pilot. I flew 0-2Bs out of DaNang In I-Corps prior to the beginning, during, and just after Lam Son 719. My areas of operation were primarily in Laos and Cambodia, and especially along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. My observations of events differ from the history recount. During my missions, I would drop leaflets, and deliver loud speaker missions designed to get the NVA troups to “Chieu Hoi” (Open Arms), switch sides with “open arms” and join forces with their SVN friends to drive the Communists out of VN. During my third mission, I was directed to rendezvous with a special forces unit in Laos. When I went over the mountains and flew over the rendezvous point, there was an army jeep with two special forces personnel and two NVA prisoners. The special forces member told me that the two NVAs found one of my leaflets and they indicated they were from a company of sappers and after discussing it with their comrades they decided that they would “Chieu Hoi”. So they killed their commander and political officer and they all wanted to “Chieu Hoi.” Since they were holed up in a ridge line and they wanted me to deliver a loud speaker mission over the ridge line to get the members of the NVA sapper unit to come down in twos with their weapons and equipment and they would be met with “open arms”. My 9th Special Operations unit required all new O-2B pilots to fly their first 3 missions with an Instructor Pilot and on the 3rd mission, he was only to act as an observer. When I arrived at the ridge, there was a cloud cover at 700 feet and above. My Command requirement was that we were not allowed to fly loud speaker orbits below 2000 feet as an AK47 could chew an O-2 to bits. So, I told the special forces person that I wasn’t allowed to fly an orbit below 2000 feet. The special forces person came unglued and started yelling over the radio that the NVA knew that they had lost contact with this sapper company and that they had already sent a unit to try to regain control. AND, “if they do, do you know how many Americans will die all because you are afraid to fly below 700 feet!”
Well, being an USAF Academy grad, that comment touched a nerve. So, I said I would do it. Just then, the instructor pulled out his pistol and said he would shoot me if I disobeyed a command directive, especially with him on board. I told him this was too significant and sometimes one had to do what was important despite normal operating directives. I told him that if he shot me, I would put the aircraft in a death dive and we would both die. This way, we had at least a chance of survival. So, he put his pistol away. I, then told the special forces person to put one of the NVA sappers on the radio and to shout several times as we descended over the ridge line, “Don’t shoot at this aircraft” and to identify himself each time he said it. My thought was they would think he was onboard the aircraft and wouldn’t shoot. Then, he was told to tell them to come down the ridge and follow the stream holding their weapons up in a non threatening manner. when the first 8 came down, I told the special forces guy that I didn’t want to press my luck. He said that it appeared that they had gotten the message and that all of them would be coming down. With that I signed off and headed back to DaNang.
As we approached DaNang, the Instructor pilot contacted out command post and asked that our commander and operations officer meet us at the aircraft and to get 2 MPs also to be there. When we landed and I drove my aircraft to the revetment at the end of the runway, there was the commander’s jeep and the MP jeep. The IP jumped out of the aircraft before I had even shut the engines down. I took my sweet time doing my post flight and both jeeps drove up to my aircraft and watched me do my post flight. As I was finishing, there was a commotion coming down the flight line. Two half tracks followed by a jeep with a 3 star flag on it and another 2 half tracks following. They drove straight at my aircraft and stopped. The general jumped out and said he was the “I Corps Army Commander” and asked who was in command of this aircraft. To which I said, “I was.” He, then said, “Congratulations! What you did was very brave and quite successful! So far, 56 sappers have turned themselves in and they are bringing in maps of staging areas and ammunition dumps all along the trail and into NVN. We are already planning on sending in the bombers. To that, my commander dismissed the MPs. Nothing was said about the mission for the next few days. The bombers flew night and day against the targets identified by the members of the NVA sapper unit and they indicated tremendous success in the number of secondary explosions. When the DaNang Gunfighter Gazette came out a few days later, there was this picture on the front page of the IP in front of an O-2B describing this mission and that all 136 of the sappers had switched sides resulting in a very successful subsequent bombing campaign throughout Laos and Cambodia. My name was not mentioned at all. I was in the command post at the time and I received a call from our headquarters in Phan Rang. They wanted the specifics of that captain IP so that he can be put in for a “Silver Star”. I became a “bit” angry and went into the commander’s office and told him that “I didn’t care about myself, but he better not get a silver star!” Sometimes one says the wrong thing, especially when one is emotional. What I should have said, “you know what went on aboard that aircraft, we both should get a silver star, but it should reflect that I was in command and I made the decisions!”
A few weeks later, it became apparent that the bombing missions had destroyed a lot the the NVA capabilities. So, Lam Son 719 was planned and executed. Although the ARVN combat units were the spear head, the US provided a lot of air cover, Initially, there was a lot of resistance and a lot of US helicopters were shot down. I flew special ops and reconnaissance missions in front of the advancing ARVN in Laos. My primary purpose was to spot evidence of NVA massing to counter attack the advancing ARVN. On none of my missions did I spot any evidence of the NVA planning to mass for a counter attack. Although there was a lot more NVA resistance than what we appeared to have planned, the ARVN did quite well. For example, they faced a lot more tanks than what we had envisioned. Before we could get them anti-tank weapons from the US, someone decided to offer that if any ARVN soldier “killed a tank, they would get a huge monetary bonus!” With that, a lot of tanks were destroyed by hand grenades! After a lot of success in moving forward along the trail, some ARVN were even discussing the possibility of attacking North VN. They said who said uniting VN couldn’t be done with SVN doing the “uniting”! On one of my missions, I witnessed very little NVA resistance and I saw no evidence of NVA troops massing ahead of them. When I returned to base, I even put in my report that I thought the reason the NVA were not appearing to mass to counter the ARVN advance was that they couldn’t! With that, I wrote that it appears WE HAD WON THE WAR!!
Since the ARVN lead units seemed to be becoming more aggressive, I witnessed of what I thought was a very stupid thing! Although the lead units were nearly all ARVN, there were several American advisors along with them primarily as contacts for American air support. I think someone at US headquarters was getting concerned that as the ARVN advanced toward the NV border, they might go into the North in an attempt to reunite under the South. In not willing to risk possible Russian and/or Chinese involvement, certain policy makers decided to stop the ARVN advance, but couldn’t as the ARVN were becoming more confident of their abilities. Then, it appeared to me that someone decided the way to get the ARVN to stop advancing along the trail was to pull out the American advisors.
So, I watched as helicopters flew in to pick up the American advisors. I really thought this was stupid as it was pulling out the contacts for the American air support. And, I watched as the lead units started to withdraw and they left a lot of American equipment behind in their haste to withdraw. The American press had a field day as the way they reported the ARVN “withdrawal” as a NVA victory and an ARVN defeat! No, I think it was the American press that lost the NV war, not the American and ARVN militaries!
Although I am still very angry about the result, I am proud of my service and those of my brothers and sisters at arms during the VietNam conflict.
Leaving a reply in the hopes someone can assist. My father was in a C&C UH-1 on 18 March 1971 during 4/1 ARVN extraction at the bomb crater. I am hoping to find out any information about this air crew:
https://www.vvmf.org/Wall-of-Faces/5377/KEITH-A-BRANDT/
Keith Allen Brandt and Allan Boffman – AH-1 crew from D Co 101st Avn Bn, 101st Avn BDE.
ANY information is greatly appreciated.