“Guerrilla” is a term that was coined by the Spaniards in the 18th Century. The word means “little war”. Guerrilla warfare typically involves groups of non-uniformed armed civilians organizing to fight for some sort of military or political objective. Hit and run attacks, ambushes, sabotage, bombings, small raids – these are the tactics normally associated with guerrillas.
Since these sorts of armed bands are not members of a conventional or national army, they are often referred to “irregulars” by those who fight them. It’s a term that’s been applied to everyone from the Minutemen of Lexington and Concord to the Taliban of Tora Bora.
Yet according to an article in last week’s Wall Street Journal by military historian Max Boot, when considering humankind’s 15,000-year history, instances of warring professional armies are both relatively new and anomalous. From the Stone Age to the present, human conflict has largely been fought guerrilla-style — uniformed “regulars” are the irregular ones, Boot says.
In fact, the author of the new book Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present rightly points out that all the conflicts currently being waged on the planet involve either terrorist groups, rebels, revolutionaries or paramilitary armies – in effect: guerrillas. Consider the fighting raging right now in Algeria, Syria, Mail, Afghanistan, Gaza, Columbia and Mexico. All of those conflicts involve guerrilla armies.
In the article, entitled “The Guerrilla Myth”, Boot argues that despite the fact that guerrilla war is the most ancient and common method of warfare, the world’s governments (and their standing armies) still struggle to find working strategies to defeat insurgencies. This makes it, as Boot points out, the most pressing security concern of the 21st Century.
In the piece, the author lays out nine misconceptions that surround guerrilla warfare. For example, he reveals data that lays bare misconceptions about the success rates and effectiveness of irregular forces, while at the same time exploring the utility of conventional armies’ “hearts and minds” strategies. Boot also examines the role technology can (and can’t play) in counter insurgencies.
To read the piece, click here.
Why is it necessarily desirable to find a guaranteed way to defeat insurgencies?
I’m no expert (I’m a journalist by trade and an amateur historian), but I would imagine that each insurgency is different and would require a unique approach. I suppose the historic problem is the fact that armies are typically designed to defeat other armies. When they go up against grass roots opposition that don’t ‘play by the rules’ so to speak, the armies need to adapt and I imagine that can be costly in terms of lives for everyone involved (including innocent civilians). But to answer your over-arching question: why is it necessary to find a way to defeat insurgencies? That strikes me as a philosophical question and I don’t have an answer. Anyone care to venture a guess?