“In January 1942, the U-boat war reached the U.S. East Coast and 20 years of American Army-Navy rivalry made the German attack much more deadly.”

By Col. Joseph T. Molyson, Jr. USAFR (Ret)

ON A rainy May 12, 1938, three shiny new U.S. Army Air Corps B-17 Flying Fortresses flew over the Italian liner Rex 620 miles off the East Coast. The bombers were not supposed to be there. It was peacetime and the planes were unarmed. Their mission however was intended to show that the Air Corps had a significant role in defending the American coast. The new four-engine bombers could fly far out to sea to collect intelligence and strike enemy shipping.

Locating the Rex was not a miracle; the vessel was sending regular position reports to its destination. These were monitored by the Air Corps and used to plot an intercept course.

The effort was part of a larger U.S. Army coastal defense exercise. Enthusiastic reporters followed the event; two of the aircraft even had print and radio media representatives aboard.

The Rex, over 600 miles from land, was clearly in the domain of the United States Navy. The Army called it a “training mission,” the Navy called it a “violation” of the agreement on coastal defense. The Army backed off without punishing any of their involved airmen; many became prominent leaders in World War II, which began 18 months later.

The incident not only stands out as an example of the historic interservice rivalry between the various branches of the U.S. armed services but demonstrates how even 20 years after the end of the First World War, the world’s militaries were still coming to terms with how the aircraft fit into national defense. Since 1918, the U.S. Navy and Army had been fighting over the Air Corps’ role in maritime air operations. In Britain, similar disputes were occurring between the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy.

Interestingly, the Rex incident wasn’t the first time Army bombers had played the role of unexpected intruders in naval training exercises.

In 1921, American Army bombers sunk the captured German battleship Ostfriesland after days of pounding with increasingly larger bombs. It was a 2,000-pounder that finally took the vessel down.

The Ostfriesland had been taken as a war prize. The U.S. Navy planned to use it as a target for their own bombing practice before Army Air Service Brigadier General Billy Mitchell had unexpectedly put the Ostfriesland on the bottom. The Ostfriesland was not moving or defending itself when bombed, and the Navy cried “foul.”

When the U.S. Army entered the war in France in 1917, the Aviation Section, still part of the Signal Corps, was made up of observation and pursuit (fighter) units. None were tasked with maritime missions. The air service was part of the Army, and the Army’s fight was on land.

Mitchell’s subsequent battles with both the Army and Navy brass sunk his own career as well as an early opportunity for interservice cooperation in defending the United States.

The Navy, never one to miss a learning opportunity, was as eager to put the emerging airplane to work as the Army. America’s admirals had the battlecruisers USS Lexington and USS Saratoga converted to large aircraft carriers while they were still under construction. The Navy intended for its own air force, U.S. Naval Aviation, to operate from aircraft carriers, seaplane tenders and shore bases to support the fleet in combat operations. Army airmen were not needed.

The U.S. Army Air Service became the Air Corps in 1926. By joint agreement, the Army airmen could venture no more than 100 miles from land in its limited coastal defense role. The Navy claimed jurisdiction over the remaining ocean, employing flying boats, floatplanes and carrier-borne aircraft to support its battleships. By 1928, Lexington and Saratoga were at sea. The chastened Air Corps continued emphasis on supporting the ground Army and provided little resources for its limited defense role along the coast.

In 1931, the Air Corps Tactical School began operation at Maxwell Field, Alabama. Here was developed a second major combat mission for the Air Corps, long-range bombardment of key industries to defeat an enemy far from the active battle zones. This new theory soon led to the development of bombardment aircraft of increasing range and ordnance-carrying ability, resulting in the B-17 Flying Fortress four-engine bomber. The revolutionary capabilities of the Fortress led directly to the events of May 12, 1938, and the Italian liner Rex.

Later that year, war in Europe loomed. Hitler’s demand to strip Czechoslovakia of its Sudetenland territory precipitated September’s Munich Crisis. While Britain and France moved to appease the German Fuhrer, in Washington an alarmed Roosevelt recognized the danger of a new conflict. Shifting his focus from the threats posed by a belligerent Japan, the president set out to rebuild the long-neglected Atlantic Fleet by transferring vessels from the Pacific. Roosevelt also called for an Air Corps of 10,000 planes, including almost 4,000 bombers. It was a stunning move; at this time, Boeing was producing only 38 B-17s a year. In keeping with the current interservice agreement, none of the new warplanes would be earmarked for maritime operations.

When in September of 1939 war finally erupted in Europe, Roosevelt directed the U.S. Navy to establish a Neutrality Patrol which included both the east and west coasts of North and South America. The White House knew that the Atlantic would soon be a hunting ground for German U-boats and that the sea lanes — Britain’s lifeline in the coming struggle — must be maintained. This patrol pushed Navy resources to their limits. Like the Royal Navy, the U.S. Navy had limited numbers of surface escorts in the Atlantic. Surprisingly, Army aircraft still had no significant role in the Neutrality Patrol.

It wouldn’t be until December of 1941 — less than four years after the Rex controversy — that the U.S. Navy would at last be forced to call upon the new U.S. Army Air Force to provide essential antisubmarine patrols along U.S. coasts and into Central and South America. The Navy had to strip the East coast for the Pacific Theater, replacing its combat losses inflicted in the Japanese onslaught. Among the assets repositioned were two aircraft carriers and some patrol squadrons.

Only the U.S. Army had the airplanes and crews to replace departing naval air units. With few surface escort vessels left in the Atlantic, the Army airmen and the remaining naval aviation units scrambled to provide some kind of maritime defense. American coastal shipping continued on poorly defended routes, as did tankers and ore carriers from the Gulf and Caribbean. In January 1942, the U-boat war reached the U.S. East Coast and 20 years of American Army-Navy rivalry made the German attack much more deadly. Only slowly did the Army learn antisubmarine skills.

In my book, Six Air Forces Over the Atlantic, I explore air power’s contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic. Five of the air forces in this campaign were Allied. These included the U.S. Army Air Force and U.S. Naval Aviation, the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. As in the United States, there was significant interservice friction in Britain to resolve.

The book describes how the American, British, and Canadian air and naval air forces evolved from defeat to victory in the Atlantic Campaign. Allied airmen did not win the campaign on their own, but the Allies could not have won either the campaign or the war without airpower. The book tells the story from several perspectives, from the cockpit to the White House. It is the story of air forces and navies learning to work together to beat the Kriegsmarine. Where was the Luftwaffe, the sixth air force?

That was a question often asked by Kriegsmarine as it ventured beyond Iceland to attack merchant shipping.

Col. Joseph T. Molyson Jr. (RET) is the author of Six Air Forces Over the Atlantic: How Allied Airmen Helped Win the Battle of the Atlantic. He’s a 30-year U.S. Air Force veteran who spent most of his service in intelligence. He lives outside Atlanta, Georgia.