“It was a victory, but it was not MacArthur’s best work.”
By Nicholas Evan Sarantakes
“ONE OF America’s greatest heroes is dead,” President Lyndon Johnson declared upon the death of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Of that there is little doubt, but MacArthur was as good as he was bad. He was feast or famine, home run or strike out. Nothing makes that point more than the Luzon campaign of 1945 and the Battle of Manila, which is the largest urban battle in the history of the U.S. Army.
Consider this for a moment: When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the general was 61. Most successful professionals at that age have developed a standard method of operation. Put another way, they get set in their ways. Not MacArthur. He showed an impressive professional dexterity. He conducted conventional infantry assaults, which he had done in World War I, but he used many other forms of military power. His use of irregular forces, air power, amphibious assault, airborne troops, and naval assets gave him an edge over his Japanese opponents. He also willingly used intelligence and psychological warfare. For a time, allied soldiers made up the majority of forces under his command. Allies are useful, but coalition warfare always comes with political diplomatic complications. MacArthur handled these difficulties well.
At first, the Luzon campaign seemed to be more of the same. At 9:30 a.m. on January 9, 1945 the 1st Battalion, 129th Infantry Regiment, 37th Infantry Division reached the sands of Luzon. “Landing not opposed” is the terse language in the unit journal.
The Japanese expected an invasion of Luzon from the south and had most of their defenses facing that direction. As a result, the soldiers of the Sixth U.S. Army had an easy time moving inland. At higher levels of command, there was a great deal of frustration. MacArthur used speed, surprise, and maneuver to overwhelm and defeat his opponents. Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, commanding general, Sixth U.S. Army was having none of it. What MacArthur wanted required allowing gaps to develop in his lines.
“I did not consider a precipitate advance for that purpose feasible with the forces initially available to me,” he explained
The main reason for the differences between the two was air power. MacArthur tended to think in more three-dimensional terms. Close air ground support would cover the gaps. What needed to be done now was to seize control of Manila. Krueger understood air power—he’d gone to flight school—but he believed air power simply lacked the permanent presence to make up the difference.
As the Sixth Army slowly moved inland, there was a great deal of gossip at MacArthur’s headquarters about a confrontation brewing between the two generals. This was nonsense. MacArthur had just recommended Krueger for a fourth star. BUT he prodded Krueger, putting his headquarters closer to enemy position. He also allowed Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, the commanding general of the Eighth U.S. Army to conduct a landing in southern Luzon. MacArthur even instructed the 1st Cavalry Division to conduct a raid into Manila.
When the horse soldiers crossed the Manila city limits on February 3, 1945, the Manila Naval Defense Force was waiting. Rear Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji’s command was a random collection of personnel scraped together from sailors that had survived ship sinkings and those working at shore installations. Even ordinary Japanese nationals who happened to be on Luzon were quickly pressed into the force. As a result, 40-year-old business executives quickly became naval ensigns and lieutenants. Needless to say, the MNDF had little competence. Many of the defenders had no training in infantry tactics and barely knew how to load their weapons. There are numerous reports of U.S. soldiers capturing Japanese prisoners of war after they failed to kill themselves with grenades because they didn’t know how to set the weapons off.
Manila suffered a great deal, though. The Japanese set fires to destroy supplies rather than let them fall into the hands of the Americans. They lost control and a huge inferno burned about a third of Manila. Stunned at the devastation, MacArthur’s leadership began to fall apart. As the theater commander, it was his responsibility to develop strategy and communicate those plans to his subordinate commanders so they could design military operations and implement tactics to support his intent. He failed to perform these tasks.
Without strategic direction, subordinate commanders developed plans which were impressive in the technical delivery of firepower and maneuver. Japanese records show that U.S. artillery was precise and destroyed in minutes positions that had taken weeks to put together. Artillery duels and gun fights slowly ripped roads apart, turned buildings into rubble, and destroyed the port facilities that the U.S. would need to support its invasion of Japan.
Amid the fighting, the Japanese committed numerous atrocities against Filipinos. Admiral Iwabuchi had declared that all civilians not helping Japan were guerrillas. These instructions basically amounted to: “kill them all and let God sort them out.” It was a stupid order; the defense force lacked the resources to carry it out, and it diverted it from what should have been its main mission of fighting the Americans.
After two and a half weeks, the U.S. Army had control of the city except for the Intramuros (the original walled city) and the three government buildings at the end of Rizal Park. A thousand U.S. personnel had been killed; tens of thousands of Filipino bodies lay out in the open, decomposing, creating a public health emergency.
In the aftermath, Civic administration fell upon the U.S. Army, which slowed down its march into the rest of Luzon. It was a victory, but it was not MacArthur’s best work.
Many military analysts believe urban warfare inherently favors the defender. The idea being that urban landscapes consume large amounts of time and resources, and that buildings, stadiums, and city streets over concealment and fortifications that slow down attackers.
Manila shows something different. Time is a relative consideration. A month to take Manila might indeed seem long, but compared to the six moths of Stalingrad or the two years of Leningrad, it was quick. There were many structures in Manila that the Japanese used as defensive positions. Some held out for days and days, but others gave way in hours. Terrain, like the weather, is neutral. What really matters is the professional competence of the fighting forces. In Manila there was no comparison.
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes is the author The Battle of Manila: Poisoned Victory in the Pacific War. He is a professor at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed here are his and do not represent the policy of the U.S. government.
