Valerius Laevinus – Meet the Little-Known Roman Commander Who Helped the Republic Defeat Hannibal

The Battle of Zama marked Rome’s final defeat of Carthage and victory in the Second Punic War. While history remembers Scipio’s triumph over Hannibal in the epic clash, posterity has largely forgotten the efforts of Marcus Valerius Laevinus in the conflict. The lesser-known Roman general’s surprising campaigns paved the way for the republic’s later success.

“Despite his many successes, the Senate does not appear to have ever granted Laevinus a triumph in honour of his victories.”

By Byron Waldron

WHEN WE think of the commanders who helped lead Rome to victory against the Carthaginian leader Hannibal in the Second Punic War (218-201 BC), we tend to think of Fabius, ‘the Shield of Rome’, Marcellus, the ‘Sword of Rome’, and of course Scipio Africanus.

However, of similar importance was Marcus Valerius Laevinus. Not only did he hold various commands continuously from 215 to 206, but his military victories both on land and at sea, won in various theatres of war, as well as his domestic successes on the home front, played crucial roles in keeping Rome in the war and in preparing the Republic for final victory.

Laevinus was possibly praetor in Sardinia in 227, and he became consul in 220 but had to abdicate the magistracy, likely due to a religious technicality. However, it was in the aftermath of Hannibal’s victory in the Battle of Cannae in 216 that Laevinus began to leave his mark on history.

In the first elections following the disaster at Cannae, in 215 Laevinus was again elected praetor and given command of Roman forces in Apulia, the very region of Italy in which the battle had been fought. He was tasked with preventing Apulian cities from joining Hannibal, and with recapturing cities that had joined the Carthaginian side.

After receiving legionary reinforcements from Sicily, he sent the survivors of Cannae to garrison the crucial port-city of Tarentum. He then campaigned against the rebel Hirpini in Samnium, recapturing the towns of Vercellium, Vescellium, and Sicilinum and taking over 5,000 prisoners (Livy 23.32.16-18, 37.12-13).

However, soon after Laevinus’ arrival in the region, news came that the warrior king of Macedon, Philip V, had made a treaty with Carthage. This was no small matter. Not only was Macedon a major power, but Philip was one of the most active commanders of the Hellenistic world, fighting around 100 engagements by the end of his reign. Rome had suffered multiple defeats to Hannibal and was now facing numerous rebellions from Cisalpine Gaul in the north to Sicily in the south. If Philip were to invade Italy and coordinate with Hannibal, Rome might be overwhelmed.

Hannibal Barca. (Image source: WikiMedia Commons)

Philip could not be allowed to cross the Adriatic Sea, and due to Laevinus proximity, in Apulia on Italy’s Adriatic coast, the Roman praetor was ordered to stand guard. Sempronius Gracchus, one of the consuls for 215, sent Laevinus to the port city of Brundisium to protect the Sallentine coast and prepare for whatever may be necessary (Livy 23.48.3).

In 214 Laevinus was retained in command as a propraetor, and his quick thinking prevented the fall of Tarentum to Hannibal. In the third Battle of Nola, Hannibal made a show of wishing to capture Nola in Campania from Marcellus, but this was likely a strategic ploy (Lazenby, Hannibal’s War, 101-102). Hannibal had recently met with the Tarentines, inhabitants of a former Greek colony in southern Italy, who sought to side with Carthage, and soon after an indecisive battle with Marcellus, Hannibal darted south for Tarentum, leaving the consuls and proconsuls in his wake. In this way, Hannibal appears to have given the impression that his present objective was the remaining cities of Campania while really hoping to secure Tarentum, which Philip could have used to land his army in Italy. However, three days before Hannibal’s arrival at Tarentum, Livius, an officer sent to Tarentum by Laevinus, increased the garrison’s size and increased vigilance on the walls, which suggests that he or Laevinus had already learned Hannibal’s purpose (Livy 24.20.9-14).

Also in 214, Laevinus learned that Philip was taking control of the Epirote seaboard opposite Italy. On his own initiative, the propraetor led an expedition against the Macedonians, sailing to Epirus with only one legion. He retook the city of Oricum from the Macedonians with a surprise attack. Meanwhile, Philip was besieging the city of Apollonia, but Laevinus sent a picked force of 2,000 men on ships to the nearby mouth of the Aous River. Marching at a distance from the river, where they could not be detected, the Roman detachment entered Apollonia by night and took command of the inhabitants. During the night they attacked Philip’s camp, and the Macedonians were routed. Laevinus used his ships to block the mouth of the Aous and thus any flight by sea. As a result, Philip burned his ships and fled by land. Taking numerous prisoners, Laevinus became the first Roman general to defeat a Macedonian army, and with his victory at Apollonia, he dashed Philip’s plans to land an army in Italy (Livy 24.40).

For the next few years Laevinus remained in command of the Greek theatre of war. Due to the need to focus most of Rome’s manpower in Italy, Laevinus never received reinforcements, and in 213 and 212 he appears to have acted cautiously, perhaps limiting himself to raids and diplomatic efforts. According to the Roman historian Justin (29.4), he plundered Macedon as well as Philip’s allies in Illyria and Greece.

Philip V of Macedon. (Image source: WikiMedia Commons)

However, in 212 Philip seized the Adriatic Greek port of Lissos, and so in 211 Laevinus made an alliance with the Aetolian League, who agreed to war against Macedon in return for the propraetor’s help against the Acarnanians, who had broken free from Aetolian control. The treaty between Rome and the Aetolians included provisions for others to be included in the treaty, namely Pergamon, Sparta, Elea, the Illyrian king Scerdilaedas and the Thracian king Pleuratus (Livy 26.24). Laevinus forged an alliance with King Attalos of Pergamon (Jerome, Chronicle ca. 209), and these states and rulers would join the war in the following years, thereby embroiling Philip in a conflict spanning Illyria, Greece and Asia Minor from which he could not easily extricate himself.

Laevinus campaigned against the Aetolians’ enemies. He captured the island city of Zacynthos, and he took Oeniadae and Nasos from the Acarnanians (Polybius 9.39.2; Livy 26.24.15). He later reported to the Senate that he had driven Philip back to Macedon after the latter had sought to attack the Aetolians (Livy 26.28.2), but exactly what he was referring to is now unclear.

In 210, at the beginning of spring, Laevinus sailed into the Gulf of Corinth and advanced against the city of Anticyra in Locris, requesting that the Aetolians attack from the landward side. The Roman fleet attacked the seawalls with special ferocity, their ships furnished with siege engines (Polybius 9.39.2; Livy 26.26.1-3). Meanwhile, Laevinus learned that he had been elected consul in absentia alongside Marcellus. In being elected consul, he had outcompeted Fabius Maximus (Livy 26.22.12-13 notes that the elections were between Laevinus, Fabius and Marcellus). Laevinus was now to return to Rome, although the military presence in Greece would continue under his successor, the proconsul Sulpicius Galba.

Receiving the surrender of Anticyra, Laevinus returned to Rome to enter upon the consulship and take over from his consular colleague Marcellus in Sicily, who in 212 had captured Syracuse after a long siege. Initially, Laevinus received by lot the command against Hannibal. However, the fact that there were Syracusan envoys present in Rome to complain of Marcellus’ sacking of the city complicated matters, and so the consuls unofficially agreed to exchange commands (Livy 26.29; Marcellus would eventually be slain in one of Hannibal’s ambushes).

By now the state was financially in dire straits. There were rumblings among segments of the population that the war had been going on for too long and that the new consuls were too ambitious and excessively fond of war (Livy 26.26.9-11). The matter came to a head when the Senate ordered that private individuals supply slaves to serve as rowers and provide them with 30 days’ provision and pay. For many this was an unacceptable expense. From 216 onwards the state had raised an unprecedented and growing number of legions, and a correspondingly declining number of taxpaying farmers had been supplying food (the tributum) to feed the legionaries. All the while, the Carthaginians and their allies ravaged Italian farms. In making its demand for paid rowers, the Senate required that farmers hand over labourers (Livy 26.35).

Map of Rome and Carthage during the Second Punic War. (Image source: WikiMedia Commons)

As the Roman historian Livy (26.36) tells us, Laevinus defused the situation. Consulting with Marcellus, he persuaded his fellow senators to voluntarily pledge much of their own funds to the treasury. By doing so, the senatorial order encouraged others to follow their example. This did not end the financial hardship, but the gesture helped to avoid further alienating the taxpayers.

Laevinus then sailed to Syracuse to take command of the war in Sicily as well as the main Roman fleet. Marcellus had received the surrender of Syracuse, but the war in Sicily appeared to be far from over, a fact that Marcellus’ enemies in the Senate had used to deny him the right to celebrate a triumph. There was still a Carthaginian army based in the city of Agrigentum, and at least 66 other towns in Sicily were still loyal to Carthage, which had a close relationship with the island. Moreover, the Liby-Phoenician commander Muttines, with his Numidian cavalry, had been harassing Rome and her allies with impunity.

Arriving in Sicily, Laevinus first settled affairs in Syracuse, which had been brought under Roman control. He then turned his attention to Agrigentum, where his talent for diplomacy appears to have earned him rapid results. After receiving the defection of Muttines, who felt slighted by his general Hanno, Laevinus had the turncoat and his Numidians seize the seaward gate of Agrigentum. The consul had stationed a Roman force nearby, possibly concealed, and these men rapidly entered the city through the captured gate. Laevinus sent men to capture the other gates as quickly as possible. Resistance collapsed, and the Carthaginian commanders Hanno and Epicydes only barely escaped to Africa in a small ship. The consul enslaved the population and made an example of the leading citizens, scourging and beheading them. This persuaded most of the other pro-Carthaginian cities of Sicily to return their allegiance to Rome (Livy 26.40.1-13).

Numidian cavalry. (Image source: WikiMedia Commons)

Following the capture of Agrigentum, Laevinus received the voluntary surrenders of 40 towns. He captured a further 20 locations after they were betrayed by the inhabitants, and he stormed and captured six towns (Livy 26.40.14-15). The fact that so many polities had still been loyal to Carthage this late into the war shows that Syracuse was by no means the only state causing towns in Sicily to join the Carthaginian war effort. Indeed, as had been the case for centuries, many cities in Sicily were more loyal to Carthage than Syracuse, a state associated with numerous tyrants and the mass deportation of populations. All the same, Laevinus had ended the war in Sicily by the end of 210.

In late 210 Laevinus sent part of the fleet to raid Africa itself, both to harry the coast and to obtain information from prisoners. With a fleet of 50 ships, Valerius Messalla raided the area around Utica. Not only was this the first Roman raid on Africa since 217, but the Romans learned of Carthaginian preparations to send a fleet to Sicily and to reinforce Hasdrubal Barca in Spain so that he could march to Italy in support of Hannibal (Livy 27.5.1-2, 9-13).

In Rome Laevinus told the Senate what he had learned. Due to fears that Carthage would land a new army in Sicily, it was decided that Laevinus needed to return to Sicily, and thus he could not oversee the consular elections. What followed suggests that Laevinus had become arrogant with success. The consul was asked to nominate a dictator, before leaving Rome, to oversee the elections, but controversy arose when Laevinus said that he would return to Sicily and appoint his admiral Messalla as dictator, perhaps because he wished to delay being superseded by a dictator. Senators objected, noting that it was the norm that a dictator be nominated on Italian soil. It appears that Laevinus refused to change his position, and the Senate decreed that he should ask the people instead to select the person to be nominated. Angered that his prerogative had been stripped from him, Laevinus refused to put the question before the assembly and induced the city praetor to follow suit (Livy 27.5.14-17).

On senatorial orders, the tribunes of the plebs then asked the assembly, who chose Fulvius Flaccus, the conqueror of Capua, to be nominated as dictator. It is possible that Laevinus and Flaccus had disagreements, for Laevinus, at the beginning of his consulship, had allowed the Capuans to bring complaints against Flaccus before the Senate despite Flaccus’ desire to keep them shut up within their walls (Livy 26.27.10-17). This time, rather than nominate Flaccus, Laevinus left the city during the night, leaving procedure in the lurch. Ultimately, the Senate had to request that Marcellus return to the city to nominate Flaccus (Livy 27.5.17-19). It is perhaps unsurprising that, despite his many successes, the Senate does not appear to have ever granted Laevinus a triumph in honour of his victories.

Despite the heated quarrel between Laevinus and the Senate, the former was clearly too invaluable to be cast aside. Laevinus was to remain in Sicily as proconsul, and he was retained in command for the next few years. Laevinus sent brigands to Rhegium to bolster its garrison against the Bruttians, and he built up his own forces by recruiting both the Numidian deserters and the experienced soldiers who had served Syracuse and Carthage (Livy 26.40.17-18, 27.5.4-6, 8.13-17, 12.4-5). However, the Carthaginian invasion never came. Beginning in 209, Carthage’s presence in Spain unravelled thanks to the successes of Scipio. The Carthaginian authorities lost the opportunity to renew their efforts in Sicily.

Regardless, Laevinus used his Sicilian command to promote agriculture. He and his Numidians rode across the island surveying cultivated and uncultivated lands. He ensured the renewed flow of grain to Italy, sending provisions to Rome and to Fabius’ army at Tarentum (Livy 26.40.15-16, 27.5.4-6, 8.18-19). He may have even expanded the efficient taxation system that had been implemented by Hiero II of Syracuse (the lex Hieronica) to the entire island. In this way, he played no small part in improving the supply to Rome’s legions.

In 208 Laevinus led 100 ships to Africa, where they raided Cape Bon. This prompted Carthage to send 83 ships against the invaders, but they were defeated near Clupea, the Romans capturing 18 vessels (Livy 27.29.7-8). The victory appears to have again brought Laevinus into the spotlight, for he was considered for the consulship in 207 but was prevented from being elected due to the requirement that one of the consuls be a Plebeian (Livy 27.34.9).

In 207, he again raided Africa, targeting the Utica region and the vicinity of Carthage itself. On the way back to Sicily, the Romans encountered a Carthaginian fleet of 70 vessels and again defeated them, capturing 17 ships and sinking four.

Following Laevinus’ two naval victories, the Carthaginians ceased to challenge Rome for control of the sea (Livy 28.4.10-15). Moreover, Laevinus’ attacks on Africa had provoked Carthage into directing their fleets against him rather sending them abroad, and they likely demonstrated the merits of a Roman invasion of Africa.

Having held military commands for the past nine years, Laevinus’ proconsulship ended in 206. In 205, Mago Barca landed an army in northern Italy, and the praetor Servilius was tasked with entrusting the city legions to the most capable man available. Servilius chose Laevinus, who, as a non-magistrate, was granted imperium to march the legions to Arretium to prevent Mago from invading Etruria (Livy 28.46.9).

Ever the diplomat, from 205 to 204 Laevinus led the Roman embassy tasked with transporting the sacred stone of Cybele from Pergamon to Rome, a response to a prophecy contained within the Sybilline Books (Livy 29.11.3). Laevinus was well chosen, having previously dealt with King Attalos.

Later in 204 Laevinus prompted the Senate to begin reimbursing those who had donated their wealth in 210, which would be paid in three instalments (Livy 29.16.1-3). In 203, when Carthaginian envoys were sent by Scipio to the Senate to present their terms of peace, he accused the envoys of being spies and persuaded the Senate to reject the peace terms (Livy 30.23.5-8).

Scipio confronts Hannibal at the end of the Battle of Zama.

In 201, with the end of the Second Punic War, the Senate decided to ascertain the state of affairs in Greece in anticipation for a possible second war against Philip. They ordered the consul Aelius to send whomever he thought was the best man for the job, and naturally he chose Laevinus. Laevinus sailed to Greece as propraetor and gathered information, reporting back to Rome on the growing strength of Macedon (Livy 31.3, 5).

Returning to Rome in 200, Laevinus died later that year. He was honoured with four days of funeral games in the Forum (Livy 31.49.9).

Laevinus never faced Hannibal on the battlefield, but in numerous ways he helped Rome to overcome its greatest enemy. He took care of matters in Apulia after the disaster at Cannae, and he crushed the Hirpini and protected Tarentum. He defeated the Macedonians, prevented Philip from linking with Hannibal, and established Rome’s network of alliances in the eastern Mediterranean. He calmed the restless population of Rome, recovered Sicily, and restored the Sicilian grain supply to Italy. He gathered information, humbled the Carthaginian navy, and paved the way for Scipio’s invasion of Africa. A general, an admiral, an administrator, a diplomat — few other Romans could boast of such versatility in war.

Byron Waldron is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Cyprus. Here he conducts research for the project ‘Group Minds in Ancient Narrative’, which is funded by the European Research Council. Byron is the author of Dynastic Politics in the Age of Diocletian, AD 284-311 (Edinburgh University Press, 2022), and has written articles on Latin literature, Roman history and Persian history for edited volumes and journals, including the Journal of Late Antiquity and Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik. He has also written documentaries for HistoryMarche, including popular series on Aurelian and the Third Samnite War.