“The humiliation Shapur had inflicted on Rome must have conjured memories of Hannibal, and later emperors would seek to restore Roman dignity.”

By Byron Waldron

IN THE third century AD, monumental sculptures were erected across ancient Iran commemorating a storied triple-victory over the Romans. In one such sculpture, the Iranian king Shapur I, who belonged to the Sasanian dynasty, can be seen riding his horse over the body of a slain Roman emperor. Another emperor of Rome is also visible in the work. He’s shown kneeling before the Sasanian ruler, his hands raised in a gesture of supplication. In the same sculpture Shapur holds a third Roman emperor by the wrist, a prisoner in his care.

For the Sasanians, the triumphs depicted were indeed worthy of tribute; Rome had not suffered so many humiliations against a foreign enemy since the invasion of Hannibal 450 years prior. And Shapur was not shy about immortalizing the feat.

He further flaunted his achievements on a massive inscription at Naqsh-e Rostam in Persia, which he ordered to be inscribed in Middle Persian, Parthian and Greek. The use of Greek ensured that Roman diplomats and merchants would be able to read the inscription themselves.

On the inscription, Shapur describes himself as “the Mazda-worshipping god,” and “King of Kings of Iran and non-Iran,” a claim to world leadership, and of dominance over the Romans themselves. Shapur goes on to lay out his achievements against the empire to the west: one emperor slain in battle against him, another forced to sign a humiliating treaty of peace, a third becoming his captive.

But who exactly was this truly exceptional enemy of Rome?

The story begins with another ruler: Ardashir, the first Sasanian ‘King of Kings.’

In the late 230s, Ardashir reignited his ongoing war with Rome. He conquered much of Roman-controlled Upper Mesopotamia, including Nisibis and Carrhae in present day south-eastern Turkey. In 238 or 239, his forces also besieged the city of Hatra, an independent kingdom and trade metropolis located in eastern Upper Mesopotamia in present-day northern Iraq. Situated atop a precipitous ridge, and surrounded by desert and loyal tribes who regarded it as a cultic centre, the city had successfully resisted a siege by the Roman emperor Trajan, as well as two sieges by Septimius Severus. Ardashir himself had even besieged Hatra previously.

According to the ancient Codex Manichaicus Coloniensis, in 240 Ardashir prepared for a final effort against the city, and that in April he raised his son Shapur as co-regent (18.1-16). The Persian historian al-Tabari records that Shapur departed Khorasan in eastern Iran to take command of the siege (827-828).

Shapur was likely already experienced in war, and a Greek historical tradition claims that he was of enormous bodily size (Zonaras 12.19), which, if true, would have made him an inspiring warrior-prince. However, it is at Hatra that historians first catch a glimpse of Shapur’s martial talents.

Here, archaeologists have detected the most extensive siegeworks known to the Near East, including a circumvallation, a 184-hectare siege camp and a 101 hectare outer perimeter, including 25 km of walls and ditches (Hauser & Tucker 2009). Shapur sacked the city, which withered into a ghost town, and he exterminated the surrounding tribes. It was a bloody war, but it set Shapur on the path to greatness.

However, in October 241 Ardashir died, prompting a series of rebellions against the young regime. It was still yet to be proven whether the Sasanian regime was more than just a one-man show centred around its energetic founder Ardashir. A coalition of Gilans, Dailamites and Gurganians, peoples living to the south and south-east of the Caspian Sea, rebelled and received assistance from the kingdom of Chorasmia (in modern Turkmenistan), formerly vassalized by Ardashir.

According to the Chronicle of Arbela (9), Shapur defeated the coalition in battle and proceeded to subjugate the rebellious peoples, including the mountain abodes of the warlike Dailamites, later renowned as mercenary infantry. Shapur returned the empire’s north to Sasanian rule, and he may have even campaigned in Chorasmia, which shows signs of being dependent on the Sasanians from the third century onwards (Vaïnberg 1977, 97).

Unfortunately for Shapur, the Roman emperor Gordian III had simultaneously launched a major counter-offensive in Mesopotamia. His experienced praetorian prefect Timesitheus began retaking Roman cities, and in 242 Shapur rushed back to his western front.

Caught on the backfoot with an exhausted army, he was defeated by the Romans at Resaina (Waldron 2024, 223-234). The Romans reconquered their territory as far as Singara, but fortunes changed yet again when Timesitheus died of dysentery.

Pausing the campaign to reorganise his forces, Gordian gave Shapur a chance to even the playing field, something he would come to regret. In 244 the Roman emperor marched towards Ctesiphon in Lower Mesopotamia, one of the imperial residences of the Sasanian kings, but he was defeated by Shapur in a pitched battle near Misiche.

The details of Gordian’s fate are debated, but most likely he was mortally wounded after being thrown from his horse (MacDonald 1981). In celebration, Shapur renamed Misiche to Peroz-Shapur or ‘Victorious Shapur’.

Shapur then appears to have hindered the retreat of the Romans. In fact, the new emperor Philip had to negotiate with Shapur to secure the Roman army’s escape. Rome was forced to pay a massive ransom of 500,000 gold coins. But that wasn’t all. The empire also agreed to provide an annual subsidy to the Sasanians, they likely abandoned the region between Singara and the Tigris, and vowed not to assist the Arsacid (Parthian) king of Armenia against the Sasanians (Potter 1990, 221-225). However, it was not all bad for the Romans. For the time being Shapur accepted what the Romans had reconquered in Upper Mesopotamia.

Shapur likely next turned his attention to the Kushan Empire, which ruled parts of Central Asia and the Indian Subcontinent. al-Tabari (819-820) claims that Ardashir had already vassalized the Kushans of Bactria (northern Afghanistan), and the evidence from coins suggests that Shapur conquered the desert and mountain-filled lands of Arachosia and the Kabul Valley (southern Afghanistan).

Another Persian author (Catalogue of the Provincial Capitals of Eranshahr 15) reports that Shapur defeated and killed the ‘Turanian’ Pahlechak near the later site of Nishapur (eastern Iran). He centralized control over the Indo-Parthian kingdoms of eastern Iran and Pakistan, establishing his son Narseh as ‘king of Hindustan, Sakastan and Turan up to the shore of the sea.’

By the early 260s, Shapur was claiming on his triumphal inscription (Ka’ba-i Zardost 4-5) to have conquered Kushanshahr (the Kushan realm) as far as Sogdiana (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), ‘Kash’ (Kashgar? Kashmir?) and the mountains of Tashkent, and up to Peshawar in western Gandhara (central Pakistan).

Fittingly, Shapur was likely responsible for the monument at Rag-e Bibi at the northern end of the Kabul Valley, which was erected in proximity to Surkh Kotal, a Kushan dynastic shrine. The relief shows the king hunting an Indian rhinoceros, a metaphor for his successes around the Indus. It appears to celebrate the capture of a Kushan king and the Sasanian absorption of Kushans as fellow Iranians into Eranshahr (Ball 2017, 157-160).

Around 250, Shapur invaded Armenia. This was the last kingdom of the Parthian Arsacid dynasty. It had resisted a previous invasion by Ardashir. Shapur finally conquered the mountainous kingdom, which also allowed him to vassalize the Georgian kingdom of Iberia and strengthen his hold over the kingdom of Caucasian Albania (in modern Azerbaijan) and provided him with a new means of threatening Roman territory.

As it would turn out, Rome already had its hands full. In 251, the empire suffered a major defeat to a coalition of Goths under the king Cniva at the Battle of Abritus. Shapur, perhaps aware of the disaster and hoping to turn it to his advantage, accused Rome of assisting the Armenians and in 252 re-invaded Roman territory. But this time, rather than focus on the fortresses of Upper Mesopotamia, Shapur marched up the Euphrates and deep into Syria, outflanking Rome’s key Mesopotamian defences. He wiped out a large Roman army, supposedly 60,000 men strong, at the Battle of Barbalissos (Ka’ba-i Zardost 10-11).

Shapur then bypassed further strongpoints to make a surprise march on Antioch, the largest city in Rome’s eastern provinces. Assisted by the exile Mareades, he caught Antioch’s inhabitants off-guard while many were watching a theatrical production outside the city. He captured the citadel with a giant battering ram and proceeded to raid Syria and Cappadocia (in modern eastern Turkey).

Shapur sacked 37 towns and cities by the end of 253, including Hierapolis, Beroea, Apamea, Larissa, Seleucia, Alexandretta, Doliche and Germaniceia, while a second force raided the Satala region from Armenia (Ka’ba-i Zardost 11-19).

In the panic, Uranius Antoninus, a priest in Emesa, led a successful defence of his city, after which he led a brief usurpation against emperor Trebonianus Gallus. In contrast, Odaenathus, the commander of Palmyra’s military, is said to have sought Shapur’s friendship. Shapur demanded that Odaenathus prostrate himself, something the latter would not do.

For Shapur, these battles and raids were intended to damage Roman manpower, gather plunder and prisoners, sap Roman morale and build royal prestige. However, he did not intend to hold territory in Syria and Anatolia. He even deported much of the population of Antioch to his new city of Gundeshapur, which was originally founded as Weh-Andiok-Shapur, ‘Shapur’s Better Antioch’, and became one of his capitals. In terms of conquest, the main western target remained Roman possessions in Upper Mesopotamia, and after this raid Shapur captured the fortresses of Circesium, Dura Europos and Apadana in present-day Syria. Such was his dedication that he had his forces maintain a siege of Nisibis while he crushed a rebellion in Khorasan in eastern Iran (al-Tabari, 826).

Although upon his return he succeeded in capturing Nisibis, the Romans recaptured Dura Europos, and so in 256 Shapur again put the fortress to siege. As had happened at Hatra, Shapur committed himself to preparing massive siegeworks at Dura. He built three siege camps — 117 hectares, 121 hectares and 124 hectares in area — which were larger than the legionary camps developed by the Romans (Sauer et al. 2017, 250). As the archaeological evidence shows, the Persians and Romans built mines and counter-mines beneath the city walls. Shapur’s soldiers even appear to have used a poisonous gas concoction of sulphur and pitch in the underground fighting to overwhelm defenders and secure a victory (James 2011). Shapur recaptured Dura, but this time it was abandoned by both sides.

Despite Shapur’s successes, the Roman network of fortifications proved difficult to overcome in the long-term, as Roman garrisons could hide behind their walls and then combine forces with each other or with the emperor to retake lost positions. The emperor leading these efforts was Valerian, who in 253 had taken control of the empire after defeating emperor Aemilian in the Battle of Spoletium.

Valerian was an experienced military officer who had served the emperors Decius and Gallus, and he enjoyed the loyalty of the legions. He reigned for seven years, seemingly without facing any usurpers (with the possible exception of an obscure and all-but-forgotten upstart named Silbannacus), an unusual thing for third century Rome.

In 259, Shapur invaded northern Mesopotamia. He again captured Nisibis, but this time advanced as far west as Carrhae in Osroene (western Upper Mesopotamia), seizing the stronghold with the aid of the giant battering ram. He then besieged nearby Edessa. This new offensive was answered by Valerian himself.

In the spring of 260, after confronting Goths and Heruli in Anatolia, Valerian arrived in the east with his main army and encamped somewhere between Edessa and Carrhae. Shapur later wrote that Valerian had 70,000 men with him, drawn from the Rhine and Danube frontiers as well as the eastern provinces (Ka’ba-i Zardost 19-24).

Greek sources claim that Valerian’s army was stricken with a plague, with the Moorish light cavalry most affected. As a result, the emperor was reluctant to offer battle. Shapur’s numerous past victories were reason enough for caution. Indeed, Valerian had arrived with a large amount of gold, hoping to strike a deal with his opponent. Valerian sent envoys to Shapur with proposals in hand, but Shapur refused to negotiate. Worse for Valerian, Shapur realised that his opponent was not confident, and he learned of the plague. Shapur now wanted battle. Meanwhile, the people of Edessa launched a sally against the Sasanian siege lines and inflicted significant casualties. This gave Valerian new hope that he could defeat the Sasanian King of Kings in the field.

There no longer survives a detailed account of the battle that followed. Peter the Patrician reports that Shapur and his army followed the Roman army, waiting for the best moment to strike (fragment 173, ed. Banchich). He claims that Shapur tricked Valerian with deceptions (fragment 201), and Aurelius Victor (HAb 32.5) reports that Valerian was surrounded by a trick. Zonaras (12.23) implies that Shapur used superior numbers of cavalry to encircle the Roman line.

The Romans suffered a defeat like no other. Valerian himself was captured, either in the battle itself or soon afterwards. Also captured were his praetorian prefect, military officers, senators and officials. The capture of an emperor was an unprecedented disaster for Rome, only to be repeated for the Eastern Roman Empire at Manzikert in 1071.

Shapur now launched the most far-reaching raid of his career, ravaging Syria, Cilicia, Cappadocia, Pamphylia and Lycaonia (in modern central and eastern Turkey). He sacked Antioch for a second time as well as other major cities, including Seleucia, Tarsus, Tyana, Iconium, Caesarea and Sebasteia. All told, 36 towns were sacked (Ka’ba-i Zardost 26-34), although paradoxically Edessa remained in the hands of its stubborn Roman garrison.

The Roman general Ballista defeated a smaller raiding force in Cilicia, and Odaenathus of Palmyra harassed the rear of Shapur’s army near the Euphrates as it departed Roman territory, but the damage was done. Shapur deported Roman citizens en masse to populate his new cities of Gundeshapur and Bishapur. Prisoners of war were put to work there on infrastructure projects. The captured Valerian was even given charge of building a dam-bridge at Shushtar in western Iran (al-Ya’qubi, 180; al-Tabari, 826-827; Ferdowsi, Shahnamah 25). He ultimately died in captivity.

The capture of Valerian sent shockwaves across the empire. Valerian’s son Gallienus now faced a collapse in loyalty to his dynasty. Usurpations broke out in Gaul, the Balkans and the east. Having lost so many senators to defeats against Sasanians and Goths and defections to usurpers, Gallienus ceased to appoint senators to military commands. Meanwhile, Odaenathus helped to defeat the usurpation of the Macriani in Syria, but Gallienus now granted Odaenathus much autonomy, as he could not tend to the eastern provinces himself. The Roman Empire would not be reunified until 274.

In the 260s Shapur appears to have returned to the Indus and Central Asia. In the mid-260s Odaenathus succeeded in retaking Carrhae, Nisibis and other towns, doing so with relative ease. There is no reliable indication that Shapur was in Mesopotamia at the time, and when Odaenathus marched on Ctesiphon, Shapur delegated the defence of the city to a coalition of satraps, who used the riverine terrain to block Odaenathus’ advance (Historia Augusta, Gall. 10.6-8). Odaenathus would twice make attempts on Ctesiphon, but there was evidently no sign of Shapur’s presence, no doubt because he was elsewhere.

Unfortunately, Shapur’s activities in the Sasanian east are poorly documented. The evidence from coins possibly suggests that Shapur, late in his reign, campaigned in Gandhara and captured the Kushan king (Carter 1985, 233-234). By the end of the third century, the Kushan Empire would be reduced to a rump state in the Punjab. Shapur may have also campaigned in Sogdiana, for in 271/2, soon after his death, his successor Hormizd I defeated the ‘Haitalites or Sogdians’ (Tarikh Ghurar al-Siyar 499, ed. Zotenberg). Shapur emphasized his claims to Sogdiana, including Tashkent and possibly Kashgar, in his triumphal inscription on the Ka’ba-i Zardost (4-5). Considering the distances involved, it is plausible that Shapur had to dedicate long-term attention to the region and conduct multiple campaigns if he ever did make true on his imperial claims. The fact that Hormizd was able to crush the Sogdians in a short space of time strongly suggests that the Sasanians had already been fighting the Sogdians beforehand.

In November 271 Shapur died. Many Romans must have breathed a sigh of relief, especially as their emperor Aurelian was planning to reconquer the Syrian provinces from Palmyra in the following spring. The humiliation Shapur had inflicted on Rome must have conjured memories of Hannibal, and later emperors such as Carus and Galerius would seek to restore Roman dignity through successes against the Persians. But for Persia he was a hero. His triumphs over western and eastern enemies were celebrated in grand monuments at Naqsh-e Rostam, Bishapur and Rag-e Bibi. Although no future Sasanian King of Kings would match Shapur in terms of sheer success on the battlefield, he left behind for them a powerful empire that would endure for centuries.

Byron Waldron is a lecturer in Classics and Ancient History at the University of Sydney. He is the author of Dynastic Politics in the Age of Diocletian, AD 284-311 (Edinburgh University Press, 2022), and has written articles on Roman history, Persian history and Latin literature for edited volumes and journals, including the Journal of Late Antiquity and Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik. He has also written documentaries for HistoryMarche, including popular series on Aurelian and the Third Samnite War.

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Carter, M. L. 1985: A Numismatic Reconstruction of Kushano-Sasanian History, Museum Notes (American Numismatic Society) 30, 215-281.

Cribb, J. 1990: Numismatic Evidence for Kushano-Sasanian Chronology, Studia Iranica 19.2, 151-193.

De Blois, L. 2019: Image and Reality of Roman Imperial Power in the Third Century AD: The Impact of War, London.

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Edwell, P. 2021: Rome and Persia at War: Imperial Competition and Contact, 193–363 CE, Oxford & New York.

Hauser, S. R. & D. J. Tucker. 2009: The Final Onslaught: The Sasanian Siege of Hatra, ZOrA 2, 106-139.

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Waldron, B. 2024 (forthcoming): Neglected Iranian and Syriac Evidence on the Persian Campaigns of Gordian III and Galerius, in Ancient Warfare, Volume II: Introducing Current Research, eds. J. Kreiner & G. Wrightson, Newcastle upon Tyne, 223-249.