“Nimitz repeatedly sought opportunities to maximize the potential of his forces and used bold maneuvers to keep the enemy off balance.”

By Trent Hone

IN DECEMBER 1943, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz—commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Pacific Ocean Areas, the largest Allied theater of war—faced a dilemma.

He had initiated the long-anticipated Central Pacific offensive the month before, seizing Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands. That preliminary move, codenamed Operation Galvanic, had tested a series of controversial new doctrines for fast carrier operations, amphibious warfare, and mobile logistics.

Galvanic had succeeded, but the cost had been high. At Tarawa, the Japanese defenders fought tenaciously and nearly pushed the Marines back into the sea. Nimitz could not afford another Tarawa. However, he had to quickly determine where to strike next. Operation Flintlock, which would take his forces into the Marshall Islands, was scheduled for January 1944. 

The Japanese were ready. Anticipating Nimitz’s next move, they had fortified their positions in the Marshalls, especially his most likely targets, the eastern atolls of Wotje and Maleolap. The Japanese hoped to defeat Nimitz’s assault forces outright, but even if they lost, Japan could still achieve its strategic goals by convincing the American people that a long and costly war was not worth the effort. The high casualties sustained by U.S. forces at Tarawa demonstrated the strategy might work. The press had criticized Nimitz for the heavy losses, and distraught relatives wrote painful letters blaming him for the death of their sons.

Nimitz had to somehow defeat Japan’s plan to wear down U.S. resolve. The best way to do it was to move quickly, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had ordered him to do. The admiral understood that; he had promised the pugnacious Admiral Ernest J. King, a member of the JCS and the Navy’s commander in chief, that he would take the Marshalls in “one bite” back in September. Now, in December, Nimitz and his staff wrestled with how to do so. It was not clear they could. Nimitz asked King for more time. King granted a small delay but insisted that Flintlock occur in January.

Nimitz had a growing fleet, but limited assault forces and amphibious shipping. As such, he had to choose his targets carefully. While he and his staff wrestled with the problem, Nimitz’s carrier forces struck Kwajalein Atoll in the heart of the Marshall Island group.

Photographs from that raid revealed something no one had anticipated: The major islands of the atoll—Roi-Namur in the north and Kwajalein in the south—had the “two enemy air bases” and “advanced fleet anchorage” that Nimitz needed to control the Marshalls. A direct advance to Kwajalein might solve his dilemma. Nimitz consulted his lead planner, Rear Admiral Forrest Sherman, and chief of staff, Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris. They agreed it was feasible.

Nimitz acted quickly. On Dec. 14, he issued a new operation plan for Flintlock—leaving the specific objectives blank—and held a conference with his operational commanders. Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet; Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, commander of Spruance’s amphibious force; and Marine Major General Holland M. Smith, commander of Turner’s assault forces, were joined by McMorris and Sherman. Sherman presented the case for Kwajalein. Spruance, Turner, and Smith all argued against it. It would be safer, they contended, to capture Wotje and Maleolap first. Nimitz disagreed. The Marshalls had to be seized in “one bite.” The only way to do that was to capture Kwajalein. Nimitz valued opportunities to talk things through and clear the air, but this time he imposed his will and overruled their objections.

He was wise to do so. The twin assaults on Roi-Namur and Kwajalein began on Jan. 31, 1944, the last day King would allow, and quickly overwhelmed the Japanese defenders. When prisoner interrogations revealed that Nimitz’s next major objective, Eniwetok Atoll, was lightly defended, he ordered Spruance to take his unused reserves and seize it immediately, three months ahead of schedule. The assault on Eniwetok began on Feb. 17, covered by a massive carrier raid on the Japanese fleet base at Truk in the Caroline Islands. Under this series of “crushing blows,” Japanese defenses in the Marshalls collapsed, creating the opportunity to assault the Mariana Islands in June, five months earlier than anticipated. Nimitz’s bold decision had shortened the war significantly.

It was not the first time Nimitz had acted aggressively and taken a “calculated risk.” Nimitz repeatedly sought opportunities to maximize the potential of his forces and used bold maneuvers to keep the enemy off balance. The Battle of Midway was one example.

Uncertain if carrier Yorktown, damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea the month before, would be repaired in time, Nimitz was willing to engage the Japanese carrier force with just two of his own, Enterprise and Hornet. The furious effort to make Yorktown ready in time helped ensure Nimitz’s gamble paid off.

Other examples, like the decision to seize Kwajalein, are less well-known but were crucial to hastening the end of the war. They include Nimitz’s decision to leverage signals intelligence to shoot down Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s plane and kill him in April 1943. Another example is Nimitz’s choice to initially bypass the Aleutian island of Kiska and move directly to Attu in May 1943. Finally, there is his recommendation—quickly approved by the JCS—to discard a series of intermediate objectives and advance directly to the Philippines in October 1944.

Nimitz foreshadowed this approach in a tactical thesis he wrote at the Naval War College in 1923. In it, Nimitz argued that “great results cannot be accomplished without a corresponding degree of risk.” He recognized that war was inherently contingent and that fleeting opportunities had to be seized, even if one’s forces weren’t “perfectly ready.” Nimitz repeatedly demonstrated the truth of this during World War II.

He was able to do so because of his unique approach to command. Nimitz collaborated with his subordinates and forged them into a cohesive team by creating an environment of mutual respect and trust. He consulted with them to draw out their ideas and explain his own. Although he overruled Spruance, Turner, and Smith and ordered them to seize Kwajalein, he listened to their objections and valued their perspectives. That approach made it easier to surface opportunities. Once they had been identified, Nimitz pursued them relentlessly. He did so by crafting well-structured plans and orders so that subordinates could capitalize on their talents and act on their own initiative.

The decision to advance to Kwajalein would have meant little if Spruance, Turner, and Smith had not helped refine the plan and then executed it so well. Nimitz’s approach—combined with his talent for organization and management—developed into a form of strategic artistry, a flexible skill that Nimitz used to overcome Japanese strategic plans, shorten the war, and deliver victory in the Pacific.

Trent Hone is the author of Mastering the Art of Command: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific by the Naval Institute Press. Hone is an authority on the U.S. Navy of the early 20th century. His other books include Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 (Studies in Naval History and Sea Power) and Fighting in the Dark: Naval Combat at Night: 1904-1944. For more, visit www.trenthone.com.