“The attrition rate for October forced the Americans to pause operations and regroup. The 1943 bombing offensive against German industry had reached a tipping point.”

By Luke Truxal

ON OCT. 14, 1943, the United States Eighth Air Force suffered one of its most disastrous defeats of the air war. The commander of the Eighth Air Force, Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, committed over 291 Boeing B-17s to strike the German ball bearing facilities at Schweinfurt. German interceptors pounced on the formation as soon as American escort fighters turned back for England after reaching the extent of their range over Aachen. In the ensuing battle, the Americans lost 60 B-17s, with additional 17 suffering irreparable damage, and another 121 requiring repairs.^[1] There was no sugar coating it. This was a massive loss that came on the heels of several costly missions for the Eighth Air Force. The attrition rate for October forced the Americans to pause operations and regroup. The 1943 bombing offensive against German industry had reached a turning point.

Yet, as with many air battles of the period, it’s sometimes easy to miss its role in the greater war in Europe and the Mediterranean. By homing in on the raid as the culmination point of the American strategic bombing offensive’s 1943 campaign, some overlook the bigger picture: While Schweinfurt was the end of the 1943 campaign, the lessons learned from the American strategic bombing experience that year were already being applied before the mission was even flown.

Schweinfurt, although costly, marked the end of the disasters of 1943 and the beginning of the much more successful 1944 campaigns. It’s clear that Eaker was stuck in October 1943. He had to continue pursuing an offensive and fight in a way that he knew was no longer effective.

At the same time, he and others started making the necessary changes that enabled the Americans to succeed in 1944. This included the addition of long-range escort fighters for strategic bombers and a more centralized command system to coordinate operations across the European and Mediterranean theaters. From this perspective, Schweinfurt is not the herald of change but rather the end of one air war and the beginning of another.

One of the chief problems faced by American bomber crews throughout the 1943 campaign was the lack of a long-range escort fighter that could provide greater protection to targets and back. The setbacks faced by U.S. forces earlier in 1943 had convinced Eaker that he needed long-range escort fighters to better protect his bombers.

Throughout October Eaker lobbied the commander of the Army Air Forces, General Henry “Hap” Arnold, for fighters that had the capability to escort his bombers deep into Germany. On Oct. 15, just one day after the Schweinfurt raid, Eaker sent a request to Arnold for the Lockheed P-38 and the new North American P-51.

In addition to his request, Eaker informed Arnold that he was in the process of securing drop tanks for the new fighters to maximize their range and combat capabilities.^[2]

Days later on Oct. 22, Eaker also brought up these same two issues again. Eaker wrote to Arnold that from his conversations with the Royal Air Force, he was told that the British believed that they could be more aggressive with their fighters if they could continue to secure more drop tanks. At the end of this letter Eaker noted an increase in drop tank production and deliveries. By the end of October Eaker expected 1,500 drop tanks of all types and 3,000 by the end of November.^[3]

Eaker’s arduous work played a key role in acquiring and equipping the long-range fighters that the Eighth Air Force so desperately needed. Unfortunately, these changes did not bear fruit until months after the Schweinfurt raid. In fact, Eaker’s former staff officer James Parton, who later would write a biography of the general, criticized Arnold’s inability to secure more long-range escort fighters for Eaker that fall, putting the blame directly on Arnold.

“Arnold’s most important reaction was to expedite the flow of fighters to England in ways beyond those already in train-steps he could have taken earlier had he not been wedded to [the] belief in the B-17’s defensive ability,” wrote Parton. ^[4]

While his commentary as a biographer must be taken with a grain of salt due to his affinity for his former commanding officer, Parton’s view largely represents the same as Eaker’s that fall. Eaker had been working hard to secure long range fighters, but he had to convince Arnold. Once that had been accomplished it took time to move the necessary fighter units, equipment, and set up the logistical support systems to get the new fighter groups operational in time for the last big push in 1943.

Another major change that was underway at the end of 1943 was the unification of the American air forces under one command authority. These changes began before the Schweinfurt raid and continued afterwards.

In the backdrop of the buildup for Eaker’s big push in October 1943 came a series of decisions to reorganize the American air forces in Europe and the Mediterranean. Between Sept. 18 and Oct. 29, the medium bombers from the Ninth Air Force were moved to the 12th Air Force. At the same time, the heavy bombers from these two air forces transferred into the newly created 15th Air Force operating out of the Foggia air complex in Italy. The Ninth Air Force headquarters then moved to the United Kingdom, which was built into a tactical air force like the 12th operating out of Italy. With the Eighth already operating as a strategic air force out of the United Kingdom, this gave the Americans one tactical and one strategic air force for both the European and Mediterranean theaters.^[5]

More importantly, at the Dec. 4 Sextant Conference, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was named the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force.^[6] His promotion also made him the ultimate command authority for the American air forces operating in these two theaters. This gave him the ability to make further changes in late 1943 and early 1944 to the forces’ command structure, which allowed him concentrate U.S. air power against operational and strategic objectives in ways that had eluded in the Americans in the past two years.^[7]

Even though change was coming Arnold had become impatient with the lack of results from Eaker’s 1943 strategic bombing offensive. In hopes of lighting a fire under both Eaker and the commander of the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, Arnold angrily wrote them on Sept 26: “We are under constant pressure to explain why we do not use massive flights of aircraft against a target now that we have the sufficient planes and pilots in sufficient quantity to put over five hundred planes in the air. What is the answer?”^[8]

As Eaker’s direct superior, Arnold’s message carried considerable weight. Time was running out to produce results that would both please Arnold and could be accomplished before poor weather made air operations more difficult. After Arnold’s letter Eaker sprang into action and once again sent his bombers deep into Germany in a series of raids.

Eaker’s opening salvo began on Sept. 27 with an impressive raid on Emden. American bombers of the First and Second Air Divisions attacked the city with 305 B-17s. American losses were remarkably low. Only two fighters and seven bombers were lost during the course of the raid. The mission was unique in that Eaker’s efforts to secure drop tanks started to yield results. For the first time in the war, the Americans were able to use the new 75 gallon drop tanks on the short range Republic P-47 fighter. As a result, the fighters were able to escort the bombers all the way to a German target and back for the first time in the war.^[9] While the Emden raid is an outlier compared to the missions that followed over the next month, it shows the nature of the air war was changing in late 1943.

The success of the Emden raid was short-lived. Eaker needed to push his bombers deeper into Germany and beyond the range of the P-47 to achieve that decisive blow that Arnold desired.

On Oct. 8, 357 bombers of the Eighth Air Force attacked submarine facilities at Bremen and an airframe construction facility at Vegesack. German fighters pounced on the American bomber formations resulting in the loss of 30 bombers with an additional 26 suffering significant damage.^[10] Things only went from bad to worse from there.

The following day the Eighth Air Force dispatched 378 bombers against German naval targets at Gdynia and the submarine slips at Danzig. Another force also struck the Focke-Wulf assembly plant at Marienburg. The final formation of the strike force attacked the Arado aircraft factory at Anklam. While the Americans were able to successfully strike their targets throughout the course of the day, the losses incurred from German fighters took a great toll on the air force. ^[11] Another 30 bombers were lost during the raid with 29 coming from the Third Air Division, 12 of which were with the 100^th Bomb Group. This resulted in the complete destruction of the 100^th as a combat formation for the time being. It had suffered heavily from attrition since the Aug. 17 Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission.^[12]

As Eaker planned the Oct. 14 his changes were beginning to bear fruit, although casualties were still shockingly high.

One of those changes was the arrival of the 55^th Fighter Group. Equipped with the P-38, the 55^th had the range to escort the bombers of the Eighth Air Force all the way to Schweinfurt and back.

Eaker’s planned fighter escort for the Schweinfurt raid required the short-range P-47s to escort the bombers into and out of the continent of Europe. The new P-38 fighters were to fly in front of the bombers and clear a path to the target. Despite his best efforts, the new fighter group was not operational until Oct. 15, one day after the raid. ^[13]

Unfortunately, Eaker was facing pressure from Arnold; delaying operations was not an option this late in the year. Victory over the Luftwaffe still eluded Eaker and the Schweinfurt mission had to achieve results. It was a disaster. Eaker’s Eighth Air Force had reached its limits and his 1943 campaign against German industry ended in failure.

The Oct. 14 Schweinfurt raid highlights two important lessons:

First, change in warfare is not immediate. It takes time. While U.S. forces in Europe were working hard to fix the problems that had plagued the air war in 1943 those changes would not fully come into effect until 1944.

Secondly, wars must continue to be fought as changes are implemented. Eaker was under immense pressure to achieve significant results by the end of the year. The weather and Arnold’s lack of patience affected his decision making at the operational level and forced him to be more aggressive with his air force than he wanted. On Oct. 14 Eaker and the Eighth Air Force were caught between two very different air wars and a lot of young airmen paid the price.

Luke W. Truxal is the author of Uniting against the Reich: The American Air War in Europe. An adjunct professor of history Cumberland University, his research has appeared in the Air Power History Journal and Balloons to Drones.

FOOTNOTES:

^[1] Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume 5: Europe, Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago: The University Press of Chicago, 1949), 699 and 704.

^[2] Ira C. Eaker to Henry H. Arnold, 15 October 1943, Ira Eaker Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

^[3] Eaker to Arnold, 22 October, 1943, Eaker Papers, Library of Congress.

^[4] James Parton, Air Force Spoken Here: General Ira Eaker and the Command of the Air, (Bethesda: Alder and Alder Publishers, 1986), 318.

^[5] Luke Truxal, Uniting Against the Reich: The American Air War in Europe, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2023) 81-83.

^[6] Ibid, 101.

^[7] For more information on this topic see: Luke Truxal, Uniting Against the Reich: The American Air War in Europe.

^[8] Arnold to Jacob Devers and Eaker, 26 September 1943, Eaker Papers, Library of Congress.

^[9] Craven and Cate, Europe, Torch to Pointblank, 693.

^[10] Craven and Cate, Europe, Torch to Pointblank,695.

^[11] Ibid, 696-697.

^[12] Ibid, 698-699.

^[13] Ibid, 699 and 702.