“Almost 80 years after the event, the myths created around the battle continue to gain strength. Providing cover for the enduring mythology are the two key decisions of the battle.”
By Mark Stille
THE BATTLE OF Leyte Gulf, fought in the Philippine Sea from Oct. 23 to 26, 1944, has no counterpart. It remains the largest and most complex naval battle in history. Up until the present day, it is the last battle between fleets.
Two American fleets were involved. Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet was comprised of 738 ships and carried an invasion force of approximately 165,000 men in addition to the 50,000 sailors aboard the ships. The other fleet, the Third under Admiral William Halsey, was the most powerful in the world with a total of 16 aircraft carriers and six of the world’s most powerful battleships. In total, the two fleets brought 235 surface combatants and 1,500 aircraft to the battle.
Opposed to this collection of naval might was the Imperial Japanese Navy. Once the most powerful navy in the Pacific, the Imperial fleet was forced into a desperate fight with all its remaining strength. In total, the Japanese committed 69 ships and some 375 aircraft, most of which were land based.
The ensuing battle was the most complex naval battle of the entire Second World War. Instead of being a single battle as the name implies, it was actually comprised of four major engagements and several lesser actions fought over the span of three days. The characteristics of the battle continue to astound: It contained the largest air-sea battle in history; it included the last carrier and battleship clashes in history; it was the only time in history that a surface force engaged a carrier force while under air attack; and it featured the first pre-planned use of suicide attacks during the Pacific War.
It was also a battle shaped by errors on both sides. The overarching American mistake was their divided command structure. Incredibly, the two fleets in the battle did not have a direct and secure means of communicating with each other. The bifurcated command structure and a general lack of awareness of what each fleet prevented the Americans from bringing their full power to bear. While Halsey’s errors are the focus of most accounts, those committed by Kinkaid were also important and deserve additional scrutiny.
The biggest mistake of all was the fatuous Japanese plan, named Sho-Go (Victory Plan) devised by Admiral Toyoda Soemu. He admitted after the war that his plan went against accepted wisdom, but he felt he had to commit the Combined Fleet before it became irrelevant. In fact, with so little chance that his plan would achieve a strategic result and so high of a probability that the Combined Fleet would be destroyed in the process, Toyoda should not have accepted battle under the conditions prevailing in October 1944. The Imperial Navy admitted to the Imperial Army that the plan was an “all-or-nothing” operation. The planning basis for Sho-Go was complete and utter desperation – not the best ingredient for success.
Predictably, the plan resulted in an utter debacle. The Japanese neither stopped the invasion of Leyte, slowed the pace of the American advance in the Pacific, or inflicted severe losses on the U.S. fleet. Toyoda intended the battle to be decisive and to turn the tide of war in favor of the Japanese. Instead, it resulted in a decisive defeat for the Imperial Navy. Over the span of four days, the Japanese lost 28 ships comprising over 300,000 tons. The scale of such losses is unparalleled in naval history. In the sense that it resulted in the end of the Imperial Navy as an effective force, the battle was decisive. For the remainder of the war, the Americans had no real concerns about the ability of the Imperial Navy’s surface fleet to shape events. If any naval battle in the Pacific War can be defined as decisive, it was Leyte Gulf. But Toyoda achieved his aim of providing the Combined Fleet was a fitting opportunity to die fighting.
Even though Sho–Go had no prospects of success, and the battle resulted in an undisputed victory for the Americans, there is still controversy attached to it. Almost 80 years after the event, the myths created around the battle continue to gain strength. Providing cover for the enduring mythology are the two key decisions of the battle.
The first was Halsey’s decision to take his entire Third Fleet to the north to attack a Japanese decoy force. This clever diversionary aspect of Sho-Go has been treated like it provided the Japanese with victory or at least the foundation of victory. It did neither, but it did provide Vice Admiral Kurita Takeo with the opportunity to exploit the divided American command structure and enter the Philippine Sea with his powerful force of surface ships unchecked where he fell upon a group of American escort carriers known as Taffy 3.
In the resulting Battle off Samar, the Americans sustained heavy losses but denied the Japanese an immediate victory. This led directly to the second key controversy of the battle when Kurita failed to press his attack to destroy Taffy 3 and then steam into Leyte Gulf in accordance with Toyoda’s plan.
Since the most alluring aspects of the battle are bound up in its mythology, my book, Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World’s Largest Sea Battle, focuses on the myths of the battle.
The first myth surrounds the Japanese plan for the battle. Even in October 1944, the Japanese thought they could fight and win a decisive battle. In fact, the Japanese had no chance to reverse the tide of war. Sho-Go was not a serious plan for victory, but a vehicle to allow the Combined Fleet a fitting and honorable death. As framed, the variant of Sho-Go used to defend the Philippines (Sho-1) had no strategic purpose since it was literally impossible for the Combined Fleet to defeat the invasion before it was firmly established on Leyte. Even if the large force under Kurita had successfully attacked into the gulf as planned on Oct. 25, it had no chance to generate any strategic impact.
The second myth seems to be the one held most firmly. Any discussion of how American naval commanders performed at Leyte Gulf begins with Halsey. Most accounts of the battle make Halsey the scapegoat for a lost American victory or even an American defeat. This is curious since Leyte Gulf was the greatest American naval victory of the war. Halsey’s controversial decisions often overshadow that fact.
In trying to assess Halsey’s performance, two key decisions are held up for examination – his decision to go north late on Oct. 24, and his decision to bring his battleships and a carrier task force back south late in the morning of Oct. 25. These certainly were key decisions that shaped the battle but focusing solely on them leaves out the bigger issue of Halsey’s handling of the Third Fleet for the entire period of the battle. Even more damning than any shortcomings in the two decisions mentioned above is the fact that during the entire period of the battle the full power of the Third Fleet was never brought to bear at any time.
Accepted wisdom is that Halsey acted stupidly on the night of Oct. 24 when he decided to take the entire Third Fleet north to attack the Japanese carrier force acting as a decoy. The author believes Halsey acted correctly with the information he had available at the time. In fact, his decision was virtually pre-ordained. Given Halsey’s mindset, his orders, existing U.S. Navy doctrine, and the manner in which the battle developed, there was no chance of Halsey acting differently. Criticism of Halsey’s action is extremely easy with the benefit of hindsight, but this criticism is built on knowledge that Halsey could not have possessed in the moment.
This is not to say that Halsey should be forgiven for his shortcomings during the battle. Everything he did was magnified since he commanded the most powerful naval force in the world during history’s largest naval battle. Even if he is excused for taking the bait so cleverly presented by the Japanese, his other actions before and after this decision were poor. As is detailed in this account, Halsey failed to bring his full power against either of the two main Japanese forces in the battle. This denied him the battle of annihilation he so earnestly desired.
The hardest myth to displace is the notion that Kurita’s force should have utterly annihilated Taffy 3 at the Battle off Samar. In the accepted version of the battle, the underdog American force prevailed against overwhelming odds. Unparalleled American bravery provided the edge while the Japanese blundered their way to defeat.
There is no doubt that the bravery of American sailors played a prominent role in the battle, but the battle was not just a David and Goliath contest with American destroyers attacking Japanese battleships. The battle was unlike anything else ever fought in naval history. A force of heavy ships surprised and attacked a carrier force during daylight and fought a prolonged surface battle while under persistent air attack.
The Battle off Samar was not just a surface battle, it was an air-sea battle of immense proportions. In addition to the brave and much-heralded attacks by the escorting destroyers, the Americans brought over 200 aircraft into play. The primary American weapon was aircraft, not the heroic escorting destroyers and destroyer escorts. The fact that a large force of aircraft defeated a surface force should be no surprise. That was the established norm from the very first day of the Pacific War.
The next myth is one that is hardly even examined. It is generally assumed that Kurita acted stupidly by not pressing into the gulf when he had the chance. By declining to do so, he threw away victory. On the contrary, Kurita did not act stupidly. He carefully considered his options and acted out of conscience by deciding not to throw away the lives of his men. He realized the utter futility of Sho-1. Because it offered no prospect of success, Kurita was totally justified to decline its suicidal design. As is detailed in this account, Kurita correctly discerned there was no possible gain to follow his orders to a dramatic but futile finish. Even Imperial Navy officers had a limit to their willingness to sacrifice thousands of men for no purpose.
The last myth is directly tied to Kurita’s refusal to commit his force on a suicidal path. As prevailing wisdom goes, had he only pressed his attack, Kurita would have found nothing in his way (in fact, entirely false) and once inside the gulf, there were targets of such importance that their destruction would have changed the course of the American campaign to retake the Philippines or even of the war itself. Few myths are easier to refute.
Kurita would have faced a force larger than his own, supported hundreds of aircraft, even before he could have entered the gulf. If by chance he had successfully forced his way into the gulf to attack the shipping present, there was relatively little of value to attack (with the exception of the three command ships and the cruiser that General Douglas MacArthur was embarked on). The invasion force was long gone, but there were 28 Liberty ships and 23 landing ship tanks (LSTs) remaining. Even in the extremely unlikely event that all had been sunk, their loss would have made no difference to the Philippines campaign or the pace of the American advance in the final months of the war. A nation that could build over 2,700 Liberty ships and over 1,000 LSTs would shrug off such losses.
Mark Stille is the author of Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World’s Largest Sea Battle. The book takes a fresh look at the battle and seeks to overturn decades of faulty analysis based on incorrect assumptions. A retired U.S. Navy Commander who recently concluded a nearly 40-year career in the intelligence community, Stille is the author of over 60 books, most focusing on naval aspects of the Pacific War.
