“Multiple miscalculations cost the Kaiser’s army a chance for a potentially decisive blow against France. The offensive instead drained Germany of irreplaceable troops and resources.”

By Michael G. Stroud

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN was the result of preparations, planning, and execution by Chief of the German General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn (1861- 1922). Falkenhayn knew that the French had effectively stripped the various fortresses around Verdun of heavy artillery and thousands of troops and, believing that the area was ripe for a German breakthrough while the Austrians protected his rear against the Russians, amassed his force accordingly.

By early February 1916, the Germans had gathered overwhelming superiority on the ground, with nine divisions against France’s two, nearly 1,400 heavy artillery pieces. In the air, they could more than 150 planes led by the effective Fokker Eindecker.

The German assault on Verdun should have been a breakthrough moment for the Imperial German army, but there were several miscalculations that the High Command did not plan for or anticipate.

First, the offensive itself was supposed to have launched on February 12, 1916; poor weather forced it to be postponed until Feb. 21. Those nine days allowed the French to reorganize and strengthen their defenses, as well as to begin to bring in reinforcements

Second, when the orders were sent down from Falkenhayn to conduct offensive operations “in the Meuse area in the direction of Verdun,” they were misinterpreted. The Crown Prince Wilhelm (1882-1951), one of two operational planners for the offensive, took the directive to mean “to capture the fortress of Verdun by precipitate methods.”[1] Yet, Falkenhayn’s plan was to seize the strategic initiative in along the Meuse, which he saw as the best location on the Western Front for a German army breakthrough. One seized, railways, more than a dozen of them, would feed men and resources into what would be referred to as the Verdun salient in the Allied line. As French forces massed troops to retake the lost ground, German guns would pound them relentlessly inflicting murderous casualties.  

Falkenhayn’s plan, as outlined in his Christmas Memorandum of December 1915 (the veracity of which some historians would later question), was supposedly one of strangulation for the French who would be forced to fight to the last man. “Should they do this, then France would bleed to death.”[2]

The Crown Prince had serious doubts about Falkenhayn’s bloodletting plan, named Operation Gericht. According to his journal entries, he favored a breakthrough that would secure a conclusive victory.

Taking the broad stroke of Falkenhayn’s plan to heart yet missing its intent, the Crown Prince would set his Fifth Army to the task of directly taking the multiple fortresses that constituted Verdun.

“We have to take Verdun,” he said in an address to his commanders. “It must be over by the end of February, and then the Kaiser will hold a grand review on the Place d’Armes of Verdun and peace will be signed.”[3]

This disconnect between Falkenhayn and the Crown Prince would cost Germany dearly as the offensive continued.

The plan also suffered from a lack of strategic coordination between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Falkenhayn, already facing difficulties in his working relationship with Austrian general Conrad von Hötzendorff, failed to properly communicate and coordinate with his counterpart in the east to keep the pressure up on Russia, enabling German troops to be redeployed for the offensive against France.

Unaware of the Germany strategy in the west in 1916, Austria-Hungary planned instead to focus its efforts in Montenegro and Italy, leaving Russia comparatively unharried. This would prove devastating for the Central Powers. Russia’s General Alexei Alekseech Brusilov would take full advantage of the opportunity to launch a devastating offensive through present-day western Ukraine. It would prove to be Russia’s most successful, albeit costly, campaign of the war.

Launched on June 4, 1916, to relieve pressure on Italy, the Brusilov Offensive would destroy the Austrian Fourth and Seventh armies, allowing Russian troops to advance nearly 47 miles. In mere days, the Austrians would lose over a million men, with almost 400,000 becoming prisoners, while ceding over 15,000 square miles of total territory. It was a complete catastrophe for the Austro-Hungarian empire and a serious set-back for Falkenhayn’s plan of coordination.

The German strategy on the Western Front for 1916 also assumed that navy U-boats would be able to cripple the British war economy, thereby weakening France’s closest ally. Unfortunately for Falkenhayn’s plan, Germany was never able to seriously challenge the Royal Navy’s supremacy. After inflicting heavy losses on the Kaiser’s High Seas Fleet in the spring at Jutland, Britain would maintain its lordship of the seas.

Perhaps the greatest miscalculation by the Germans at Verdun was the underestimation of France’s resolve. This stalwart resistance could truly be traced to the actions of the French Second Army commander, Philippe Pétain.

Passed over for promotion to general on the eve of war, Pétain had considered retiring. Two years later, the 59-year-old career soldier was in command of the Verdun sector. His appointment came just days after the German offensive on and would go on to greatly stiffen French defenses.

Pétain acquired and massed heavy artillery (13 batteries in short order), infantry reinforcements, rolling stock, trucks, and fleets of new Nieuport 17 airplanes. Using these resources, and relying on the tenacity of the French soldier, Pétain blunted the German attack and eventually drove the Germans back. His motto at Verdun — “They shall not pass” — became a national rallying cry.

The German attack plan might have succeeded had Falkenhayn struck the Verdun sector with the full might of his assembled forces as planned and on schedule. But once Pétain arrived to stiffen the backs of the French and to greatly strengthen area defenses, Germany would become bogged down in a protracted battle of attrition that robbed it of the strategic initiative for the entire year.The Battle of Verdun would last 10 grueling months. By the time Berlin called it off in December of 1916, 337,000 German and 377,000 French troops would be dead. The losses would be far harder for Germany to replace.

Multiple miscalculations cost the Kaiser’s army a chance for a potentially decisive blow against France. The offensive instead drained Germany of irreplaceable troops and resources.

Michael G. Stroud is a U.S.-based military historian who has been published in a series of magazines, academic journals and websites in both the U.K. and the U.S. He has been an invited guest on various history-themed podcasts and maintains a strong presence on LinkedIn where he can be followed and reached at www.linkedin.com/in/michaelgstroud.

Notes

[1] Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2006), accessed November 22, 2021. http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1116170&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

[2] Alan Axelrod, The Battle of Verdun (Guilford: Lyons Press, 2016): 61.

[3] Ibid., 98.

Bibliography

Axelrod, Alan. The Battle of Verdun. Guilford: Lyons Press, 2016. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005. http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1116170&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Willmott, H. P. First World War. New York, NY: DK Publishing, 2003.