“It was possibly the harshest place on Earth to conduct a war and led to Churchill describing the Arctic convoys as ‘the worst journey in the world.’”
By John McKay
THE ARCTIC convoys were a crucial factor in Allied victory in the Second World War, yet surprisingly they’re often overlooked when considering the decisive campaigns of the conflict. There have been no films made, and very few books written, about the brave men who sailed on the convoys bound for Russia. This lack of acknowledgement and appreciation for those who fought and died in the most inhospitable of environments rankled with those who saw action. Yet the Russian convoys accounted for 20 per cent of all the equipment and supplies used by the Soviets on the Eastern Front during the war. The importance and sacrifice of the men who got them there should never be underestimated.
The convoys came about as much for political reasons as military necessity. In August 1939, the leaders of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact (often referred to as the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact” or the “Hitler-Stalin Pact”). Strengthened by the agreement, Hitler was free to invade Poland, France and the rest of central and western Europe without fear of attack in the East. Indeed, the Soviets themselves saw Germany’s war as an opportunity for their expansion and, as per a secret protocol hidden in the agreement, invaded Poland from the east 17 days after Hitler’s troops crossed the Polish border in the west. Before the campaign was over, the Red Army was in control of all lands from Wilno in the north to Lwöw in the south. The Soviets next invaded Finland in what became known as the “Winter War.” Stalin’s goal was to annex the regions of Salla and Karelia. The resulting turmoil led to an unlikely alliance between Germany and the Finns.
After the fall of France in 1940, the United Kingdom stood alone. Unable to break Britain in the late summer and autumn of that year and the subsequent Blitz, Hitler instead turned his attention to the East and drew up plans to invade his ally: the Soviet Union.
On 22 June 1941, the Führer launched Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. Ill-prepared for war, the Red Army was forced to give ground in the face of the German onslaught.
Factories vital to Soviet war production were being overrun; those not yet under German occupation were hastily deconstructed with production being moved further east, but it would take months – possibly years for manufacturing to resume. With a total Soviet collapse appearing inevitable Stalin appealed directly to the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, to provide material help to resist the German advance.
Seeing an opportunity to gain what could potentially be a powerful ally, Churchill agreed to Moscow’s appeals and ordered shipping routes to the Soviet Union open. Deep water ports at Murmansk on the Barents Sea and Archangelsk on the White Sea provided the most direct access. Goods could also reach Russia through the Persian Gulf and Iran, leading to a joint Anglo-Soviet invasion.
On Aug. 18, 1941, the first of the Arctic convoys, codenamed Operation Dervish, set sail from Liverpool. Seven merchantmen with an escort of 14 Royal Navy ships arrived in Archangelsk 13 days later. This first voyage escaped Berlin’s notice.
More convoys would soon follow, growing in size each time. Quotas of supplies agreed between the two nations were loaded at ports in the United Kingdom and the United States (which although officially neutral agreed to help both Britain and the U.S.S.R. under the terms of Lend-Lease). Merchant vessels would converge in the waters around Iceland to form up into convoy. Due to the threat posed by U-boat wolf-packs operating in the Western Approaches, in February 1942, it was decided that Loch Ewe in northern Scotland would be the mustering point for future convoys. From there, cargo ships and their escorts would sail to Hvalfjord near Reykjavik where they would then proceed on to Murmansk and Archangelsk.
Routes changed between the summer and winter months. During warmer seasons, the ships could sail further north, beyond the easy striking distance of German air bases in Norway. However, with almost 24 hours of daylight at northern latitudes in June, July and August, convoys could be easily spotted by the Luftwaffe’s long-range bombers.
In wintertime the Arctic pack ice would force convoys further south and closer to enemy air bases, albeit amid shorter daylight hours. Conditions at sea were considerably worse during colder weather.
Operating in temperatures plunging to below 30 degrees Celsius, sailors were forced onto frozen decks to remove ice from weapons and superstructures, build ups of which could make ships top-heavy and prone to capsizing. Storms appeared seemingly from nowhere, tossing vessels and making life aboard miserable. Any unfortunate soul swept overboard could expect to survive less than two minutes in the frigid water. It was possibly the harshest place on earth to conduct a war and led to Churchill describing the Arctic convoys as “the worst journey in the world.”
However, there were more dangers to the convoys than the weather and the enemy planes. German naval bases dotted the Norwegian coast from which both surface ships and U-boat wolf-packs could sail. The latter could operate year-round. The fear of attack from Germany’s submarine fleet was ever-present.
The German battleship Tirpitz, the most powerful vessel in Hitler’s Baltic Fleet, posed a constant threat. Indeed, British Admiralty fears over the nearly 43,000 ton Bismarck-class warship led to one of the worst disasters in British naval history.
In late June 1942 convoy PQ17, made up of 35 merchant ships and a large number of escorts, set sail from Loch Ewe en route to Archangelsk. Intelligence received by the Admiralty that the Tirpitz had set sail to engage with the convoy led to the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound to order the ships to scatter, with each vessel making its way independently to the Russian port. The decision, although risky, was meant to give individual ships a greater chance of successfully reaching Archangelsk. The opposite would prove to be the case.
Over the next few days, twenty-four merchant ships were sunk by the Luftwaffe and U-boats. Ironically, the intelligence about the Tirpitz was incorrect. Churchill described convoy PQ17 as “one of the most melancholy naval episodes in the whole of the war.”
The disastrous PQ17 convoy was quickly followed by another: PQ18. With the flow of supplies to Russia temporarily cut, the success of this next shipment of materiel was vital. Relations between Churchill and Stalin were strained by the debacle; if PQ18 failed, the entire Arctic convoy strategy would be in jeopardy. The convoy sailed in September 1942 and was the most heavily protected yet. The aircraft carrier HMS Avenger, complete with squadrons of Sea Hurricanes and Swordfish aircraft, would sail the whole route as part of the close cover escort to provide air cover.
Recognizing their chance to cut the Allies’ Arctic route once and for all, Berlin threw everything it had at PQ18. No convoy of the entire war would face such relentless attacks. Yet, despite the Germans sinking 12 merchant ships and an oil tanker, 27 ships reached Archangelsk. PQ18 was considered a success and the Arctic convoys were to continue.
Despite the triumph, the Arctic convoys halted temporarily in November of 1942 amid Operation Torch; Allied commanders needed the escorts for the invasion of North Africa. The following month, however, the convoys resumed.
Germany would continue to try to cut the sea route in 1943. In December, a flotilla of German warships, led by the battlecruiser Scharnhorst moved in to engage convoy JW55B. What followed became known as the Battle of the North Cape, which saw 13 British vessels, including one battleship and four cruisers, take on and destroy Scharnhorst with the loss of nearly 2,000 German sailors. With the battleship Tirpitz at this stage also being out of action, undergoing repairs, the Arctic convoys were now able to operate without fear of German battleships. The withdrawal of Luftwaffe planes from Norway in 1944 reduced much of the danger posed to Arctic convoys in the war’s final year; the threat from U-boats continued right up to the German surrender.
The final Arctic convoy, JW67, set sail on 12 May 1945, four days after the signing of the surrender of German forces in Europe to the Allies. Its escorts returned to Britain with five surrendered U-boats in tow.
In total, 78 Arctic convoys sailed to or returned from Russian ports. Over four years, they delivered over four million tons of cargo. These included tanks, aircraft, trucks, food, medicine, raw materials, ammunition, artillery pieces and other vital supplies needed by the Red Army on the Russian Front.
Approximately 1,400 merchant vessels made this hazardous journey, escorted by ships of the Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy and the U.S. Navy. Over 3,000 Allied servicemen lost their lives on the convoys with 85 merchant ships being sunk and 16 Royal Navy ships also succumbing to enemy attacks.
I have had the privilege of knowing a number of men who sailed on these convoys and despite the lack of acknowledgement for their endeavours, which was an issue for them for many, many years, they remained humble and proud to have been a part of them. It was only in 2014 that the British government finally recognized convoy veterans with the Arctic Star. This occurred shortly after the Russian government had agreed to give them their own Ushakov medal for the heroics they performed during the Second World War.
I have written three books on the Arctic convoys. My novel, ‘Hell and High Water’, has recently won the Aspects of History Unpublished Historical Novel award. It has been published by Sharpe Books and is available on Amazon.
I was also honoured to collaborate with my late friend, Charlie Erswell, a gunner on the destroyers HMS Milne and HMS Savage, who sailed on eight Arctic convoys, in writing his wartime memoir. This was published by Pen & Sword in June 2021 and is entitled ‘Surviving the Arctic Convoys – The Wartime Memoir of Leading Seaman Charlie Erswell’.
I have also written a book on the convoy PQ18 which I am hoping to publish in 2023.
For more information on my writing please take a look at my website www.johnrmckay.com or my Aspects of History author platform.
You normally don’t think about the struggles made behind the scenes but there are so many that accured during the war. Those women and men that fought through those times in the shadows are every bit a hero. Thanks for their service.
I think the first official Soviet acknowledgement of the Artic Convoys was in the 1977 Helsinki accords. A neighbour of my mother in South Australia recieved a medal in the late ’70’s from their embassy in Canberra. Well before anything from the British.
Unfortunately a number of the facts included in this article are not correct but to be fair have been widely publicised in print and visual media and recycled across a wide number of websites.
Although 78 Convoy Identification Codes were issued only 75 supply convoys sailed: 40 to North Russia, 35 return, not 78. (PQ.9 and PQ.19 were combined and JW/RA.61A related to forced repatriation of Russian ex POWs).
The number of sailings i.e passage by individual merchant ships, was 1,503; 806 eastbound and 697 westbound excluding losses, returns and diversions.
The number of merchant ships and naval auxiliaries lost on passage to and from, or in North Russia was 103.
The number of RN warships lost was 21, not 16, i.e 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 2 frigates, 2 corvettes, 3 sloops, 4 minesweepers and 2 armed whalers. A further 3 Allied warships were also lost.
1 Carrier, 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers were seriously damaged.
The number of Allied sailors MN, RN and USN Armed Guard/UK DEMS killed or MPK was around 3,500. A number of civilian passengers were also lost.
The number of individual merchant ships involved (including Operation FB) was 527. 100 of these (excluding naval auxiliaries) were sunk, wrecked, or damaged beyond repair, giving a loss rate of just over one in five, or just under 19%. Official Government statements based on 1,503 sailings – see below, claimed ninety-four per cent of shipments arrived safely, (giving a loss rate of 6%), sadly and significantly misrepresented the true human and material cost.
Other inaccuracies include the fact that a number of luftwaffe junkers 88 squadrons were operating and attacking all the convoys up until late February of 1945. Operating from Banak and Barfufoss and other airdromes they participated in multiple attacks to be met from wildcat squadrons from carriers like Nairana. Campanula and Vindex. 835 Squadron was particularly skilled and had victories not just in driving off attacks but also in shooting down 88s. At least five of those pilots were awarded DSCs
The caption relating to a torpedo exploding in an arctic convoy taken from Wikimedia is incorrect. The official description in British and Australian Official Archives reads:
Barents Sea. 1942-09-14. A bomb from a Junkers 88 aircraft explodes at 1.30pm, close alongside Hunt class destroyer HMS Wheatland as Tribal Class destroyer HMS Eskimo speeds between convoy lanes.
The description attributed to a torpedo explosion is unfortunately incorrect. The description in British and Australian Official Archives reads:
Barents Sea. 1942-09-14. A bomb from a Junkers 88 aircraft explodes at 1.30pm, close alongside Hunt class destroyer HMS Wheatland as Tribal Class destroyer HMS Eskimo speeds between convoy lanes.
I read the artic convoys for merchant ships/crews during the worst 2 years of the war were 3 times more lethal than the Atlantic convoys, but the Mediterranean convoys were 17 times more lethal?