“Unlike Haig’s divisions, which quickly bogged down, the French enjoyed a stunning success in the opening phase of the battle.”

By Benoît Chenu

THE 1916 BATTLE of the Somme has been exhaustively dissected, debated and analyzed by scholars and historians throughout the English-speaking world. Indeed, nearly a thousand books have been written on the infamous First World War offensive. But is there anything new to be learned about the five-month campaign? 

While the offensive in British sectors has been well-studied, this is far from the case for the French portion of the line. Yet unlike General Douglas Haig’s divisions, which quickly bogged down, the French enjoyed a stunning (and often overlooked) success in the opening phase of the battle. 

Yet, these surprising advances, which might have ultimately proved decisive and perhaps even shortened the war had they been properly exploited, were squandered, contributing to the bloody battle of attrition that is remembered today. Despite this, the French contribution to the Somme Offensive is strangely and curiously seen as a footnote to the British efforts. 

French Planning

From the start the French were in global command of the allied effort on the Western Front. In 1916, it was France’s generalissimo, Joseph Joffre, who pushed for broad offensives across multiple points that year. A Franco-British operation along the Somme in July would be part of this wider strategy.

Initially, Joffre foresaw that France would play the leading role. But with the grinding on of the campaign at Verdun, launched in February, the French army was left overextended.

Joffre hoped that Britain’s reconstituted but largely inexperienced contingent, dubbed Kitchener’s Army, would instead bear the brunt of this planned offensive.

The main axis of the attack along the Somme would take place in the British sector and drive into a heavily fortified segment of the German lines. The French Sixth Army would support the British assault: one corps on the right bank of the Somme while two other corps would occupy the Flaucourt plateau on the left bank. On that bank, the German defences were less built up.

French batteries would use 240-mm trench mortars firing 45-kilogram shells to make short work of any enemy dugouts and concrete bunkers that sat within easy striking range. For British gunners, whose positions were much farther back from the front, it would not be so easy.

In spite of the strain Verdun had placed on resources and manpower, the French army was still able to bring considerable force to bear on the Somme. General Ferdinand Foch of the Group of the Armies of the North (GAN) commanded three of the best French corps of the war, in particular I Colonial Corps. The group’s combat experience, its seasoned officers and its commander, General Pierre Berdoulat, combined to make it an exceptional unit.  

French firepower was also considerable. No fewer than 555 heavy guns had been deployed along the Somme; the British had only 362 on a front that was twice as long.  

Unlike the British, who assigned the bulk of their forces to the first assault, the French only had five divisions on the front line for the opening of the offensive, keeping several in reserve. Foch also had five other divisions attached to the GAN and Joffre had planned to put an additional five at his disposal. And all this on top of three cavalry divisions were already in the area.

Last, the French ammunition stockpiles that had been built up in the rear allowed for 10 days of high-intensity combat and four days of uninterrupted fire.

Opening Moves

On 1 July at 7:30 a.m. the French XX Corps attacked north of the Somme alongside the British on a front of about five kilometres. Within less than two hours, the position was taken, virtually casualty-free.

South of the Somme, the assault was led by three divisions. The 2nd Colonial Infantry Division operated along the river. At 10:30 p.m. its regiments occupied les deux garennes as well as Hélène and Sophie trenches marking the ultimate limit of the first German position. To its right, at 10:30 a.m., 3rd Colonial Infantry Division entered Dompierre, where the Germans offered little opposition.

Finally, 61st Infantry Division, part of XXXV Corps, captured the village of Fay. At 11 a.m. The entire German first position was in French hands. From that moment, the first French patrols set off to explore the approaches to the second position.

At 3:35 p.m. Berdoulat, 36-hours ahead of schedule, launched his two divisions to attack the second position.

On the second day of the battle, 17 French field batteries that had been brought forward bombarded the German barbed wire networks to destroy them. Despite their strong resistance, the Germans were not able to withstand Berdoulat’s troops. French combined arms tactics proved terribly effective — the air force, which dominated the skies, constantly provided information to the infantrymen themselves, who were in permanent contact with the artillery.

French gunners benefiting from a ground hardened by a summer drought could move the field artillery – 75 mm guns and 58 mm mortars – forward and follow the troops in movement.

At regular intervals, the aircraft dropped ballasted messages or sent wireless communications to indicate enemy defence centres and guide fire.

Every attempt by the Germans to counter the French advance was immediately spotted from the air and suppressed by artillery.

With the enemy reeling, Berdoulat decided to continue fighting after nightfall. During the night, colonial troops managed to clear the whole of the second position. By dawn on July 3, the Germans withdrew.

Between Belloy and the Somme, over an area measuring more than 10 kilometres, the enemy had been destroyed, driven back or taken prisoners – more than 5,000 German troops were captured by I Colonial Corps.

Being free to operate on open ground behind the enemy’s trench network increased French superiority tenfold. The few reinforcements that the Germans managed to get across the Somme were immediately spotted and eliminated by the artillery even before they entered the battle.

Breakthrough

By July 3, a decisive victory appeared within reach for the Franco-British armies. The combination of French artillery, infantry and aviation offered the rare opportunity for a war of movement.

As Joffre mentioned in his report, it was now a question of: “[…] letting the English fight a battle of attrition on their current front of attack and developing our own manoeuvre toward the south.”

This scenario had been anticipated at the French GHQ in Chantilly by the chief of staff, the second in command of the French armies, General de Curières de Castelnau.

For weeks before the offensive, he had planned a manoeuvre towards the South should French forces break through the Germany lines. It seemed as if that moment was at hand. After three days of successes, the offensive power of the French was intact. Losses so far had been low. Each of engaged divisions still had its own reserve battalions – there were 12 of them – which could at any moment replace those who had been fighting for the past 72 hours. Behind these divisions were six other divisions that could take over the operations within a few hours. All these reserves would be in place long before a single constituted German division could engage.

But on 3 July at 3 p.m., when Generals Joffre and Foch met Generals Haig and Henry Rawlinson at British HQ at Beauquesne, everything changed.

To the astonishment of Haig, who had prepared a new plan to disengage from the north and support the French attack in the south, Joffre instructed the British commander to continue as ordered.   

Meanwhile, at the French GQG, Castelnau impatiently awaited word to use the Sixth Army to pursue the enemy in the bend of the Somme. As the hours passed and nothing came, his anxiety grew.

Late in the evening, he received an incomprehensible order from Joffre: Stop the attack. There was no explanation.[bc1] 

Momentum Lost

For four days, the Germans benefited from this salutary respite and reconstituted their lines of defence, while redeploying their artillery.

On July 8, Foch finally resolved to order this French attack to the South. A day later, the whole of Sixth Army finally attacked. The offensive lasted a whole week. It was a fiasco.

Thus, this large victory opportunity which had opened on 3 July at midday had just closed. The French high command did everything it could to see that it failed.

At the GHQ, Castelnau, dismayed and powerless, could only note in his report on this event: “Generalissimo Joffre was inconsistent in his command. He gave up on imposing the decisions he had proposed to make the day before. General Foch had been a prisoner of overly conceptual approaches, and had unnecessarily postponed a decision that should have been made immediately. At the head of the French Sixth Army, General Fayolle had made a very serious tactical error.”

At the highest level of French political power, the information was put under embargo. An official version would begin to filter through the press

“Our soldiers took a moment’s rest yesterday on both banks of the Somme,” the army reported. “This momentary slowing down of our offensive is imposed by the need to wait until the British line, in front of which ours forms a prominent salient, has gained ground.”

The communique implied that the British were responsible since the French had been forced to ‘wait’ for them. The British generals made perfect scapegoats for this serious and uniquely French mistake. Shamelessly, Joffre could write in his memoirs: ‘on 10 July, the mission entrusted to the French Sixth Army was fully achieved.”

Benoît Chenu is the author of 1916 – The Battle of the Five Empires. A member of France’s Académie de Versailles and of the British Commission for Military History, he is a descendant in a long line of French servicemen. Chenu is the great-grandson of General de Curières de Castelnau (GCB, GCVO), one of the most important French military leaders of the Great War.