“Alexander confronted Persia with the seasoned army his father had created.”

By Adrian Goldsworthy

ALEXANDER THE GREAT was one of the most successful military commanders in history.

In just seven years, he led his army from Macedonia to what is now Pakistan, overthrowing Persia, the superpower of the classical world, and creating his own new empire.

Most of Alexander’s adult life was spent on campaign. He conspicuously shared the rigours of marching and riding thousands of miles with his men, enduring fatigue, hunger, thirst and the extremes of climate. In battle he led from the front, fighting hand-to-hand and suffering a long catalogue of wounds.

A Macedonian king was expected to set an example of personal courage. Alexander not only took this notion to the extreme, he combined it with shrewd tactical and strategic thinking.  Unrelenting in taking the offensive, he was always bold, even reckless. Yet behind this constant aggression lay careful calculation and purpose and a rare ability to adapt to each situation. Napoleon admired Alexander, as did Hannibal and Caesar. Even today, many military commanders believe that they can learn lessons from the campaigns of the ancient Macedonian king.

Like most successful leaders, Alexander was lucky; he could have been killed or crippled by wounds early on in his campaigns. But more important than his good fortune was the army he inherited from his father, Philip II. Just as Napoleon benefitted from the mass conscription of Revolutionary France and the ideas of a generation of French military theorists, Alexander found himself in command of a fighting force unlike anything seen before. It is no exaggeration to speak of a military revolution under Philip and Alexander, and most of the reforms occurred under the father.

Philip inherited a kingdom that was weak, vulnerable and apparently on the verge of being dismembered by stronger neighbours. Yet in little over two decades, he united and expanded Macedon until it dominated southern Greece and the Balkans. In the process, he went from a dashing young hero to scarred, limping and one-eyed veteran, for he exposed himself to dangers every bit as much as Alexander would later.

At the heart of this change were sweeping reforms of the Macedonian state and army. In the past, the kingdom produced some decent cavalry, but few other soldiers of much account.  Greek warfare was still dominated by the hoplite, armoured spearman who fought in the close-knit ranks of the phalanx. This method of warfare was intimately linked with the ideal of citizenship in the Greek city-states. But Macedonian society was different. It lacked prosperous farmers willing to serve when required – men who provided their own equipment and were proficient in its use. Earlier attempts to bring hoplite tactics and equipment to Macedonia had failed.

Philip changed this. But instead of the typical 10-foot-long hoplite spear or dory, he issued each Macedonian infantryman with a much bulkier 16 to18-foot pike known as a sarissa. The weapons required two hands to wield and infantrymen who carried them needed special training to stay in formation so that serried rows of pike-heads projected in front of them. The sarissa ensured the enemy was kept at a distance and would need to struggle to get in close enough to the Macedonians to strike a blow. All the while Philip’s men could jab and wound the enemy.

A phalanx of sarissa-armed pikemen was hard to break, as long as they kept together and put steady pressure on the enemy. One experienced Roman general later described the advance of the Macedonian phalanx as the most terrifying thing he had ever seen. Over time, training and experience gave the Macedonian pikemen ever better unit drill and individual skills.

Yet the pike phalanx was just one element in Philip’s new system. The Macedonian cavalry also trained hard, enjoyed better equipment. And their numbers grew during his reign as he awarded estates in conquered territory to men obliged to serve as horsemen.

There were also the hypaspists, elite professional infantrymen equipped more like hoplites. A wide range of archers, slingers, javelinmen and other light infantry and cavalry, as well as mercenaries of all types, rounded out the Macedonian order-of-battle. Few challengers had the variety of troops included in Philip’s army; none combined them so effectively.

Beginning in 334 BC, Alexander confronted Persia with the seasoned army his father had created. It had already subdued Greece, where the opposition had strong infantry, but was weaker in other arms.

The Persians fielded excellent cavalry, but struggled to find large numbers of reliable heavy infantry and relied to a great extent on Greek mercenaries. The combined arms tactics of the Macedonians gave the invaders an advantage over both, and in due course allowed more contingents fighting in different styles to be bolted onto the basic system. Horse-archers from the nomadic peoples of the Steppes proved a very effective asset in Alexander’s campaigns in Afghanistan and India.

Equipment and tactics are only part of the story. Like Alexander, Philip spent most of his life on campaign and – apart from a few setbacks – not just fighting war after war, but winning them. The Macedonians grew accustomed to victory and also well used to working as a team.  Nearly all the men and the vast majority of officers at the start of the Persian expedition had campaigned extensively with Philip. One ancient source notes that this was an elderly and highly experienced army, and this was certainly true by modern standards. These men knew their job and knew each other. One reason Alexander could lead charges was that he trusted subordinate commanders at all levels to deal with any local crisis and exploit any opportunity.

Three major battles sufficed to defeat Persia, and a fourth decided the main campaign in India. None lasted more than a day, and for all their importance, far more time was spent in raids, skirmishes and most of all sieges of cities, towns and villages. Early on, Philip had recruited engineers, paying them well and funding their research into all aspects of siegecraft. The ability to take fortified places was one of the greatest single reasons for the Macedonians’ success, combined with a rapidity of movement, for Philip’s men marched as hard as they fought. Fighting Philip or Alexander meant confronting an enemy who struck suddenly with great and precisely aimed force and seemed able to capture any stronghold.  This was a hard combination to beat, until after Alexander’s death the Macedonian leaders turned on each other to tear apart his short-lived empire.

Adrian Goldsworthy has taught at Cardiff University, King’s College, and the University of Notre Dame in London. His new book, Philip and Alexander: Kings and Conquerors, is forthcoming from Basic Books on Oct. 13.