“Napoleon laid out a series of martial maxims from which to conduct war and warfare by, he just did not always adhere to them himself.”

By Michael G. Stroud

EYLAU HAD BEEN a wintry bloodbath.

The battle, which was fought in East Prussia over two days in February of 1807, proved to be little more than a pyrrhic victory at best for the French.

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) had been denied his most central tenet of a decisive battle to knock Russia out of what would be called the War of the Fourth Coalition and force Tsar Alexander I to the negotiating table. The French emperor would seek to remedy that after coming out of winter quarters in 1807. To do so, he would bring to bear several of his vaunted maxims of warfare.

Having opened operations in early 1807, the French were soon frustrated, first with their siege of Danzig and then the strategically inconclusive Battle of Heilsberg on June 10, 1807.[1]

Napoleon at this point in the campaign reassessed and reaffirmed Maxim V which states:

All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of art. War should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome.[2]

Bonaparte’s ultimate objective was to seek out, bring to battle, and destroy the main Russian army, which had eluded him at Eylau and Heilsberg.

Ironically Napoleon had also become transfixed with the secondary objective of Konigsberg as a large source of provisions for his army. His troops had been suffering great deprivations the further from France they campaigned and he also hoped to deny it to the elderly Prussian-born commander, General Levin August Bennigsen (1745-1826) and his retreating Russian troops.[3] Napoleon split his forces in an attempt to both locate Bennigsen and to capture Konigsberg.

Up to 60,000 troops under marshals Joachim Murat, Jean-de-Dieu Soult and Louis-Nicolas Davout were ordered to the city, while Marshal Jean Lannes’ (1769-1809) corps of no more than 26,000 found and became engaged with Bennigsen’s more than 45,000 Russians by the Alle River at Friedland (present-day Pravdinsk, Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia).[4]

Even after Lannes sent couriers to Napoleon to report his discovery of the Russian army, the emperor for a time was still fixated on the prize of Konigsberg, which was in direct denial of his Fifth Maxim.

Finally, after having sent his own observer to verify that the Russians had indeed massed against Lannes who had been bearing the full brunt of Bennigsen’s attacks, Napoleon quickly peeled off orders for units to come to the marshal’s aid while he was on his way from Eylau (approximately 15 miles away).

Once having arrived at Friedland by mid-afternoon and having assessed the situation, as well as having brought in the Imperial Guard and the rest of the First Corps by 4 p.m. that afternoon, Napoleon determined that he now had enough proportional force available to deliver a crushing blow and achieve his definitive objective.

After initially contradicting his own maxim by fixating on the secondary objective of Konigsberg and only putting minor forces out as feelers for his main objective — destruction of the Russian field army — Napoleon soon brought himself back in line. Once verifying the presence of the main enemy force, the emperor used speed of maneuver to mass a force large enough to decisively engage the enemy at Friedland.

Napoleon’s Maxim XV holds that once the battle is joined, taking the initiative, coupled with bold and daring action, can be costly but ultimately ends battles sooner, thereby preserving one’s army.  

The first consideration with a general who offers battle should be the glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting from the former that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means we obtain victory and deserve to obtain it.[5]

The maxim held true at Friedland.

Napoleon immediately assessed the enemy’s precarious positioning. They had deployed nearly their entire corps across the river Alle in their effort to destroy Lannes before French reinforcements arrived). With the Russians’ backs against the river and with French numbers swelling, Napoleonic saw the opportunity to execute his tried-and-true tactic of the hammer and anvil. Here, the leaner French left flank would engage the Russians and Lannes would continue to hold the center (the anvil), while Marshal Michele Ney (1769-1815) and his VI Corps would serve as the hammer to hit the Russian left flank.[6] Once the plan was in motion, the French center lived up to the Maxim XV by taking the initiative and seizing glory in the process.

The Russians were soon compressed to an ever-tightening area as the flank attacks and fresh French cavalry had driven their own cavalry back onto their infantry causing chaos in the ranks. In that moment General Pierre Dupont (1765-1840) of the I Corps in the French center along with artillery general Sénarmont took the initiative to move their forces forward to press the Russians.[7] It was here that Sénarmont showed personal courage and battlefield initiative by pulling together more than 30 guns and then engaging the Russians in ever decreasing distances, starting at 1,600 yards which ultimately proved devastating to the Russian infantry. By the end, Sénarmont and his massed and mobile artillery would be within “60 paces of Bennigsen’s infantry” and would have accounted for the destruction of almost 4,000 Russians.[8]

Ney at this point had reformed his divisions from the hammering they received earlier when they had emerged from Sortlach Wood and was headed right for Friedland proper. Failed Russian counterattacks including that of the Russian Imperial Guard to stem the advance only resulted in more Russian casualties from French guns while others drowned in the Alle. Ney would see his troops in control of Friedland by around 8:30 p.m., thereby bringing up the point of Napoleon’s Maxim XXIX:

When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force. Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.[9]

Interestingly, Napoleon neglected this point twice at Friedland.

Once it was evident that Lannes was engaged with a sizeable enemy force early on June 14, Napoleon should have immediately marched his main force to Friedland, as well as recalling those troops he dispatched to Konigsberg. By not adhering to his own warfighting philosophy, the French emperor subjected Lannes’ immensely outnumbered force to a severe, yet unnecessary beating. Furthermore, Napoleon’s stated main objective was to destroy Bennigsen’s field army so it would force the Tsar to sue for peace on French terms. But he became too focused on taking the fortress and its supplies at Konigsberg, which delayed his own arrival at Friedland and still denied the use of nearly 60,000 troops to the battle itself.

Napoleon also neglected Maxim XXIX when he missed the opportunity to truly finish off the Russians. After 8:30 p.m., the Russians had lost Friedland and Bennigsen tried to stave off total disaster by ordering a general retreat under cover of Russian artillery and 25 squadrons of cavalry.[10] This should have been the moment when Napoleon ordered his more numerous cavalry to charge the retreating enemy, as Maxim XXIX clearly calls for battles to be fought with your entire force and to “dispense with nothing.”[11] Interestingly this did not happen, nor did Napoleon send in the fresh Imperial Guard or unused divisions of the 1st Corps. While political considerations might have stayed his hand, not finishing off the Russian army contradicted Napoleon’s own maxim.

Bonaparte was a master of the battlefield. He had been winning battles for more than a decade and would go on to triumph over numerous adversaries, often defying long odds. He was however human and as such, could fall victim to whims, decisions and influences that often contradicted his own warfighting ethos. Bonaparte would generally focus on Maxim V to always seek the decisive battle. Both he and numerous subordinates would seize opportunities with Maxim XV, but would fall victim to inconsistency with Maxim XXIX.

In the end, Napoleon laid out a series of martial maxims from which to conduct war and warfare by, he just did not always adhere to them himself.

Michael Stroud is a military historian with a passion for travel, having visited such iconic sites as Napoleon’s Tomb, the Palace of Versailles, the Colosseum, Pompeii, Gettysburg, and a host of others. He is currently writing a book on England’s rise as a naval power during the Tudor period. Michael lives in Coldwater, Michigan with his wife Kellie. You can follow him on LinkedIn.

Notes

[1] David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1966), 561-564.

[2] The Military Maxims of Napoleon (London, UK: Greenhill Books, 1994), 57.

[3] Robert B. Bruce et al., Fighting Techniques of the Napoleonic Age 1792-1815: Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics (New York, NY: Thomas Dunne, 2008), 190.

[4] Andrew Roberts, Napoleon: A Life (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2014), 451.

[5] The Military Maxims of Napoleon (London, UK: Greenhill Books, 1994), 60.

[6] Robert B. Bruce et al., Fighting Techniques of the Napoleonic Age 1792-1815: Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics (New York, NY: Thomas Dunne, 2008), 190.

[7] David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1966), 579.

[8] Ibid.

[9] The Military Maxims of Napoleon (London, UK: Greenhill Books, 1994), 64.

[10] David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1966), 582.

[11] The Military Maxims of Napoleon (London, UK: Greenhill Books, 1994), 64.

Bibliography

Bruce, Robert B., Iain Dickie, Kevin Kiley, Michael F. Pavkovic, and Frederick C. Schneid. Fighting Techniques of the Napoleonic Age 1792-1815: Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics. New York, NY: Thomas Dunne, 2008. 

Chandler, David. The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York, NY: Macmillan Company, 1966. 

Chandler, David. The Military Maxims of Napoleon. London, UK: Greenhill Books, 1994. 

Roberts, Andrew. Napoleon: A Life. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2014.