“The French, for all their elan and sacrifice, succumbed to the unstoppable drive of a modern and vastly better organized army of which they had little understanding.”

By Ron Singerton

BY THE LATE 1860s the Prussian government and its high command had committed themselves to two strategic goals. The first was to unify a 39-state German confederation into a single central European country it would itself lead. The second was to replace France as the continent’s preeminent military and political power.

They were spectacularly successful in both endeavors and the impact of Prussian military might would eventually consign the world to a very traumatic 20th century.

The utter destruction of the French military would be brought about by a diplomatic crisis shrewdly engineered in the summer of 1870 by the wily Prussian aristocrat and statesman, Otto von Bismarck, to entice the haughty and vainglorious Louis Napoleon III into declaring war. France’s total collapse became a virtual certainty following the Battle of Sedan.

Fought along the Meuse River on Sept. 1 and 2, 1870 — just six weeks after the commencement of hostilities — the clash saw 200,000 German troops under Helmuth von Moltke smash Patrice de MacMahon’s 120,000-man army. The capitulation of French forces led to the capture and exile of Napoleon III and the inevitable collapse of the Second Empire.

But despite France’s grave defeat, Sedan was by no means the end of the war. The end of the Bonaparte dynasty was largely hailed by Parisians who vowed to defend the city against the invaders at all costs. The eventual siege of Paris, which began on Sept. 19, lasted four months. By the end, starvation had gripped the city.

Prussia’s second goal, the unification of its confederation, was accomplished with the coronation of Friedrich Wilhelm I of Hohenzollern, the first emperor of a united Germany. To make France’s humiliation complete, the ceremony took place on Jan. 18, 1871 in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles Palace outside Paris.

But how did France, a geopolitical powerhouse, fall so quickly to an alliance of duchies led by Prussia? As explained in a previous article, the French army proved to be supremely ill-prepared. But that’s only half the story. A number of factors combined to give Prussia the decisive edge.

Motivated soldiers

To ordinary Prussians, the war was seen as a moral duty. Many believed the contest was sanctioned by God. To that end, it was supported by a profound Lutheran, Teutonic and patriotic belief in the righteousness of the cause. Furthermore, there was an absolute need to humiliate France, the aggressor of Europe. And unlike in France, there would be no public vacillation or outcry if the army suffered a battlefield reversal.

Prussia also relied on universal conscription of all classes, not the detested lottery system as in the ineffectual French system of reserves. Military service was commonly seen as a basic necessity for the Fatherland.

In contrast to France’s haphazard and disorganized mobilization, every German requirement for the transportation of troops, the distribution of materiel, food, medical supplies and munitions, was minutely planned for. Within two weeks of France’s declaration of war, nearly 1.2 million equipped troops were massing by the French border.

Professional commanders

Prussia under Bismarck and Moltke organized the only general staff on the European continent. Due to their meticulous planning, troops knew exactly where to assemble and what trains they were to take to the front.

All 22,000 Prussian officers trained regularly with the troops they were to lead. And unlike France, military schools were well run and promotions were based on skill and effectiveness, not favoritism in court or the prominence of one’s family.

Tactics and weaponry

Aside from strategy and organization, the most telling factor on the battlefield was the employment of artillery. While the French relied largely on muzzle-loading artillery, the Krupp gun works provided Prussia with steel breech loaders with a rapid rate-of-fire and superior accuracy.

Although most German casualties were due to the state-of-the-art French Chassepot rifle (far superior to the German “needle gun”) the bulk of French casualties were caused by artillery. In nearly every instance, it was German artillery that determined the outcome of battle. In the siege of Paris following Sedan and the surrender of Louis Napoleon and his army, the Germans used 70 pieces of heavy artillery that lobbed modern shells into city. So large were the munitions that they had to be loaded into the weapons mechanically. These very same artillery pieces were on exhibit at the Paris Exposition years before the war as a symbol of German industry. The French dismissed them as unwieldy and therefore useless in combat. They found out differently during the siege.

Intelligence

The Prussians benefitted from an understanding of French strategic aims and were well-aware of their opponents’ miscalculations and deficiencies. Prussian spies had managed to tap into telegraph cables from Paris to the frontier. Saboteurs would later sever wires connecting French forces to sow confusion. The absence of effective communication resulted in forced marches and counter marches by exhausted troops in dismal weather. This led to pronounced pessimism in the ranks regarding their leaders as well as the waste of precious time and materiel.

France made blunders as well. The empire’s original plan was to press across the border and invade Germany. But it quickly became obvious that offensive operations were impossible thanks to a general lack of preparedness. Thus, the French were forced to fight a defensive war. The resulting need to defend the entire border left France with overstretched lines of which enemy strategists took full advantage. With moves of encirclement supported by artillery and (usually) numerical superiority, the Prussian-led forces had the advantage of determining where and when they would strike. And although Moltke and Bismarck had to deal with a few egotistical senior officers who disobeyed orders, in general, the German efforts were characterized by bold offensive actions that the French could only hope to slow or repulse.

The result

The French army fought with extreme bravery. Some units had notable success in countering Prussian advances and inflicting enormous casualties. The survivors of a regiment of French cavalry at Sedan were even saluted by German officers after their desperate but futile charge. But on the whole, the French, for all their elan’ and sacrifice, succumbed to the unstoppable drive of a modern and vastly better organized army of which they had very little understanding.

Louie Napoleon wanted to be killed on the field of battle at Sedan. He charged about ineffectually leading his entourage from one faltering position to another until he was halted by his own hussars. He was taken prisoner by the Prussians shortly after, along with his army. His capitulation and the surrender of French arms was witnessed from open ground south of the Meuse by Wilhelm, the king of Prussia, as well as Moltke and the Prussian elite.

Also in attendance was General Phillip Sheridan of the U.S. Army, a strong supporter of Prussia. The British sent Colonel Charles Walker and General Kutusow represented the Tsar. This sad and final throw of the dice was witnessed by numerous correspondents reporting for various publications. It was an assemblage in elegance worthy of a royal ball. But it was also the death throes of the Second Empire of Louis Napoleon III.

When eventually released from captivity, he abdicated and joined his wife in England where he remained with Eugenie’ until his death in 1873. Eugenie’ lived to be 94 and died on July 11, 1920. Never returning to France, they are both buried in Michael’s Abbey in Farnborough, Hampshire, England.

Their only son, Napoleon Eugene Louis Jean Joseph de Bonaparte, was taken to England during the war by Empress Eugenie’ to keep him out of danger. Once in England he was befriended by Queen Victoria who allowed him to gain military training and join the British army. He volunteered for service in South Africa. Dashing and impetuous (in fact a worry to the British politically and militarily) he was left behind in a skirmish and killed by Zulus near Ulundi in 1879. He is buried beside his father. Eugenie visited Sobuza’s Krall in South Africa to view the place in which her son was killed.

Ron Singerton is the author of The Refused from Penmore Press, a novel set in Paris during the period of the Franco-Prussian War. All of the above material is featured in the book. It’s available in ebook as well as paperback and can be found on Amazon.