“The six- month debacle would result in the abdication of Louie, the exile of he and his willful wife and the fall of the Second Empire in 1871.”

By Ron Singerton

“IF THERE IS no war my son will never be emperor!” ranted Empress Eugenie’ to her husband Louie Napoleon III, emperor of the scandal-ridden but glittering Second Empire. The conflict desired by the beautiful, audacious (but frigid) lady was to be against Prussia, a nation the French considered inept and of little consequence.

What would become known as the Franco-Prussian War (1870 to 1871) was the byproduct of an intractable rivalry between Prussia, who under Otto von Bismarck was poised to unify a confederation of German princedoms and duchies into a European super-state, and France, at the time, the continent’s greatest military power.

“I did not doubt that a Franco-German war must take place before the construction of a United Germany could be realized,” Bismarck wrote of the deteriorating relations between the two powers and set about trying to provoke hostilities with France. Napoleon III obliged in the summer of 1870 following a diplomatic row over an abortive plan to place a Prussian prince on the empty throne of Spain.

France wrongly assumed a war with its estranged neighbour to the east would be “a walk in the park,” according to one high-ranking parliamentarian. But the six-month debacle that kicked off on July 19, would result in not just tens of thousands of French dead and the humiliating capture of Paris, but the abdication of Louie, the exile of he and his willful wife and the fall of the Second Empire. In effect it amounted to the end of an age and the beginning of the rise of Germany as a united and modern nation.

But how could Europe’s supposed greatest military power suffer such a shattering defeat so quickly? It turns out several factors converged to bring about the French collapse. Consider the following.

A failure of leadership

Although Louie and his architect Georges-Eugène Haussmann turned Paris into “the City of Light,” France, unlike Prussia, had not kept pace with the Industrial Age. Her manufacturing capacity, as well as her military, was suited for the 18th century, not the 19th. Except for their wars of imperialism and neo-colonialism, the French believed that general war in an enlightened Europe was unlikely. Hence, the French parliament frequently voted down the army’s modernization as often as possible. Moreover, the legal system believed universal service unconstitutional. The primary purpose of the French army during the Second Empire was to maintain the status quo. It was basically a police force intended to derail the revolutionary underclass; le peril interieur. The army was a sort of Praetorian Guard meant to protect the elite and the Church.

Militarily lagging

Unlike the Prussians, the French gave little importance to military science. Despite such universities as St. Cyr and Metz, the study of rapid movement of major forces, communications, distribution of materiel and preparedness were in woeful neglect. Although the French rifle, the Chassepot was far superior to the Prussian “needle gun” the French, arguing secrecy, never utilized their true killing machine, the Mitrailleuse, a greatly improved Gatling gun. In addition there was horrific illiteracy amongst junior officers, something that astounded the Prussians. The ruling concept of French forces was le systeme D: on se debtouiller toujours, or “we’ll muddle through.” The qualifications for attaining higher rank were personality and popularity at court as well as dash and the essential e’lan: the basic concept of French military mentality.

Logistics were a mess

While the Germans had six major railroad lines heading toward the French frontier, the French had only two leading to its eastern border making it nearly impossible to bring up needed supplies when war did break out. Furthermore, French troops were saddled with 70 pounds of equipment. When discarded by the roadside by exhausted infantrymen during the hot summer, these supplies were never recovered leading to shortages. A lack of food (much of it jammed up roads and unloaded wagons in the rear) resulted in pillage angering the civilian population.

Reserve forces were unprepared

A French reserve force, le Garde Mobile, was on paper 500,000 thousand men. Hampered by disorganization and ineptitude, very few made it to the front. Many of those who did were despondent, defiant and ill-disciplined. French professional soldiers despised the poorly trained reserves, mostly men of the lower class who were chosen by ballot, the mauvais numero. To make matters worse (or comical) parliament required that training be limited to only a few weeks per year and men must be able to return home each night. And any man who could afford it could pay for a substitute.

Mobilization was chaotic

Only a few days before declaring war Empress Eugenie insisted that her husband lead the armies. This required a total last-minute reorganization of all forces into eight corps causing confusion. Not only did Louie not want war, but he quietly suspected that French forces were no match for Prussia. Worse, France went to war without allies. Austria and Italy were, according to treaties, supposed to come to the aid of France. Neither obliged. By August 6, the 23rd day of mobilization only half of the reserve of the regular army had reached their regiments and many had no uniforms or equipment because depots were strung out across the country, not where the majority of men were assembled. This meant chaos for mobilization since supply of essential materiel and arms had to be redeployed. There was no real plan for an offensive nor was there any understanding of the strength of the Prussian army or their capabilities. Louie Napoleon was a horribly inept leader, suffering gallstones, incapable of issuing orders with a death wish at Sedan. France lost all but one battle.

Upon taking command of the army Louis addressed the troops. “. . .All France follows you with its fervent prayers, and the eyes of the world are upon you. On our success hangs the fate of liberty and civilization.”

Within only a few month’s time the ecstatic French hope of success turned to despair and none yet knew the horrors to come. And for France, what was it over?  Succession to the Spanish throne. But that is for another story. The next article concerns Prussia and its preparation for a war they anxiously awaited.

Ron Singerton is the author of The Refused from Penmore Press, a novel set in Paris during the period of the Franco-Prussian War. All of the above material is featured in the book. It’s available in ebook as well as paperback and can be found on Amazon.