“The surrender of the outpost and its defenders was the final humiliation for Washington and his New York campaign.”
By Michael G. Stroud
THE ENTIRE effort to hold what is now Manhattan Island from the British had been an utter failure.
British Lieutenant-General William Howe (1729-1814) with his 6,000 redcoats, 7,000 newly arrived Hessians under the command General Wilhelm von Knyphausen (1716-1800) and up to 150 ships sailed into Long Island Sound and disembarked their force east of the American positions on the island.[1]
In relatively short order, the British forces had dislodged the Americans from New York City in September of 1776 and nearly trapped General George Washington (1732-1799) and the bulk of the colonial forces at Harlem Heights in October of the same year.
Realizing the urgency to abandon New York or risk being surrounded and annihilated thus effectively ending the push for freedom, Washington pulled the bulk of his troops out and across the river to White Plains. It was here on Oct. 28 that he was dealt another defeat when the tenacious Hessians took Chatterton Hill, forcing the rebels to withdraw even further.[2] General Howe and his forces owned all of Manhattan Island, save for Fort Washington and its force of 1,000, that Washington determined at the time, was vital in maintaining communication links with New Jersey across the river.
Having pulled back the bulk of the Continental Army with him, General Washington, deferred to his second in command, Major General Nathanael Greene (1742-1786) as to if they should keep the garrison at Fort Washington or to pull them out. Greene had made his case and convinced Washington to further reinforce the fort to “tie up British troops that might otherwise join in an attack on New Jersey (and ultimately Philadelphia) and lead possibly to another slaughter of the enemy as at Bunker Hill.”[3]
Not long after Oct. 31, after pulling regiments from Maryland, Virginia, Connecticut and Pennsylvania, the force at Fort Washington under the direct command of Colonel Robert Magaw (1738-1790) would swell to almost 2,800 which was “far too many to crowd in and hold the small fort, yet far too little to man the two-and-half mile” between Harlem Heights and Kingsbridge.”[4] The additional troops and continued Continental investiture of the fort in early November astonished Howe as he had fully expected them to have withdrawn. Nevertheless, the British general could not allow an American presence on the island.
Fort Washington in theory was a well-positioned fortification, having been authorized for construction in June of 1776 to control and seal off the Hudson River to British ships. The fort was constructed of earthworks in a pentagonal shape with five bastions but lacking in everything else including its own secure water source. Having been built 300 feet above the river “atop a tall, craggy, steep, granite mound” affording it a commanding view for its gunners, it became evident early on that its value was questionable when during its construction, two British ships sailed right up and through the Hudson, past the fort’s gunners.[5] The incident was a harbinger of the battle yet to come. Colonel Magaw along with General Greene felt that the fort’s elevated location and the areas strong defensive lines that ran nearly five total miles, could hold out until the end of the year, buying more time for Washington and the Continentals to reconstitute.
General Howe would challenge that assumption. After an artillery bombardment that began at dawn on Nov. 16, Howe hit the American fort and its 2,800 defenders from three directions with a force of 8,000 men (although some accounts indicate he has as many as 13,000 troops). General Knyphausen with his 3,000 Hessians pressed the main attack from up steep, rocky inclines to the north in the face of accurate fire from the Virginia and Maryland defenders, as General Lord Cornwallis with 3,000 men of the 33rd Regiment attacked form the east with Lord Percy and the remaining British and Hessian troops striking from the south.[6]
By 10 a.m., the professionalism and sheer weight of Howe’s forces began to tell. After two hours of the fiercest fighting and suffering casualties as high as two-thirds of their attacking force, the Hessians managed to dislodge the Americans from their outer perimeter, who finally broke and ran back towards the protection of the fort. It was here in the hotly contested defense of Kingsbridge, when, after the death of cannoneer John Corbin that his wife Margaret famously took his spot to continue fighting. The 25-year-old camp nurse would end up being wounded and then captured. Corbin finally returned home following a prisoner exchange and in later life would become the first woman in U.S. history to be granted a military pension by Congress.
General Cornwallis and Lord Percy’s attacks pressed the defenders back into the confines of Fort Washington, though some of the patriot defenders exacted a sizeable toll for every bit of ground lost. One unit of American defenders that faced off against Percy from the south “described how 150 men with a single 18-pounder . . . held off 800 of the British.”[7]
As the battle continued, the Continentals steadily lost ground; it was too much to cover with such a small force to begin with. With their weapons fouled by the buildup of powder from constant firing, and now forced into the confined and underprepared Fort Washington, the defenders had very few options remaining. As the British ringed the fort with artillery in preparation for a siege that they and the defenders knew they could not resist, Colonel Magaw accepted his only real choice: surrender.
After five hours of fighting, Magaw and his 2,800 men marched out of Fort Washington into captivity, having suffered 149 killed. The Crown’s forces lost 458 (the largest bulk being from the Hessians) in the effort to rid Manhattan of American troops.[8] The surrender of the outpost and its defenders was the final humiliation for Washington and his New York campaign.
The entire battle was unnecessary as it was evident early on that the fort itself would not be able to serve the purpose it was supposedly built for; to control the Hudson River and deny British ships access. Additionally, once Howe used the Royal Navy to land troops at various points around the fort and the wider area, there was no tactical or strategic point to be made in maintaining a defending garrison. Washington simply did not have men or resources to counter the British on the island.
Also, in divesting the decision to maintain the fort to General Greene, Washington showed great military ineptitude, which ultimately cost him scarce men and resources. Indeed, he very nearly sunk the rebel cause. As late as the morning of the battle, the Continental commander realized his error in not abandoning the fort, as its position and defenses were untenable. Not only would the defeat cause Washington great personal grief and anguish, it led to questions from friend and foe alike over his military leadership and whether he should even remain at the head of the Continental Army.
Fortunately, his commitment to the patriot cause and his sense of perseverance would win out and carry him forward.
Michael Stroud is a military historian with a passion for travel. He’s visited Napoleon’s Tomb, Versailles, Rome, Pompeii, Gettysburg and Antietam. He currently lives in Coldwater, Michigan with his wife Kellie. You can follow him on LinkedIn.
Notes
[1] David McCullough, 1776 (Seventeen Seventy-Six) (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 229-233.
[2] John E. Ferling, Almost A Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 147.
[3] David McCullough, 1776 (Seventeen Seventy-Six) (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 236-237.
[4] Harry Schenawolf, “The Battle of Fort Washington Was the Final Devastating Chapter in George Washington’s Disastrous New York Campaign,” Revolutionary War Journal, May 17, 2020, https://www.revolutionarywarjournal.com/the-battle-of-fort-washington-was-the-final-devastating-chapter-in-george-washingtons-disastrous-new-york-campaign/.
[5] John E. Ferling, Almost A Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 151.
[6] Harry Schenawolf, “The Battle of Fort Washington Was the Final Devastating Chapter in George Washington’s Disastrous New York Campaign,” Revolutionary War Journal, May 17, 2020, https://www.revolutionarywarjournal.com/the-battle-of-fort-washington-was-the-final-devastating-chapter-in-george-washingtons-disastrous-new-york-campaign/.
[7] David McCullough, 1776 (Seventeen Seventy-Six) (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 242.
[8] John E. Ferling, Almost A Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 153.
Bibliography
Ferling, John E. Almost A Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009.
McCullough, David. 1776 (Seventeen Seventy-Six). New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2005.
Schenawolf, Harry. “The Battle of Fort Washington Was the Final Devastating Chapter in George Washington’s Disastrous New York Campaign.” Revolutionary War Journal, May 17, 2020. https://www.revolutionarywarjournal.com/the-battle-of-fort-washington-was-the-final-devastating-chapter-in-george-washingtons-disastrous-new-york-campaign/.
I would like to use this article as a reference in a graduate paper that I am writing. I use proper historiographical methods is my research.