“The two days of combat had savaged Japanese naval power to the point it would never recover.”
By Jim Stempel
ON JUNE 15, 1944 at 6:35 p.m., the American submarine USS Flying Fish operating in the Philippines Sea’s San Bernardino Strait spotted a large Japanese naval force heading east. One hour later – and farther south – the USS Seahorse raised its periscope and observed another large fleet of battleships and cruisers heading north into the Philippine Sea.
Both Flying Fish and Seahorse were part of an advanced screen of American submarines, tasked with keeping tabs on any and all Japanese naval movements.
The submarines had detected two converging elements of a massive Japanese naval force, intended to deliver the Kanti Kessen (decisive victory) the Japanese had sought, but failed, to inflict upon the U.S. Navy since the outbreak of the Pacific War, two-and-a-half years earlier.
The impetus for this Japanese naval offensive was the recent American assault on the Marianas Islands (namely the island of Saipan) which had begun on June 12 and would culminate three days later with a massive amphibious landing.
Saipan was the key, for while the territory was only 13 miles long, its airfields – along with those on neighbouring Tinian – were roughly 1,200 nautical miles from Tokyo. If the Northern Marianas fell to the Americans, the Japanese capital would be in range of U.S. bombers. The imperial high command would have to hold the islands if it hoped to stave off a complete collapse.
Since their disastrous defeat at Midway, the Japanese had been backpedaling across the Pacific, steadily losing valuable territory, troops, ships, planes, pilots, and aircrews in the process. The Americans, on the other hand, had only been growing in strength, as domestic wartime production surged. Desperate war planners in Tokyo gambled that a major, decisive blow might stop the relentless American advance across the Pacific, while buying Japan precious time.
Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, commander of the Japanese fleet, had 440 aircraft available on nine carriers. These, he believed, would be supported by land-based aircraft on nearby islands. He also had at his disposal four light cruisers, seven battleships, eight heavy cruisers, 68 destroyers, and 28 submarines. If he could throw them at the U.S. Navy near Saipan, it might change the trajectory of the war.
Despite the seeming power in Ozawa’s hands, the Americans outmatched the Japanese in the region. U.S. admiral Ray Spruance, in command of Naval Task Force 58 (TF-58) – the group supporting the capture of Saipan – had at his disposal 905 aircraft flying from 15 carriers, six of which were of the new Essex class. Large, exceptionally fast carriers, they could outperform anything the Japanese had at sea. His force also contained five battleships, 11 heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, 31 destroyers, and 24 submarines.
Spruance also enjoyed an advantage in manpower. The U.S. Navy flyers at his command were battle-hardened. They flew the newest, best-performing planes in the theatre.
Following 72 hours of naval bombardment of Saipan, on June 15 U.S. forces stormed the island. By June 18, 50,000 American soldiers and marines were in action there.
Thus, was the stage set for a major engagement at sea; Ozawa moved his forces to strike.
Alerted by submarine reports of the recent Japanese passage into the Philippine Sea, on June 18 Task Force-58 steamed west in search of the Japanese fleet.
Both sides had scouting aircraft in the air looking for the other’s carrier fleet; the Japanese located the Americans first. Ozawa, believing his carrier attack would be supported by a great number of nearby land-based aircraft, launched his carrier attack in multiple small waves rather than committing to one massive overwhelming attack. He reasoned that an extended battle would wear the Americans down over a full day of relentless combat.
Ozawa had no idea that much of the land-based airpower he was counting on had recently been decimated by recent American attacks. Thus, unknown to the Japanese commander, the Americans held a decided air power advantage at the battle’s onset.
The Japanese came-on in four distinct waves.
The first group launched from airstrips on Guam early on the morning of June 19. These were immediately identified by American radar, however, and a force of Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters was dispatched to engage them. The Hellcats – a newer fighter aircraft that was far superior to the Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zero – promptly located the first Japanese wave, and shot down 35 enemy aircraft, with the loss of only one American plane. It was a stunning kill ratio that would be repeated throughout the day.
At 9:57 a.m., another large group of Japanese aircraft was again picked-up on radar approaching the American fleet from the west. The Hellcat squadron fighting in the skies over Guam was immediately recalled, while the carriers turned into the wind, launching every fighter available to search for the enemy.
Additionally, American bombers were ordered into the air and flown out of harms-way. The U.S. commanders hoped to avoid losing them should the carriers be struck by bombs. The American fighters quickly grouped, then circled overhead in defensive layers, awaiting the enemy’s approach. They did not have long to wait.
At 10:36 a.m., the Japanese were spotted some 70 miles west of TF-58; the Hellcats instantly swooped in. After 25 minutes of furious aerial combat, 25 Japanese planes had been obliterated; just one American plane was lost. Then the Hellcats that had earlier fought over Guam arrived, gunning-down an additional 16 enemy aircraft.
Fighting raged across the skies, but 27 Japanese bombers and fighters managed to pierce the Americans’ protective screen and attacked the U.S. fleet. Several struck the destroyers Yarnall and Stockham; no damage was inflicted. One plane did manage to drop a bomb on the main deck of the battleship South Dakota, killing 50 sailors, but the giant ship remained in the fight.
In the meantime, farther west two American submarines had stealthily intercepted Ozawa’s carrier group. First, the USS Albacore drew a bead on the closest target it could distinguish, which just happened to be the Taiho, Ozawa’s flagship and the newest and largest carrier in the Japanese fleet.
At 8:36 a.m. Albacore took aim and fired a spread of six torpedoes; only one found its mark. The warhead ruptured two aviation fuel tanks below decks. Initially the damage was thought to be minimal. That assessment would prove dangerously premature.
Then, around noon, the second American submarine, USS Cavalla, was able to maneuver into firing position, closing-in on the carrier Shokaku, a veteran of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Cavalla also launched a six-torpedo spread. Three struck home on the carrier’s starboard side. Explosions ruptured aviation fuel tanks, igniting fires that roared throughout the vessel, setting-off numerous secondary blasts. These in turn detonated bombs and ignited fuel on the carrier deck, causing the ship to burst into a raging inferno, forcing the captain to abandon ship.
Back on the Taiho, things were not going well. Gasoline vapors from the ruptured aviation fuel tanks were accumulating up on the hanger deck. A maintenance engineer turned the ventilation system up in hopes of venting the flammable build-up outside. Instead the fumes were dispersed through the entire vessel. At 2:30 p.m., a spark from a generator ignited the gases, causing a string of catastrophic explosions throughout the ship, savaging the carrier. Within minutes only, the Taiho was turned into a wild conflagration. While Admiral Ozawa was able to abandon ship, only 500 men and officers from a crew of 2,150 were able to escape the carrier alive.
Meanwhile, in the skies surrounding TF-58, at 11:07 a.m., another wave of Japanese aircraft was detected on radar. Made up of 107 fighters and bombers, the formation approached from the west. Once again, the Hellcats responded. Intercepting the enemy 60 miles from the American carriers, 70 of the 107 were promptly shot out of the sky, the speed, firepower, and maneuverability of the Hellcat’s coupled with the skill of their pilots, completely outclassing the Japanese flyers and aircraft.
Nevertheless, despite the dismal losses, Japanese efforts were far from over. At 1:00 p.m., a third wave of 47 Japanese aircraft was intercepted 50 miles out. Seven were shot down immediately, while the remaining 40 promptly turned about and headed back to their carriers.
The fourth Japanese wave was launched, but for some reason could not locate the American fleet. Breaking into two groups, one headed back for the safety of the Japanese airfields on Guam. As they circled to land, swarms of American fighters appeared. Thirty of 49 Japanese planed were downed, the remaining 19 were later shredded on the ground.
Returning to their carriers, the American flyers were naturally elated. Lieutenant Alexander Vraciu, for instance – who had shot down six Japanese Judy dive-bombers in an incredible eight minutes – upon spotting Admiral Marc Mitscher gazing down toward the USS Lexington’s flight deck, held up six fingers to signify his day’s tally.
Mitscher smiled back at the gesture, and a photo of the jubilant Vraciu was snapped, becoming one of the Pacific War’s most memorable images.
Another pilot on the Lexington, relating the ease by which the Japanese attacks had been defeated remarked: “It was just like an old-time turkey-shoot,” giving the morning’s aerial combat the name by which it would be recorded in history – “The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.”
By day’s end, the Japanese had lost a combined 350 aircraft, while the Americans had seen only 30 go down. Moreover, while some few Japanese planes had managed to penetrate American fighter cover, they had inflicted no significant damage. So far, the battle had gone decidedly in America’s favor.
Yet the U.S. Navy’s work was not over. The following day would see the task force take the fight to the Japanese fleet. At 3:12 p.m. on June 20, an American spotter plane pin-pointed the position of the Japanese carriers.
The enemy was 275 nautical miles west of TF-58 – almost beyond the limits of the American planes’ range. What’s more, the Japanese were steaming rapidly away. And even if the American pilots could find and successfully attack the Japanese carriers at that distance, daylight would be fading into night during their return leg, making any attack hazardous in the extreme.
Nevertheless, the decision was made to risk everything. Two waves were planned. The first, consisting of 240 aircraft was launched; the second wave was scrubbed when information placing the Japanese carrier force even farther away than originally thought was received.
Ninety-six Hellcats, 54 Avenger torpedo bombers and 77 Helldiver and Dauntless dive bombers made their way towards the enemy fleet. Despite the widening distance, they continued on with the mission, flying west into a setting sun.
After losing 14 planes due to engine trouble, the American formation spotted the Japanese fleet just before dusk. Brushing aside a fighter screen of 35 Zeros, most headed straight for the carriers, while a small group destroyed several oil tankers trailing the main carrier group.
The Japanese, realizing it was time to do-or-die, put-up a furious defense. Despite their frantic efforts, the carrier Hiyo went-up in a ball of flames after being struck by a combination of American bombs and torpedo’s, soon disappearing under the waves, stern first. Then, carriers Zuikaka, Jun-yo and Chiyoda suffered severe bombing damage, but did remain afloat. During the intense attack, the Americans lost 20 aircraft from a combination of fighter and antiaircraft fire before turning for home, already low on fuel.
Realizing just how desperate the situation was, Admiral Mitscher ordered the lights of the U.S. carriers turned on, and spotlights raised as guides for those pilots flying blind through the darkness. Destroyers also fired star shells to help illuminate the task force’s location. And he did all this despite the lurking threat of Japanese submarines. At 8:45 p.m. the first aircraft managed their way back to the American carriers, frighteningly low on fuel, many crashing on the flight decks or in the waters nearby.
Of the 226 aircraft in the first wave that attacked the Japanese fleet, only 115 returned safely to their carriers. Ninety ditched at sea or crashed upon landing, while 20 were lost in combat. Many, but not all, of the American flyers who had ditched were recovered over the following few days.
Regardless, the two days of combat had savaged Japanese naval power to the point it would never recover. The Americans had suffered one battleship damaged, 123 aircraft lost or destroyed, and 109 men killed.
In contrast, Japanese losses included three fleet carriers sunk, two oil tankers sunk, 550 to 645 aircraft destroyed, of which 440 were carrier-based – a loss that represented almost all of the empire’s remaining carrier-based aircraft. Six additional warships had been damaged, and 2,987 sailors, flyers, and officers lost their lives. While a handful of Japanese carriers remained in service, after the Battle of the Philippine Sea, there were no longer planes enough to fly from their decks. What’s more, Japanese factories were incapable of replacing them quickly, and carriers without planes are essentially useless.
Since the Battle of Midway in 1942, the Japanese had been fighting a defensive war. Now, with their airpower decimated and their naval reach substantially reduced, the Americans would command naval and air supremacy throughout the remainder of the conflict.
As a result, Tokyo had no choice but to rely on increasingly desperate measures – the infliction of horrific losses on the Allies by the Kamikaze might avert the looming destruction of the Japanese Empire. In the end, even suicide tactics did little more than delay the inevitable. Nurtured on the death-cult fanaticism of bushido, the high command would blindly fight on until – as one historian wrote – “Japan would lay in ruins, and two million of her sons and daughters would be dead.”
Jim Stempel is a speaker and author of nine books and numerous articles on American history, spirituality, and warfare. His newest book regarding the American Revolution – Valley Forge to Monmouth: Six Transformative Months of the American Revolution – is now available on Amazon and at virtually all online booksellers. For a full preview, pricing, and reviews, visit Amazon here or visit his website for all his books, reviews, articles, biography, and interviews.
Admiral Ozawa had based his attack on the sound plan that he would be able to hit the US carriers by using both his carriers and the Japanese land-based planes. His longer-range aircraft could take off and strike the US carriers before the American planes were in range to attack him. After bombing the Americans, his planes planned to then fly to Guam, refuel, rearm and hit the American fleet one more time before heading back to the safety of the Japanese carriers.
He did launch first, while out of the range of the American carrier aircraft, but then the rest of his plans fell apart.
I add a few tidbits to a superb history and a few thoughts. In the year 1944, the US launched more tonnage in warships than Japan had made in the prior century. Our warships, particularly carriers, had significant fire fighting/prevention systems which the Japanese ships lacked. They died due to battle damage which our ships and sailors, would have survived.
As most wars, this one should never have been fought, Japan had no chance on day one. Their leaders commited national suicide. Bravery, by both sides, is a testament to man’s courage, arrogance and abysmal stupidity. And the weapons extant today, make the WWII weapons by comparison, trivially harmless toys .
Can’t we get along?
… my simulations of the Battle of the Philippeans, Ozawa’s mistake is proven to be, squandering his air units being baited into dogfighting. Had he adopted a standoff posture, playing hit ‘n run, tit-for-tat, avoiding dogfighting, keeping his eye on the prize, protecting his land masses, atritting Spruance’s bomber aircraft, Ozawa would have fared far better, and taken far less casualties. No two ways about it, those two submarine hits on Ozawa’s carriers, Spruance got lucky. Ozawa’s submarines might have gotten lucky, just the same –