“At Bladensburg, the British did everything right and the Americans did everything wrong.”

By John Danielski

THE BATTLE OF Bladensburg, August 24, 1814, was the greatest military debacle in American history; a martial comedy-of-errors. Yet because it occurred in a misbegotten little war whose very name suggests forgettable mediocrity, mention it to the average American and you will receive a blank stare.

For the British, Bladensburg was the greatest triumph in the War of 1812, a masterpiece of military professionalism. Yet the average Briton has no recollection of it either.

The precise numbers of combatants to take part in the battle continue to be disputed. Some estimate 13,000 troops fought at Bladensburg, others peg the number at 11,000. Some chroniclers say the fighting lasted four hours, most maintain it was closer to two. What is not up for debate is that after the Americans were defeated, the British captured and burned Washington, D.C.

The British christened the fight, “the Bladensburg Races” for the speed at which the American army fled the field. The label stuck.

The British attack on Washington was more of a raid than an invasion. Benedict, Maryland, the location of the landing, was only 60 miles from the District of Columbia. The plan was simple and direct: quick in and even faster out. Hard marching and the use of runaway slaves as guides helped. And to further speed the advance, the attackers dispensed with any sort of baggage train, trusting that swiftness and surprise would triumph over superior enemy numbers.

The raid was the brainchild of Rear Admiral George Cockburn. Washington newspapers had already been portraying the 42-year-old naval commander as the devil in a blue uniform. His summer of amphibious raids up and down the Chesapeake had been as ruthless as they were effective. One editor went so far as to label him, “the most hated man in America.” Marylanders derisively pronounced his name as “Cock-burn,” instead of “Coe-burn” as it was spoken by the British.

The British admiral fielded a seasoned and professional landing force of between 3,500 and 4,500 redcoats and Royal Marines. Many of the army regulars were veterans of the Peninsular War. The expedition also included 200 Colonial Marines, men recruited from the ranks of runaway American slaves.

The raiders had no artillery, but they bring along batteries of Congreve rockets. The explosive projectiles were wildly inaccurate, but the deafening hissing noise they produced and their unpredictable trajectories terrified enemies who’d never encountered them.

The British army commander was Major General Robert Ross, a cool-headed tactician who had distinguished himself under the Duke of Wellington. Officially, Cockburn had command of the expedition while it was aboard the transports in Chesapeake Bay; Ross took over once the troops landed at Benedict, Maryland on the Patuxent River. In practice, they functioned as co-commanders because they complimented each other well – Ross was the detached professional, while Cockburn was the driving Hotspur.

The Americans defending Washington mustered a poorly trained army of between 6,000 and 9,000 men. Most were hastily assembled militia. They were seasoned by 500 regular army troops under Lieutenant Colonel William Scott and 140 dragoons under Colonel Jacint Laval.

Its most experienced members were the 120 Marines – one fifth of the entire corps at the time – and 360 sailors commanded by the redoubtable Commodore Joshua Barney. Barney began his distinguished career during the Revolutionary War as a privateer captain. Since then, he’d amassed more than $1 million in prize money. Barney’s men were experienced naval gunners and anchored a formidable battery of cannon: three 12-pound field pieces and two 18-pound naval guns brought from the Washington Navy Yard.

The commander of the motley American force was Brigadier General William Winder. An attorney rather than a military man, his considerable courtroom prowess fueled an outsize hubris that made him the worst of armchair generals, and one who was unwilling to listen to professionals. He had been commissioned several years before by President James Madison, who at the time was looking for Federalist party supporters for his unpopular war with Great Britain. Also, Winder’s brother was the governor of Maryland. Winder’s chief accomplishment before Bladensburg had been to get himself captured in action on the Niagara frontier. He was subsequently paroled by the British and returned to service.

Winder chose to make his stand on the western bank of the Anacostia River, six miles from the capital. He entirely missed the defensive possibilities of the high ground of Lowndes Hill on the opposite bank. Wrongly believing that the narrow Bladensburg Bridge was the only point at which the Anacostia could be crossed, Winder neglected a ford upstream where the water narrowed. It also never occurred to him to burn the bridge itself.

Winder erected a line of poorly constructed entrenchments at the western end of the Bladensburg Bridge anchored by a battery of six-pound cannon. However, the gun revetments had been built in anticipation of much larger 12 pounders and they actually restricted the fields of fire of the smaller pieces. They were protected by three regiments of Maryland militia and 150 riflemen. Unfortunately, Brigadier General Tobias Stansbury, Winder’s second-in-command, posted the supporting troops too far to the rear of the cannon to provide effective cover.

From his command post on Lowndes Hill, Major General Ross had a clear view of the American lines. He sent out experienced scouts who discovered that the Anacostia was indeed fordable upstream and downstream of the Bladensburg Bridge. He decided to use the stall-and-hook approach that had served him well in Spain.

Roughly 1,100 men of Colonel William Thornton’s Brigade would be the stall to fix the enemy in place by making a direct frontal attack across the bridge and on either side of it. Meanwhile, 2,000 men of Colonel Arthur Brooke’s Brigade and the part of Ross’s reserve under Colonel James Patterson would be the hook, swinging around the American left flank to pounce on their supply trains in the rear.

Winder made things easy for Ross by foolishly dispersing his forces into three lines. Each was a mile from the other, well out of supporting range. The second line was composed of a brigade of D.C. militia and occupied a low hill behind a small creek. The third line occupied a higher hill and contained Winder’s heaviest artillery manned by Barney’s sailors and supported by his Marines. An unwelcome element of confusion was added when the Secretary of State, James Monroe, appeared on the field and repositioned several units without bothering to inform Winder. His completely unauthorized intervention resulted in a great deal of pointless marching and counter-marching, which demoralized and exhausted the inexperienced militia.

Ross opened the engagement at noon by deploying skirmishers in “chain order.” The tactic involved four-man units advancing in a loose row formation. After the lead soldier fired, he’d retire to the end of the line to reload making way for each man to fire and move to the end of the line in turn. By the time every solider had shot his round, the first man had reloaded and was ready to fire again. The skirmishers took advantage of folds in the ground as they advanced taking a toll on the militia formed up on the opposite bank. Arrayed in orderly ranks, the Americans made perfect targets for British sharpshooters. It was an ironic reversal of Lexington and Concord a generation before where the colonial Minutemen fired from cover as the redcoats paraded in exposed battle lines.

With the skirmishers providing the diversion, men of the 44^th Regiment of Foot charged across the bridge but were repulsed by rifle fire. A second effort supported by men wading the Anacostia on either side of the bridge gained the far bank. Several disciplined volleys shoved the Americans back, but it was a barrage of Congreve rockets that made them flee in terror. The American six-pounders had little effect on the advancing enemy; they had been supplied with solid shot rather than anti-personnel cannister.

The destruction of the American first line uncovered the left flank of the second. The British were quick to spot the opening and exploit it. Winder issued an order for the second line to reposition itself a hundred yards back only to countermand the order minutes in later. The conflicting orders disrupted the U.S. formations enabling the British to easily roll up the enemy flank and rout the entire American line.

Meanwhile, Brooke’s Brigade on the British right advanced steadily during these attacks and made solid progress toward the American rear.

Colonel Thornton’s attack on the American third line was twice repulsed by artillery and the disciplined musketry of Barney’s sailors and Marines. Thornton realized he was facing professionals and fell back to regroup for a third attack.

Winder, leaving Barney to his own devices, galloped toward the American left flank. Alarmed at how far Brooke’s men had advanced, the general ordered the withdrawal of two regiments to higher ground in the rear. His order was again misunderstood. The entire left retreated slowly, then broke into a run.  Winder was caught up in the confusion and fled the field along with his men. President James Madison, who rode up to watch the battle himself first hand, was also swept along with the retreating army.

The rout lets Barney’s troops suddenly isolated and exposed to enfilade fire. The sight of so many redcoats advancing quickly panicked the civilians manning the ammunition wagons and the drivers rode off in their carts leaving Barney’s batteries with just two more rounds.

Realizing his hopeless position, Barney ordered most of his men to retreat. Wounded in the hip after the last cannon blast, he surrendered what was effectively the rear-guard of the American army. He was immediately given medical attention by the British. Both Ross and Cockburn spoke to him personally. Both officers were so impressed by Barney gallantry they granted him immediate parole and released him. Sadly, Barney died a year later from complications of his injuries.

At this point, Ross had a drummer beat the parley. It was an age-old European custom that took place when a city was about to fall. Under a parlay, the defenders were offered a chance to declare their soon-to-be captured settlement an “open city,” meaning that as long as civilians stayed in their homes and did not molest the occupying troops, no inhabitants would be harmed and private property would be respected. Ross had the drummer continue to beat the parley for at least an hour; no response from the Americans was forthcoming. Most of the U.S. government had fled with President Madison. The vilification of Cockburn by the local press may have been a factor. Americans refused to negotiate with a man they viewed as little better than Satan’s chief earthly agent.

With their offer of a truce ignored, Ross and Cockburn marched into the city. They faced little opposition. Despite stories that Cockburn had decided in advance to fire the capital as revenge for the American burning of York in 1813, the admiral had no such plans. The eventual razing was the result of sniper fire from a group of 100 renegade militiamen barricaded in a house near the Capitol. A musket-ball from the hold-outs killed Ross’s horse and sent the general tumbling from the saddle. It might have been the most expensive round in American history. The British considered the gunshot a violation of the laws of war and it was felt a message needed to be sent to discourage other bushwhackers. Even then though, Ross and Cockburn agreed that only government buildings should be burned, not civilian structures. It was a gesture meant to show that the British had a grievance with the American government not the people of the United States.

Ten government buildings went up in flames, including the legislature, the War Department building, the Treasury and the executive mansion, which the British derisively called “the president’s palace.” The brownstone mansion would famously be painted white in 1817 to cover the scorch marks from the blaze.

Interestingly, the Patent Office was spared, thanks to the valiant efforts of local women who informed Cockburn that their husbands’ irreplaceable models resided within and were civilian property. The admiral granted their request. Not knowing the identity of their high-ranking benefactor, one woman thanked him for being so much kinder than “that Ogre Cockburn.”

“Why madam,” smiled the admiral. “I am the Ogre Cockburn.”

The British occupation of Washington was orderly and disciplined, lasting only 24 hours.

Looting was minimal and mostly carried out by local residents, not British soldiers.

While a number of buildings were razed, the flames were doused by a huge thunderstorm in the wee hours of Aug. 25. Ironically, it was the Americans who did the most damage; blowing up the stores and ships in the Washington Navy Yard to prevent them falling into British hands. Legend has it when British soldiers reached the burned-out facility, Cockburn ordered the still-standing Marine Barracks to be spared in recognition for the Corps’ gallant conduct at Bladensburg.

Casualties at Bladensburg were light, but the psychological damage to American morale caused by the loss of the capital was considerable. That a U.S. president and his entire government had been reduced to cowering fugitives was downright humiliating.

The shame was partially offset just three weeks later by the dogged American defence of Baltimore.  The image of the Star-Spangled Banner flying proudly over Fort McHenry after a heavy night bombardment from Sept. 13 to 14 was the stuff of legend and far more palatable to American memories than skedaddling militiamen.

At Bladensburg, the British did everything right and the Americans did everything wrong. The battle showed how a small, well-trained, and well-officered professional army could defeat a much larger force composed largely of amateurs. The British unity of command and purpose displayed by Ross and Cockburn stood in stark contrast to the confusion and incompetence of Brigadier General Winder and company. Bladensburg was a disgrace to American arms, but offered emancipation to many black slaves. The British promised freedom to any runaways who reached their lines; as a result, the 10-day Chesapeake Campaign represented the greatest mass manumission in American History. The British would eventually free 2,200.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: John Danielski is the author of the Tom Pennywhistle series of novels about a Royal Marine officer in the Napoleonic Wars. Book six, Bombproofed, has just been released. Book five of the series, Bellerophon’s Champion: Pennywhistle at Trafalgar, was published by Penmore Press last year. Check out all his books on Amazon.