“Both had a bias for aggressive action as represented in their pursuits against formidable enemies despite inhospitable environments, choked supply lines, and operational gambits that threatened ruin.”

By Gregory Starace with Alexander Merrow

GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel are firmly immortalized in the annals of warfare. Historians, students, and practitioners alike endlessly study their military exploits and contributions to tactics and the operational art of war. Each balanced the requirements for supply and logistical support with the need for maneuver and combat to achieve operational success. And curiously, although living almost 2,000 years apart, these paragons of military prowess found themselves in parallel situations: operating at the very end of the supply line, they had to juggle the competing demands of facing an enemy army in the field, reducing an intervening enemy strongpoint while staving off logistical deprivation in a harsh and barren operating environment.

A comparison of Caesar at Avaricum and Rommel at Tobruk reveals common operational complexities and comparable supply lines challenges. Both Caesar and Rommel had to contend with robust enemy-held strongpoints astride their lines of supply while ensuring their own tenuous supply lines. Failure to neutralize the former risked the latter – and threatened the objectives of their respective campaigns. Success, however, promised an infusion of supply bounty that would enable a continuation of their advances against the enemy in the field. Both commanders executed similar gambits while contending with an enemy army in the field, and, interestingly, provoked in their enemies some internal command disagreements about whether they should garrison their respective intervening strongpoints. Examining each military case in turn will prove instructive.

Caesar in Gaul

Before Caesar initiated his military campaign against Vercingetorix, the supreme commander of a confederation of rebelling Gallic allies, he returned to Gaul from Italy, raised levies, and gathered his wintering legions and auxiliaries. Taking these forces, he traversed snow-covered mountain passes and entered the south of Gaul by heading north from Narbonese Gaul (southeastern France). He then followed the right bank of the River Saone to Andomatunum (modern Langres) and finally to Agedicum (modern Sens) in the territory of the Lingones. There he united with the bulk of his wintering army. A campaign in early 52 BC followed a U-shaped route in which Caesar headed south, crossed the Seine and Loire rivers, and pursued Vercingetorix’s army besieging and capturing Vellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum along the way. As Vercingetorix retreated toward his seat of power in Gergovia, he engaged in a scorched earth campaign to attrite the Romans. As Caesar followed through the now barren wastelands he encountered the enemy held oppidum (fortified town) of Avaricum (near modern-day Bourges, France).

Vercingetorix sought to destroy Avaricum, the capital of the Bituriges, along with other cities vulnerable to Caesar’s advance in order to deny the Romans refuge and sustenance during a winter campaign. The Bituriges complied with destroying their other smaller settlements, but they convinced Vercingetorix to spare Avaricum, their biggest, most defensible, and best fortified city in their territory. Avaricum benefited from naturally defensive topography in the form of a river and marsh that limited access to the town to one narrow approach.

For 25 days, Caesar besieged the robust and tenaciously defended oppidum, all the while contending with the threat of Vercingetorix’s main force, who followed Caesar and encamped in an area protected by woods and marshes just 15 miles from Avaricum. While declining to seek a decisive engagement, Vercingetorix nevertheless waged a particularly effective campaign targeting Roman foraging parties. Caesar lamented how the enemy was ever observing his foraging parties and inflicting “severe loss” to the foragers who were both dispersed and at distance from their camps.[1]

Vercingetorix’s attacks nearly brought Caesar’s legions to their knees as they slowly suffered from supply strangulation. Risking the complete collapse of his army, Caesar and his legions nevertheless stoically and deliberately advanced the siege, overcame the defenses of Avaricum and took the Bituriges capital. The captured bounty from the oppidum restored desperately needed food to a critically undersupplied army and lifted Roman morale. Ultimately, Caesar’s success at Avaricum reset the chessboard and allowed him to continue his advance against Vercingetorix.

Rommel in North Africa

Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel was in a similar predicament to Caesar. He arrived in North Africa in February 1941 with advanced elements of the Afrika Korps (DAK) and additional Italian forces. The DAK’s limited objective under Operation Sonnenblume was to buttress the crumbling Italian defense in Libya and defending the area around Tripolitania. Rommel, however, defied the orders of his nominal superior, General Rodolfo Graziani, in order to go on the attack against the British. He initiated a mobile armored offensive in Sirte and pursued the retreating British easterly along the Libyan coast hoping to ultimately conquer Egypt and the Suez Canel.[2] The offensive halted on the Sollom Front, along the Libyan-Egyptian border, primarily due to the presence of the British stronghold of Tobruk, Libya. Like Caesar at Avaricum, Tobruk sat astride the Axis line of supply and had a garrison that could sortie out to cause disruptions. Tobruk was a well-stocked and well-provisioned port, the “strongest fortress in North Africa,”[3] and was garrisoned by tenacious defenders who made use of an integrated and sophisticated defense in depth that maintained tactical standoff from the port of Tobruk.

And British forces in Tobruk did not opt to remain in a passive defense. They sallied forth with raids targeting vulnerable positions held by the Axis besiegers. British air elements based within Tobruk and Egypt also flew raids. More deliberately, the main British force in Egypt attempted several offensives to relieve Tobruk and push the Axis forces back through Libya. Rommel was stuck in the middle. Forced to repel these counter offensives and maintain a defensive line oriented on the main British forces in Egypt, he was unable to defeat the garrison at Tobruk. With an already burdened supply chain nearing collapse due to the added demands imposed by a spate of British attacks, Rommel conceded the 241-day siege early-December. By months’ end, the Afrika Korps had withdrawn back to El Agheila, Libya (about halfway between Sirte and Tobruk).

The retreat did not last long. The British strongpoint had the potential to disrupt vulnerable and limited lines of Axis communication and supply. Tobruk’s port facilities, moreover, remained an attractive target. In late-January 1942, Rommel was back on the offensive and was systematically re-capturing lost ground and punishing Britain’s Western Desert Force (WDF) along the way. Towards the end of May, Rommel initiated Operation Venezia to capture Tobruk.

Armed with lessons from the first siege, his now experienced soldiers were facing defenses that were less robust and enemy troops who were less familiar with both the environment and each other. In just five days, Tobruk and its desperately needed bounty were in Axis hands, infusing vital provisions that enabled Rommel’s further advance east. The Second Siege of Tobruk is also known as the Fall of Tobruk, testifying to Rommel’s success.

Stretched Supply Lines

The first and most obvious point of comparison is that both Caesar and Rommel embarked upon white-knuckled offensives where the operational tempo of the advance outpaced the flow of supply.

Caesar operated deep within rebelling territory during the desolate winter. Vercingetorix, who was in retreat, encouraged Caesar’s advance further away from his resources. The Gallic warlord burned villages and supplies, drove off livestock and activity harassed foraging parties with swarms of cavalry operating in the Roman rear area. Not only were Caesar’s strategic supply lines from Rome severely limited, but he was operating inside rebelling territory during the winter. His legions were mostly reliant on foraging, spoils of victory, and accepting intermittent requisitions from tepid allies, the Boii and Aedui, whose commitment to the Roman cause was in question.[4]

The largely barren North African landscape did not lend itself to forage, but the spoils of victory were greedily consumed by Rommel’s mechanized and motorized forces. Interestingly, Rommel also suffered from lacklustre allies, as occasionally supplies from the Vichy French were reluctantly given and often short of the mark.[5] Rommel’s strategic supply lines were comparably limited. Axis supply, which was largely dependent on seaborne shipments from Europe, faced disruption in the Mediterranean by Allied naval forces and air power. Insufficient port facilities in North Africa only exacerbated the situation, along with an absolute dearth of trucking assets. Roving British air patrols, always ready to attack supply columns, took an additional toll.

The two commanders had different experiences, however, with perhaps the most fundamental resource of all: water. Caesar benefited from multiple rivers in Gaul and, in fact, made no mention of water in The Gallic War. Rommel, by contrast, routinely cited the challenges of obtaining sufficient water in North Africa in The Rommel Papers. This contrast notwithstanding, both Caesar and Rommel made almost all-or-nothing bids to invest an enemy strongpoint while on a tenuous supply tether.

Facing Fire From Home

While Caesar had his detractors in Rome, Rommel was heavily criticized for his precarious supply situation. Field Marshall Erich von Manstein – who fought critical battles in the Soviet Union – insisted dismissively that Rommel “never worried about supplies.” Manstein, it should be pointed out, admitted that he “never liked that man” and was fond of recreating Rommel’s failures, using matchboxes to represent the mechanized forces.[6] Count Claus von Stauffenberg, the man who tried to kill Adolf Hitler on July 20, 1944, had similar reservations. He had been grievously wounded in North Africa on April 7, 1943 and subsequently recuperated in a field hospital in Germany. There, he complained to his brother, “We were always short of rations and often had to rely on [looted] British rations.”[7] Colonel von Stauffenberg also recalled that supply from Germany was “terrible, unreliable,” adding that the lack of potable water, was a “major issue.”

Entrenched Enemies

Both Caesar and Rommel found themselves between hostile armies in the field and enemy strongpoints. Since Caesar had been operating under supply duress, the cache of materiel within Avaricum was undoubtedly part of the objective when taking the oppidum. He certainly benefited from gaining it once the siege was concluded. Equally important, however, Caesar realized that a continued pursuit of Vercingetorix would be exceedingly difficult if a well-supplied force within a fortified sanctuary was bypassed and allowed to operate with impunity in his rear area. Consequently, Caesar halted his advance to reduce Avaricum, temporarily allowing Vercingetorix’s main force a reprieve of pursuit. The breathing room offered Vercingetorix the opportunity to influence the siege via a second front, of sorts, with which Caesar had to contend.

Rommel found himself in a similar predicament. His primary motivation for Tobruk was to secure a port closer to the Egyptian front that would enable follow up operations against the WDF (later the British Eighth Army). Capturing Tobruk shortened the supply route from 1,400 miles of desert roads (from Tripoli, Libya, to El Alamein, Egypt) to just 350 miles.[8] Tobruk was thus intended to support Rommel’s eastern movement. Like Caesar, Rommel greatly benefitted from the supply hoard reaped when Tobruk finally fell. Additionally, Rommel saw the imprudence of leaving a bypassed strong point capable of bringing force to bear in his rear area as he advanced into Egypt. Thus, reducing Tobruk forced Rommel to maintain a second front against the main body of the WDF/British Eighth Army. Unlike Vercingetorix in Gaul, General Claude Auchinleck of the British Eighth Army in North Africa did not seek to harass and attrite Rommel; he sought to break the siege via three deliberate military operations. And during the winter of 1941/1942, the British temporarily achieved a reprieve for Tobruk during the third of these, Operation Crusader.

What is interesting about both sieges is that the high command and operational commanders of the respective besieged forces differed on whether the strongpoint should be maintained or abandoned. Vercingetorix wanted to raze Avericum like the other Biturgies cities and provoke Caesar to follow him deeper into the denuded lands of central Gaul. Against his better judgment, he conceded to the leaders of Bituriges to maintain the oppidum. The British also disagreed about how to defend Tobruk. Auchinleck, like Vercingetorix, saw little point in defending the stronghold for a second time, yet Prime Minister Winston Churchill ambiguously, yet successfully, communicated that Tobruk must be maintained as a symbol of national pride. [9]

Conclusion

Both Caesar and Rommel had a bias for aggressive action as represented in their pursuits against formidable enemies despite inhospitable environments, choked supply lines, and operational gambits that threatened ruin. They recognized that temporarily shifting focus to investing a secondary force within an intervening strongpoint eased the challenges caused by attenuated supply lines in a supply challenged operating environment. In shifting focus and conducting a deliberate siege, as opposed to bypassing the strongpoint, Caesar and Rommel ensured they had the requisite supply resources, via secured supply lines and captured bounty, and also the requisite combat power, since they did not have to contain the force within the strongpoint or use it to protect at-risk supply lines. They could continue the offense against their primary opponent’s field army. Likely through a combination of leadership, tactical savvy, and well-trained, disciplined, and highly motivated troops – and a small serving of luck – both flirted with disaster, reduced the threat to their advance, and came out the better.

Caesar’s follow up pursuit against Vercingetorix was ultimately successful. Rommel, similarly, delivered a punishing blow against the British Eighth Army at the Battle of Mersa Matruh, though he ultimately outpaced the temporary supply advantage he held as he aggressively pursued fleeing British forces deeper into Egypt.

Lastly, both men both Caesar and Rommel made risky all-or-nothing bids to invest an enemy strongpoint while on a tenuous supply tether, and ultimately won their gambles, helping cement their public reputations as great commanders.

Gregory Starace is the co-author of Caesar’s Great Success: Sustaining the Roman Army on Campaign. He is a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Marines. He has a B.A. in History from George Washington University, a M.S. in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University, and a M.A. in National Security Affairs with a focus on Africa from Naval Postgraduate School. 

Alexander Merrow studied history and German at Denison University before completing a masters’ degree in history at Cambridge University and a Ph.D. in European history at Georgetown University, writing his dissertation in the field of Modern German History. He taught European History at Georgetown University, Franklin & Marshall College, and the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. He is the co-author of numerous works of military history and, under a nom de plume, the author of numerous works of fiction.

 

Sidebar

Spaghetti alla Carbonara, North Africa Style

By Agostino von Hassell

ONE MUST never forget that supply difficulties hit hardest on the individual soldier. In times of hardship, Caesar’s troops combined requisition, foraging, personal acquisition, and private trade to spice up their daily grain rations that were ground on portable mills. Soldiers in the Second World War were no different, though they found their steel helmets to be more serviceable than stone mills. A veteran from Italy’s 10th Army, which fought in North Africa, described how spaghetti alla carbonara was prepared by boiling the pasta in one helmet and mixing any available ingredients – eggs, cream, grated cheese, and pancetta (bacon) – in another. And unlike Rommel’s Italian troops in the desert sands of North Africa, in your kitchen you should have plenty of water available to prepare the pasta.

Spaghetti alla Carbonara

Serves 4

Ingredients:

• 13 oz spaghetti
• 5 oz Pancetta or bacon
• 4 egg yolks
• 4 oz Pecorino cheese (or Romano)
• salt and pepper to taste

Instructions

1. Cook the spaghetti in a large pot of salted water. Steel helmets are hard to come by
2. Cut the bacon into cubes and put it in a large pan, without oil, and brown.
3. Beat egg yolks, add ground cheese and a bit of hot water
4. Drain cooked pasta
5. Add to the pan with the browned bacon
6. Add the mixture of egg yolk and cheese 
7. Stir rapidly yet briefly
8. Salt (coarse sea salt is best)
9. Garnish with coarse ground black pepper while serving

The intersection between food and military campaign is explored in the author’s recent book, Caesar’s Great Success: Sustaining the Roman Army on Campaign (Frontline Books, 2020).

Agostino von Hassell studied history at Columbia University, graduating in 1974, and attended Columbia Journalism School, graduating in 1975. He has taught on leadership in the graduate program of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, in New York. He has written extensively on military and food history and has authored books including Military High Life: Elegant Food Histories and Recipes, Alliance of Enemies: The Untold Story of the Secret American and German Collaboration to End World War II, In Honor of America, West Point: The Bicentennial Book, Strike Force: U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations, and Warriors: The United States Marines.

Bibliography

Caesar, Gaius Julius, The Gallic War. Translated by H.J. Edwards. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917.

Plutarch, Lives, vol. VIII: Sertorius and Eumenes. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1919.

Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press 1977)

W. Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles. (New York: Ballantine Books 1984)

Ronald Lewin. The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps. (New York. 1977)

H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company 1953)

Paul K. Schreiber, “Rommel’s Desert War: The Impact of Logistics on Operational Art”. (Naval War College, Newport, RI) Paper

G.B. Malleson, “Vercingetorix”, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society , 1889, Vol. 4 (1889), pp. 1-40 http://www.jstor.com/stable/3678158 downloaded10 Jul 2020

Rickard, J (23 March 2009), “Siege of Avaricum, 52 BC” , http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/siege_avaricum.html downloaded 7/7/2020

Milan Vego, “On Operational Art” Strategos, 1(2), 2017, 15-39, UDK 32, UDK 355/359, Scientific Review1 Accepted for publication 17 Oct 2017

Foot Notes

[1] Caesar Gallic Wars Book 7, Chap 16.

[2] Schreiber, Rommel’s Desert War, 3-4.

[3] Rommel Papers, 225

[4] Caesar Gallic Wars Book 7, Chap 17.

[5] Creveld, 191

[6] Manstein sat with one of the authors at the latter’s grandmother’s house in the 1960s.

[7] Alexander Franz Clemens Maria Schenk Count von Stauffenberg told this to one of the authors after the war.

[8] Von Mellenthin Chapter 5: Sidi Rezegh, Strategic Background

[9] Panzer Battles, Editor’s Note, Part Two, 8 Tobruk to Alamein