“After the Battle of Assaye in 1803 [Wellesley] wrote that all the troops had performed admirably: ‘the sepoys astonished me.'”

By Martin R. Howard

THE BRITISH ARMY that conquered much of India in the years 1798 to 1805 has been described as “the most successful army in the world.” This surprising claim reflects the enormous territorial gains made and the control exerted by such a small body of men.

A hybrid army of Indian and British and other European troops allowed a paltry number of military and civil servants to govern 50 million subjects. The campaigns opened with the crushing of the army of Tipu Sultan, the ruler of Mysore, by the battalions of George Harris at Seringapatam. In the subsequent Second Anglo-Maratha War the armies of Commander-in-Chief Gerard Lake in the north and Major-General Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) in the south overcame the sophisticated forces of the Maratha princes in dramatic pitched battles such as Assaye, Delhi and Laswari and epic sieges such as Gawilghur.

The British army in India was an unlikely mix of the local East India Company (EIC) Presidency armies and of King’s regiments sent out to the continent from the United Kingdom. Native troops (sepoys) always made up the great majority of the ranks as there was no prospect of attracting sufficient European troops to fulfil Britain’s expansionist policies and to protect the EIC’s interests.

British commentaries of the Second Anglo-Maratha War suggest that the EIC sepoy was mostly an effective soldier. Very senior British officers praised their native Indian troops, albeit in a qualified manner. Lake was quick to applaud his sepoys, but equally keen to stress that they needed European support.  Wellesley perhaps had low expectations of his native battalions, but after the Battle of Assaye in 1803 he wrote that all the troops had performed admirably: “the sepoys astonished me.”

Wellesley’s and Lake’s strategy was based upon mobility and speed. This was to be an audacious war, fought on the front foot. This is explicit in the writings of both men.

“Time is everything in military operations…” Wellesley wrote in November 1803.

The Maratha princes had to be intimidated by the “ease and celerity” of movement of the British forces. In the Deccan campaign in the south, Colonel James Stevenson was continually harangued by Wellesley to “dash’ at the enemy.”

Lake was even more aggressive in his actions in the north, frequently surprising the Marathas with the rapidity of his response and movement. While Wellesley tempered the risks of this strategy by giving assiduous attention to logistics and supply, Lake was frequently careless in his preparations, a weakness seized upon by his increasingly confident junior colleague.

In a letter to a fellow officer, Wellesley is openly critical:

“What can have induced the General [Lake] to press for the commencement of the war with Holkar [a Maratha leader], being entirely unprepared to follow him, or to carry the war beyond the Company’s frontier?”

Lake often trusted his instinct and left much to chance whereas Wellesley was the consummate planner.

If Wellesley was the more cautious of the two generals, it can be said that both underestimated their enemy. Wellesley’s repeated assertions that the war with Holkar would last only two weeks if Lake “would only dash at him with his cavalry” was to prove grossly over-optimistic. Wellesley was frequently to be surprised by the proficiency of his Maratha opponent but was always able to find a tactical solution. Lake was rewarded for his verve on the battlefield but he was to pay a heavy price in human lives for his complacency in siege operations. He lost 3,000 men in the four futile attacks on the fortress of Bhurtpore in early 1805.

The tactics of the British in the field were broadly similar to those adopted in European campaigns. Infantry manoeuvred and fought in line, transferring their parade ground drill to the battlefield. A two-rank line maximized firepower and the gleaming bayonets considerably increased the psychological threat to an adversary. The Marathas probably underestimated the central role of the bayonet in British tactics. Wellesley’s greatest victories in India, Assaye and Argaum, depended on the cohesion of his battalions advancing in line. At Assaye, the British line crossing the river was 1,400 yards long.

King’s and East India Company cavalry regiments were effectively used as heavy cavalry on the battlefield, charging at controlled speed with the sabre. Normally these charges were made with squadrons and troops in line, the front and rear ranks of horsemen having an interval of around 15 yards.

Field artillery tactics employed the two six-pounder guns routinely attached to each infantry battalion and cavalry regiment. The infantry guns both increased the battalion’s firepower and protected the men from the encroachment of enemy cavalry and the close attention of rocketeers. The British were outgunned by the Marathas, but the ‘gallopers’ (horse-drawn, light field guns) of the cavalry proved especially effective, demoralizing enemy horsemen. Wellesley was initially sceptical of their use but he eventually admitted that he would only reluctantly part with the flying artillery.

Neither Lake nor Wellesley made any great innovations in tactics. Lake was more tested in the field than Wellesley, able to draw on his experiences in the American War of Independence. He saw no alternative to the orthodox use of musket and bayonet against the Maratha regular battalions. He would maintain the offensive at almost all cost. It was Wellesley’s objective to always tackle the Maratha foe when they were on the move, avoiding attacking them in a position of their choosing and giving them no opportunity to attack him. Surprise and the relentless grasping of the initiative were key elements. Retreat was not a serious option.

At battalion level, Wellesley’s tactics at Assaye can be regarded as primitive, the close quarter use of bayonets and sabres ultimately overcoming the superiority of the Marathas’ musketry and artillery fire. Both Lake and Wellesley have been criticized for their strategy and tactics in the Anglo-Maratha War. Any adverse comment must be viewed in the context of British campaigns which were close to being universally successful. There also has to be acknowledgement of the severe challenges of campaigning in the subcontinent. There were extremes of climate, difficult terrain and roads, tenuous supply chains, and a lack of reliable intelligence and maps.

Historians have argued regarding the extent to which Wellesley’s experience as a ‘sepoy general’ influenced his later triumphs in the Peninsular War and at Waterloo. He had undoubtedly learnt to command an army and had displayed both courage and a talent for meticulous planning and preparation. He had met adversity with patience, he was flexible, and he was ruthless. In later years the Duke was to tell Lord Stanhope that at the time of his departure from India he had “understood as much of military matters as I have ever done since or do now.” He remained loyal to India throughout his life. It had been the making of him.

Martin R Howard is the author of Wellington and the British Army’s Indian Campaigns 1798−1805. A visiting professor at the University of York in the United Kingdom, he has a longstanding interest in the Napoleonic Wars with a particular focus on the human dimension of the conflict and the lesser-known campaigns.