“Hartmann was always more of a tactician than a brawler. He was aggressive but not reckless, and understood his aircraft bolt-for-bolt.”
By Erik Schmidt
AMONG THE World War II Luftwaffe’s experten, Erich Hartmann stands alone.
With 352 kills to his name, he is the top-scoring fighter ace in history. But how did he do it? How could one man amass so many aerial victories over the frostbitten Eastern Front? Is such a thing even plausible? Let’s find out.
The practical factors
We’ll begin by crunching some numbers.
Between Oct. 14, 1942 and VE Day — a period of 937 days — Hartmann flew an astounding 1,404 combat missions. A full 825 of these flights put him in the company of enemy aircraft. This was possible because Germans like him didn’t rotate out after set tours — they stayed at the front until death, injury or the war’s conclusion ended their careers.
All told, Hartmann scored a kill for every 3.99 missions flown, or one for every 2.34 missions that involved air combat. Remarkably, other pilots posted even higher averages, albeit during much shorter periods.
The resurgence of the Soviet air force after Germany’s early successes in 1941 also played a role in Hartmann’s staggering stats. Ironically, the same industrial revival that made the Soviet military a more dangerous enemy transformed Hartmann’s airspace into a target-rich environment.
Had Hartmann gone to war earlier or been sent to any other theatre, his performance probably would not have been as dominant or sustained.
It’s also important to note that when Hartmann embarked on a mission, he usually was given a “free-hunt” assignment: Find any aircraft you can and knock them out, at will. This contrasts with bomber escort missions, for example, which constrained fighter pilots, limited their initiative, and made them more vulnerable to attack. Hartmann rarely had to deal with any of that.
As a result, he usually entered dogfights with two powerful advantages:
1) the element of surprise, and
2) the choice of whether or not to engage. When he did decide to attack, he waited until the enemy was so close that he could hardly miss when he opened fire.
Often, his victims had no idea what had hit them.
The personal factors
Hartmann was always more of a tactician than a brawler. He was aggressive but not reckless, and understood his aircraft bolt-for-bolt. He kept physically fit and mentally sharp, and he had excellent vision. All of these factors made him a natural, and exceptionally dangerous, hunter.
Also working in his favour was his flight training. It took place early in the war, before the dramatic attrition forced the Luftwaffe to speed new pilots through the instruction process.
In the beginning, the Germans trained their pilots heavily in the science of aerodynamics, mechanical systems, and of course dogfighting. By contrast, Soviet aviators (Hartmann did shoot down a handful of Americans) varied wildly in their skill and preparedness. The German ace was the first to acknowledge that while some of his opponents were highly skilled and ruthlessly effective, many lacked his preparedness.
Of course, the aircraft were also important. Hartmann’s Messerschmitt Bf 109, Germany’s legendary day fighter, was receptive to upgrades and remained sneakily effective until the end of the war. Despite going up against newer aircraft that were superior, the 109’s beefy engine, harmonious controls, and rugged airframe allowed pilots to fly it aggressively, routinely pushing it to the upper limits of its performance envelope. Many Soviet fighter planes, by contrast, were frailer and flown by pilots who didn’t know how to get the most from their machines.
Should we doubt Hartmann’s kill total?
Could Hartmann have inflated his tally? His proponents say no. In fact, they are quick to point out the comparatively rigorous process through which a German pilot was awarded a kill.
By official order, any claim usually had to be supported by a witness (airborne or ground-based), and the kill had to include either the complete, verifiable destruction of the enemy aircraft or a bail-out by its pilot. Based on this, some might even assume he killed more enemy aircraft than his official tally would indicate.
It is becoming clearer, however, that all combatants over-claimed and were often awarded kills throughout the conflict for which the might not deserve credit. During the Battle of Britain, for instance, there are plenty of cases in which the British and the Germans claimed upwards of double the number of enemies that could ever be confirmed destroyed.
The most relevant dissenter in Hartmann’s case was a Russian researcher named Dimitri Khazanov, who published an article in 2005 claiming to have identified notable inconsistencies and even errors in Hartmann’s kill log. Khazanov estimates that Hartmann probably only knocked down 70-80 aircraft, not 352.
Once this commentary made its way to the internet, it generated a partisan exchange of reactions and little, if any, resolution. Hartmann’s supporters criticized Khazannov’s data sources (iffy Soviet-era records) and methodology, while others considered his analysis a welcome reality check. Most people are still comfortable with Hartmann’s kill total, and today it is unlikely that some new deluge of information will arrive to change the conversation.
The bottom line
Hartmann’s skill and contributions as an airman are unquestionable, even though his service to Hitler makes him something of a difficult historical figure. Now that air combat has become digitized and depersonalized, he will almost certainly remain at the top of history’s leaderboard — no modern pilot, in any foreseeable conflict, would even encounter enemy aircraft in such quantities as Hartmann did, much less shoot them down. We can hope this remains the case.
About the Author: Erik Schmidt is the author of Black Tulip: The Life and Myth of Erich Hartmann, the World’s Top Fighter Ace. A former magazine editor and senior marketing writer, he has an MFA in creative nonfiction and brings a lifelong love of history and aviation to his work. He is a freelance writer based in Denver, Colorado.
The picture at the top is from Jagdgeschwader 27 Afrika Boys who served in North Africa and the Mediterranean.
Hartmann was part of Jagdgeschwader 52 on the Eastern front.
Col. Feodor Sverdlov who was a staff officer for the Eleventh Guards Army at Kursk and later a professor at the Frunze Military Academy presented in 1994 chart showing Soviet air victory claims to German losses of Operation Citadel, Sverdlov stated that “the enemy always suffers 30% more losses than you.”
Colonel Sverdlov knew from his experiences in the war (and he was there from the Battle of Moscow to the end), that they regularly reported more German losses than they suffered. This was just standard procedure.