“Today a computer would instantly process the flood of incoming information and fly the correct profile, but in 1942 the pilot was the computer.”

By Walter Topp

THEY WERE THE Navy’s last chance.

It was 10:20 a.m. on Thursday, June 4, 1942. Forty-seven U. S. Navy dive bombers had found what they were looking for. Far below, four Japanese aircraft carriers were launching the first planes of a massive strike that could decide the Battle of Midway. So far, two days of American air and submarine attacks had failed to damage a single ship of the peerless Japanese Aircraft Carrier Striking Force. The priceless intelligence advantage the U.S. had gained through years of backbreaking effort by Navy codebreakers was about to be squandered. The heroic sacrifice of Navy torpedo plane crews who had pressed home their slow-motion attacks in the face of deadly Japanese opposition looked to be in vain.

But now, at the last possible moment, three squadrons of SBD Dauntless dive bombers from the American aircraft carriers USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise had arrived unobserved and unopposed in the skies above the Japanese fleet.

Somehow, against all odds, the Americans had achieved precisely the situation that Navy commanders had dreamed of: dozens of dive bombers screaming down on Japanese flight decks jammed with gassed up and armed aircraft, fueling hoses snaked about, bombs and torpedoes scattered hastily across the hangar bays.

The broad flight decks of the carriers were perfect targets for the American pilots whose aircraft, training, and combat tactics had prepared them for precisely this type of attack. Dive bombing had been developed by the U.S. Navy in the 1930s, and in 1942 it was the most accurate form of air attack. That was one reason that Navy carrier air groups had more dive bombers than any other type of aircraft. By pointing his plane directly at the target until he released his weapon, a skilled pilot could keep his eye on the target throughout his dive and simplify his bomb’s trajectory.

No Easy Task

But success was far from certain. This was just the second great carrier versus carrier battle of the Pacific War, and no one yet knew what to expect. Pilots from Yorktown had fought at Coral Sea, but pilots from Enterprise had not. Dive bombers from the third U.S. carrier at Midway, USS Hornet, hadn’t even found the Japanese fleet.

Pre-war doctrine supposed that aircraft carriers couldn’t survive a massed air strike. But at Coral Sea, one month earlier, three of the four fleet aircraft carriers that were attacked – two Japanese and two American – did survive. Yorktown was one of the survivors. Pre-war doctrine also held that B-17 bombers could effectively bomb ships from high altitude, but attacks against Japanese ships by Flying Fortresses at Midway scored no hits. It was becoming clear that the real war was going to be different from the conflict that was envisioned.

The dive bombing attacks themselves would be difficult. Carriers were big targets, but they were moving fast and the American pilots would have to fly precise flight profiles to hit them. During their 40-second dives, the aviators would have to continuously work their rudder pedals and sticks to correct their plane’s speed, heading, and dive angle to remain on target, while the carriers below maneuvered violently. For much of the dive, the pilots could track their targets through spotting scopes, similar to the telescoping sights that snipers mounted on their rifles. But the bomber scopes provided only a 3X magnified view; it was up to the pilots to make the necessary adjustments in three axes to ensure a hit.

Today A Computer Would Do It

The plane’s dive flaps held the bomber’s speed at about 276 knots, giving the pilot a little more time to make adjustments. It also made the plane an easier target for enemy anti-aircraft gunners and defending fighters. For gunners on the targeted ships, a diving plane appeared almost motionless in their sights, slowly growing in size as it neared, which greatly simplified their aim. Fortunately for the dive bomber crews, most anti-aircraft mounts lacked the ability to fire directly up, so the volume of fire the planes faced was limited.

American dive bombers typically approached their targets at an altitude of around 20,000 feet, flying at more than 200 knots. When they spotted a ship, dive bomber pilots increased speed and descended to about 8,000 feet. Since Japanese vessels mostly lacked radar, whenever possible the Americans approached their targets from out of the sun. When over the target, pilots pulled the noses of their planes up to put the aircraft into a stall, opened their dive flaps, and then turned down toward their target.

The ideal dive angle was 70 degrees; a dive might take 30 or 40 seconds. During that time, the rear seat radioman/gunner – on his back, facing the sky – would be nearly weightless. Gunners often described how spent shell casings that had fallen to floor of the plane would drift up past their eyes. The pilot hoped to release his bomb when he was between 2,000 and 1,500 feet above the target. At that altitude the bomb would fall for less than 10 seconds. But even during that short time, a ship turning at 30 knots might move 500 feet.

So, the pilot had to fly a narrow flight profile, continuously adjusting his own deflection, speed, and dive angle to correct for the movement of the target, for the effect of gravity, and for the effect of the wind on his plane and on his bomb, once it was released. He had to correctly estimate the wind direction and speed and the target ship’s current course and speed and aim where the target ship would be when the bomb reached the surface. If the dive angle was slightly off, the bomb would land short or fly past the target. If the plane’s heading was slightly off, the bomb might miss to either side.

Since aircraft – even dive bombers – are designed to fly horizontally, putting a plane into a 70-degree dive alters the forces affecting the aircraft and causes the attacking plane to drift across the target, decreasing accuracy. Dive flaps helped correct this problem, but it was just one more thing that pilots had to contend with.

Today a computer would instantly process the flood of incoming information and fly the correct profile, but in 1942 the pilot was the computer.

Insanely Dangerous

Once the bomb was released, the aviator pulled out of his dive, a maneuver that might leave him struggling to breathe as he experienced as much as six times the force of gravity. These stresses were considerable and dive bombers were built to handle them, but pilots could be rendered briefly unconscious by the forces.

If everything went well, the bomber would level off at around 500 feet and the pilot would start jinking rapidly to avoid anti-aircraft fire from enemy ships and defending fighters.

This, of course, was the primary drawback to dive bombing. Pointing your plane at an enemy ship and diving as close as possible before releasing your weapon sounded good in theory and was accurate in practice. But finishing your bombing run directly over your target at 500 feet altitude was insanely dangerous. Shipboard gunners probably couldn’t hit you as you flashed by, just above their masts. But your escape would leave you in antiaircraft range for a long time, and at an altitude of 500 feet you would have little room to maneuver if attacked from above by enemy fighters.

The vulnerability of dive bombers after releasing their weapons was a major reason why the Germans abandoned dive bombing attacks against land targets whenever enemy fighters were present. By mid-1942, a German dive bombers’ life expectancy in combat had fallen to less than five days.

There was nothing easy about hitting a moving target at sea in the face of anti-aircraft fire or defending fighters. The plane is moving, the target is moving, and the air around the plane is moving. It takes many hours of practice and considerable skill. At Midway, Marine Corps pilots who had just received new dive bombers attacked Japanese ships using glide bombing techniques because they had not been sufficiently trained in dive bombing. They scored no hits.

By Chance a Coordinated Attack

By the time the Navy dive bombers arrived above the Japanese carriers, U.S. land-based and carrier-based planes had been engaging the Japanese formation nearly continuously for two hours. While no hits on the enemy vessels had been achieved, and more than 35 American aircraft had been shot down, the attacks had disrupted Japanese operations, scattered their ships, and had drawn Japanese fighter planes down to the surface of the sea.

Two SBD squadrons from Enterprise arrived together, while a third squadron from Yorktown appeared at the same moment from another direction. It was a fluke that all three formations converged simultaneously; the Americans had made no effort to have all of their attacking planes arrive over the Japanese fleet at once. The Yorktown bombers had actually taken off an hour later than the Enterprise planes.

The dive bombers, torpedo bombers, and fighters all flew at different speeds; coordinating their arrival over a moving target whose location at the time of arrival could only be guessed was impossible in 1942. Planes could only be launched one at a time, so it might take an hour to assemble a full strike force. By then, the first planes aloft would have used 30 minutes or more of fuel circling their own fleet. Without knowing exactly where the enemy ships would be when the strike would arrive, it was impossible to calculate courses and speeds that would bring all the planes over the enemy at the same time. At Midway, American commanders, desperate to strike the Japanese carriers before they could attack the U.S. fleet, sent their planes off in small groups as soon as they were launched. That decision doomed the torpedo bombers – 39 of 43 were shot down. But inadvertently the strikes opened the way for the dive bombers to attack unhindered by Japanese fighters.

Communications Failures Almost Saved a Japanese Carrier

Miscommunication between the attacking SBDs almost spared one of the Japanese carriers. LCDR Wade McClusky, Enterprise Air Group Commander, wanted one of his squadrons to attack the carrier Kaga, and the second to attack carrier Akagi. But the pilots didn’t hear his instructions and both squadrons dove on Kaga. At the last moment, one of the section leaders, Lt. Richard Best, realized what was happening and redirected his five-plane section to attack Akagi. The luckless Japanese carrier was struck with just one bomb, but the secondary explosions from fueled and armed aircraft ignited massive fires that couldn’t be contained. Kaga, attacked by more than 20 planes, was struck four or five times.

Meanwhile, Yorktown’s squadron, approaching from the other side of the formation, dove on a third Japanese carrier, the Soryu, striking her with at least three bombs and leaving her aflame. The fourth Japanese carrier, Hiryu, was hidden by a rain squall and was not attacked. This would prove disastrous for the Yorktown later, as the undamaged Hiryu would launch a retaliatory strike that would cripple the American carrier. A Japanese submarine would finish Yorktown off on June 7.

By 10:25 am, three of Japan’s front-line aircraft carriers were blazing wrecks. Later that day, Hiryu would be attacked and destroyed as well. The Japanese canceled their planned invasion of Midway and withdrew. Their attempt to destroy the U.S. carriers in a decisive battle was a failure.

Eighteen Dive Bombers Were Lost

No one knows for sure how many attacking SBDs were shot down at Midway, but it’s clear that 18 of the 47 dive bombers that struck the Japanese carriers that morning never made it back to their ships. Two more had to ditch near their carriers because the pilots were running too short on fuel to actually land. Some planes were shot from the sky, others crashed into the sea when they ran out of fuel. At least three aircrewmen were plucked from the sea by the Japanese and were interrogated and executed.

During the Battle of Midway, the U.S. deployed a total of 223 carrier aircraft and 113 land-based planes of various types, including B-17 bombers, torpedo bombers, fighters, and SBD dive bombers. But the only significant damage inflicted against the Japanese was by SBD dive bombers. Overall, the United States lost 92 officers, 215 enlisted men, an aircraft carrier, a destroyer, and approximately 150 aircraft at Midway.

A Rugged Little Plane

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps would operate SBD Dauntless dive bombers for the rest of war, even though a replacement plane, the Curtis SB2C Helldiver, had been designed by mid-1941. But delays in development of the more powerful SB2C meant that SBD’s remained the Navy’s primary dive bomber until 1943. Marine Corps Dauntlesses operating from Henderson Field played a critical role in the Battle of Guadalcanal.

The SBD Dauntless was a rugged little plane that could absorb significant damage and still make it home, which made it popular with its crews. The plane possessed long range, good handling characteristics, maneuverability, a potent bomb load, and outstanding defensive armament. Early in the war, when U.S. carriers operated only a single squadron of fighters, SBD’s were sometimes deployed to defend their carriers from torpedo bombers as part of a low-level combat air patrol. At the Battle of Coral Sea, while defending USS Lexington and Yorktown, SBDs shot down several Japanese torpedo bombers.

The Dauntless was one of the most successful and important U.S. aircraft of the Pacific War. SBDs sank more enemy shipping than any other aircraft, including six aircraft carriers, 14 cruisers, six destroyers, 15 transports or cargo ships, and countless smaller craft.

Nearly 6,000 SBD’s were built during the war. A handful remain, including a veteran of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway at the National Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola, Florida.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Walter Topp is a former U.S. Navy officer, emergency manager, police officer, and newspaper reporter. He is currently a writer and is working on several history and emergency management projects. He speaks regularly on emergency management topics but prefers writing about military history. He is a regular contributor to MilitaryHistoryNow.com.