“Despite Caesar’s own first-hand accounts of his British invasions, many of the finer details of his campaigns have stumped historians and researchers for literally hundreds of years.”

By Roger Nolan

JULIUS CAESAR INVADED Britain more than 2,000 years ago. In fact, the famous Roman conqueror carried out two invasions from his base in Gaul.

The first landing came in the late summer of 55 BCE. Arriving with just two legions, he established a beach head, but was forced to withdraw his army before the arrival of winter.

The following year’s invasion involved five legions totalling at least 25,000 troops, along with an unknown number of cavalry, auxiliary troops and slaves. It was during this second campaign that he famously stormed the capital of the warlord Cassivellaunus and his Catuvellauni tribe in what is now Hertfordshire.

Yet despite Caesar’s own first-hand accounts of his British invasions, many of the finer details of his campaigns have stumped historians and researchers for literally hundreds of years. In my book, Julius Caesar’s Invasion of Britain – Solving a 2000-Year-Old Mystery, I set out to answer all of the questions surrounding the general’s time on England’s shores.

Where were the ‘marching camps’?

Perhaps the most baffling mystery involves the location of the Roman’s temporary marching camps or castra.

The camps, which would have been situated about a day’s march apart, were constructed by Roman armies as temporary fortified bases. They also functioned as supply dumps for the logistical needs of the army. They were typically constructed by armies on the move. After a day’s march, the troops would complete the construction of the camp before nightfall. Each legionary soldier carried an entrenching tool and would be assigned a section of the perimeter to dig a trench and create a rampart. (Click HERE to see a scale model of a section of a castra perimeter)

Despite centuries of searching, there has never been any evidence found of the fortified camps built during Caesar’s march across southern England.

Investigations have been made over the years, especially in the late 16th and early 17th centuries and again in the 19th century, while folk traditions have come down through the years as well. Yet no evidence has been found, despite the fact that Caesar himself wrote an account of his invasions.

My book contains details of research that identifies for the first time the site of the temporary marching camps. There were four of them – each a day’s march from the other.

Remains of the Roman marching camps have been discovered at Denge Wood, on the edge of the River Stour, south-west of Canterbury, at Kemsley near Sittingbourne in north Kent, at East Tilbury, just over the Thames in Essex and at Loughton Camp in Epping Forest in Essex.

Where did Caesar’s army cross the Thames?

Another mystery involves the location where Caesar’s army crossed the Thames.

The site where Caesar’s army forded the river has now been identified as East Tilbury, down river from London. The crossing had always been assumed to be in the London area probably because in general, the Thames is narrower upstream. However, Caesar writes that “the Thames is fordable at one place only and there with difficulty.” This effectively rules out the London area as the site of the crossing, as there would have been a number of fords across the river around what is present-day London and certainly before the embankments were built in the 19th century.

There was however a ford across the Thames 2,000 years ago downstream at East Tilbury and this would undoubtedly have been negotiable, although with difficulty as Caesar writes.

What has proved fascinating is that when plotted on a map, the marching camps, the Thames crossing and Cassivellaunus’ headquarters are all in a straight line on the map. As a result, when that line is traced back to the coast, it has been possible to identify the site of the seaboard landing.

Where did Caesar’s army come ashore?

Surprisingly, this is Dover and yet all perceived wisdom is that Caesar didn’t land near the famous White Cliffs during his second invasion, as local defenders could have used the heights to drive the invaders back. This was certainly what happened in 55 BCE during the first invasion.

But Caesar is careful to mention that on the second occasion in 54 BCE, the Britons had fled from the coast after seeing how much larger Roman army was on this occasion. The fact that Caesar mentions this is a clear indication that he was explaining that he was indeed able to land at Dover on the second occasion in 54 BCE and it was safe to do so.

These discoveries also include the identification of the site of the battle between the Roman army and the Ancient Britons, which had started when Caesar’s legions were out foraging for grain. According to Caesar, the Britons swooped down on them in their chariots “from all sides.” This site can be pinpointed at Chartham Downs just south of Canterbury.

The research detailed in my book is comprehensive and includes a complete analysis of the two invasions in 55 BC and 54 BC. It also contains a reasoned analysis of the probable site of Portus Itius, named by Caesar as the port in Northern Gaul (modern day France) where the armies embarked for Britain.’

Did Caesar accomplish his mission?

Whether or not the invasions were a success has been the subject of debate over the years. My research considers the extent to which it was a success for the Romans, in the light of the objective Caesar set himself in carrying out the invasions.

Those making the case that the invasions were a failure, point to the fact that both incursions were temporary and not immediately followed by any permanent occupation of the island by the Romans. However, in his own account of the campaigns, Caesar never once states that he was seeking a permanent occupation of Britain. On the contrary, what he does write is that his objective was to punish the local inhabitants for providing support to the Gallic tribes in their battles with Rome and to ensure that they would not provide aid for the Gauls in the future.

During the invasion of 55 BC, Caesar judged that just two legions would be sufficient to achieve his objective of quelling the Britons. Indeed, he had received assurances from the British tribes themselves that they would not attack the Romans. However, the locals proved to be duplicitous and as Caesar was landing, they attacked his army. In addition, bad luck hindered the first invasion. A massive storm wrecked a number of his ships and ships bringing the cavalry across were forced to turn back to Gaul because of this storm and this left Caesar without his cavalry which were a necessary part of his army.

Despite this, the Roman army succeeded in defeating the local tribes and Caesar returned to Gaul before winter set in. In the light of his experience of the first invasion, he put in place plans for a massively larger invasion force for the following year, 54BC.

Until now, all kinds of theories have been suggested for the site of Caesar’s landing and passage through southern Britain and in particular, academics have expressed surprise that none of Caesar’s temporary marching camps had ever been discovered. What the research detailed in my book shows is that those seeking to find evidence on the ground of Caesar’s invasions of Britain have all been looking in the wrong places.

Shortly after Caesar’s invasions of Britain, the whole of Gaul (modern day France and Belgium) became a Roman province and all trade by Britain with the continent was effectively trade with the Romans. As a result, Britain became increasingly Romanized by the time of Claudius’ invasion in 43CE, which resulted in the permanent Roman occupation of Britain.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Roger Nolan is the author of Julius Caesar’s Invasion of Britain – Solving a 2000-Year-Old Mystery published by Frontline Books. He is retired and lives in Kent.