“The factors driving the insurgency are not commonly understood.”

By Phil Halton

IT’S EASY TO forget that there is no military solution possible when seeking to defeat an insurgency. Although counter-insurgency operations have absorbed the thinking of many Western militaries for the past two decades, the military component of defeating an insurgency is simply in weakening it, or preventing it from growing, to allow a political settlement and reconciliation between different parts of society to occur.

Despite nearly 18 years of operations in Afghanistan by Western militaries, there remain many common misperceptions about what is driving the conflict. Without a clear understanding of the issues underpinning the violence, our military and political actions will remain unfocused, and possibly counter-productive.

No single motivation can explain why insurgents continue to fight, but there are a number of factors that in combination are key to understanding the roots of the conflict. Rather than dividing the enemy into “fundamentalists” and “moderates,” as Western pundits tend to try to do, Afghans themselves see them differently. They speak of makhtabi (literally “school”) fighters, who are those who are motivated ideologically, and of majburi (literally “forced”) fighters, who are those driven to revolt out of a sense of personal grievance.

Part of the reason that the conflict in Afghanistan has dragged on as long as it has is that the factors driving the insurgency are not commonly understood. This leads to the implementation of misguided initiatives, and poorly designed metrics to gauge success.

The following is a list of the actual issues that are driving the insurgency in Afghanistan today:

Afghanistan’s Pervasive Corruption

This is the primary driver of the insurgency in Afghanistan. With the fall of the communist backed government in Kabul, the various mujahideen groups that defeated the Soviets began to fight amongst themselves, and the country came to be ruled by bandits and petty warlords. The Taliban defeat of these elements during the 1990s was applauded by ordinary Afghans. But many of the key players in the current Western-backed government in Kabul are the very same warlords the Taliban defeated, and who continue to be widely seen as greedy, corrupt and cruel. Many insurgents point to grievances they have suffered at the hands of government officials–abuse of power, exclusion from power or resources, or the flouting of laws by the officials themselves–as the reason that they are fighting.

Personal Safety

Although seemingly contradictory, the need for personal safety has driven many to remain as active insurgents and is a motivator that stretches back into the period of the war to ouster the Soviets. In a country as plagued by conflict as Afghanistan, it is undoubtedly difficult to exist without taking sides. And for anyone who has participated in the insurgency at some point, simply returning to “civilian” life has not been a viable option. Demobilized insurgents continue to be subject to a wide variety threats from Western militaries, the current government, from previous victims, and from their former comrades. Given these conditions, there is little incentive for an individual fighter to leave the insurgency once he has become embroiled within it.

Loss of Opportunity

Despite the vast sums of foreign money spent on economic development throughout Afghanistan, the result has been increasing conflict between groups vying for a “slice of the pie.” This motivation is present even in arenas not seen as primarily economic, such as hiring for security forces or appointments to administrative posts. Heavy direct investment by foreign governments and non-governmental agencies, besides being unsustainable, also undercuts the very same Afghan government and economic structures that the military is ostensibly there to support in the first place, creating negative effects in other spheres.

Economic Motivations

Poverty is endemic in Afghanistan, in part because of the disruptions to infrastructure from four decades of war. Economic incentives have been used to try to reconcile and reintegrate former insurgents. These efforts have produced little lasting impact. In many cases, greater money can be made from the production of narcotics and insurgents have been adept at exploiting this, encouraging or coercing farmers into growing opium, creating both economic opportunity as well as opening them up to eradication and reprisals from government forces, economic rivals or other insurgent groups. This adds to the grievances that fuel support for the insurgency.

Xenophobia

There’s a widely held cultural narrative in Afghanistan that their country has long been the venue for world powers to play out the “Great Game.” From Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan to the British Empire and the Soviet Union foreign presence continued to be a source of mistrust. A poll conducted in Helmand and Kandahar in July 2010 found that only 12 per cent of respondents felt that foreigners were in the country to bring peace and security. This creates the paradox where the very presence of foreign military forces creates the insurgency they have been deployed to defeat.

Issues of Culture and Identity

Afghan culture, particularly Pashtun culture, includes a strong sense of personal honour and an obligation to redress even minor slights. Counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan routinely include such things as house searches, seizure of property and crop eradication, as well as unintended civilian casualties. All of these things create second order effects on the “honour” of surrounding communities, members of which may feel obligated to take action. Traditional Afghan culture has mechanisms to negotiate and de-escalate these forms of conflict, but traditional social structures have been weakened by decades of war and the targeting of leaders by all sides.

Religious Factors

The moral values espoused by insurgent groups, especially the Taliban and the Islamic State, are interesting in that they purport to be those of a traditional rural village, which as an ideal likely does not exist in fact, and which many of the proponents have never themselves lived in. This ideal village that the Taliban refer to is actually only an interpretation of a simple, earlier time – but seen through the lens of a fractured society. This nostalgic appeal is necessary as though both the Taliban and Islamic State frame their actions as being religiously motivated, neither has produced a religious program of any particular depth. Their relatively simplistic grasp of Islam differs greatly from the nuanced, academic religious platforms produced by other radical Islamist groups in Egypt, Palestine and elsewhere.

Blowing up the Myths of the Afghan Insurgency

Part of the Western narrative about Afghanistan misidentifies the drivers of conflict, either simplifying the problem or seeking external motivations and sources. Many strategic decisions have been made to address these false factors, leading to wasted efforts and negative outcomes.

Afghans Enjoy Fighting

Westerners often invoke an old local proverb to explain the ongoing conflict: “Me against my brothers, me and my brothers against my cousins, me and my cousins against the world.” A similar phrase also used is, “A Pashtun is never at peace, unless he is at war.” This idea, that the insurgents in Afghanistan fight simply because that is what Afghans do (and have done for centuries), is one that has surprising currency amongst what is otherwise good, nuanced analysis.

It’s a Tribal Conflict

Ethnicity and tribalism are also often wrongly raised as factors behind the ongoing violence. While it is true that there are many conflicts between parties in Afghanistan that are along tribal or ethnic lines, Western understanding of tribal structures is essentially superficial and static. In reality, tribes and sub-tribes merge and divide over time for reasons of expediency, and the relations and standing between tribes remains a matter very much in flux. These shifts are all the more common now that tribal structures have been weakened by years of targeting by both sides of the conflict.

It’s Being Driven by Pakistan

Many blame the ongoing conflict on support from elements within the Pakistani government. While Islamabad undoubtedly has supported the Taliban, its role in creating or sustaining the insurgency is over-stated. The connection between Pakistani authorities and Afghan insurgents stretches back nearly 40 years, and links between the insurgent groups and Pakistani society have become extensive, rooted in inter-marriage, long-term residence, the shared experience of jihad, and political and military cooperation. Even with the fullest Pakistani support, however, the insurgency in Afghanistan would wither if it did not derive primarily from credible grievances amongst the Afghan population.

It’s Part of a Global Jihad

Despite the fact that the Taliban sheltered the al Qaeda leadership for many years, there has been very little interest expressed by Afghan insurgents in widening the conflict outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is not a significant factor, as their grievances and desires remain profoundly local, despite attempts by outside groups to radicalize them for employment elsewhere.

Conclusion

Oversimplification of the root issues has been used as a tool to dismiss the roots of insurgency in Afghanistan as incomprehensible, when it is merely foreign and complex. Together, the complex and interlocking sets of motivators behind the insurgency form a powerful narrative that gives organizations such as the Taliban an undeniable appeal amongst segments of the Afghan population.

Recognition of these motivations, and the fact that many of them stem from credible grievances, is a necessary first step to find a means to end the insurgency through negotiation and create a lasting peace.

Phil Halton is the author of This Shall Be a House of Peace, a novel describing the origin of the Taliban movement. A 25-year veteran of the Canadian Armed Forces, he has worked around the globe as a soldier and security consultant and has spent time in Afghanistan. He holds a Masters of Defence Studies from the Royal Military College and publishes the literary journal Blood & Bourbon. He lives in Toronto.