“The United States Army was a frontier constabulary force manning posts throughout the west and the Pacific and was in no way prepared for the Great War.”
By William Stroock
THE UNITED STATES was the last of the great powers to enter the First World War. When the Armistice went into effect on Nov. 11, 1918 the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) numbered over a million men in 42 combat divisions. Amazingly, none of these units even existed prior to Washington’s declaration of war in April of 1917. Below are 10 remarkable facts about the army America sent to Europe a century ago.
The United States was unready for war
In 1914, the United States Army was a frontier constabulary force manning posts throughout the west and the Pacific and was in no way prepared for the Great War. The army was commanded by old Indian fighters. General John J. “Blackjack” Pershing, future commander of the AEF in France, rode in the Geronimo and Wounded Knee Campaigns, as had General Robert Lee Bullard who later commanded the 2nd Army. Bullard is actually mentioned in Captain Britton C. Davis’ memoir of the Geronimo campaign. Later in their careers, Pershing, Bullard, and future 1st Army commander Hunter Liggett served in a variety of American outposts including Cuba and the Philippines. After fighting Moro warriors, Philippine insurgents and Cuban rebels, the men who later led the AEF were counterinsurgency experts. When the United States joined the war in Europe in April,1917, a quarter-million regular army and National Guardsmen patrolled the Mexican border following Pershing’s ill-fated Poncho Villa Campaign. Bullard commanded an infantry brigade on the Rio Grande where he fought Mexican banditos and revolutionaries. Hunter Liggett commanded the Department of the Philippines. Charged with defending the islands he surmised that an enemy would land at Luzon’s Lingayen Gulf, which is exactly where the Japanese landed in 1941.
America hadn’t fought in a major conflict since 1865
To the generation of Americans serving in the AEF ‘the War’ referred to the American Civil War. When commenting on trench warfare in his memoirs Pershing declared, “Americans are no strangers to trenches” in reference to the sieges of Petersburg and Vicksburg. Louisiana born Robert Lee Bullard, who changed his middle name to Lee to honor the general, vividly recalled Confederate veteran’s tales of doldrum in Vicksburg’s trenches. Hunter Liggett went on Virginia staff rides with old Confederate generals. Pershing and his commanders were taught by Civil War veterans at West Point. Pershing met both Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman while at the academy and received his diploma from the latter in 1886. Both President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of Defense Newton Baker readied themselves for the Great War by reading Southern histories of the Civil War. Both men concluded that Lincoln meddled too much in the affairs of the Union Army and gave Pershing a free-hand in Europe to build and command the AEF as he pleased.
Pershing built the AEF’s officer corps in his image
Pershing hand-picked division commanders. These were his men, in many cases classmates of his at West Point. Before taking assignments in the AEF, generals toured France, spent time in the trenches and met with Pershing personally. In this way, Pershing ruthlessly purged the army of the old and unfit. Before becoming his most trusted general, Blackjack tried to send Hunter Liggett home for being too fat. “There is no fat above my collar,” the rotund general told his boss. Liggett was right.
Many current U.S. Army traditions began with the AEF
Pershing began the practice of labelling staff offices G-2 for intelligence, G-3 for planning, G-4 logistics, and so on. Several U.S. Army divisions in service today were first formed in the AEF. These include the famous 1st Infantry Division (the Big Red One), the 3rd Infantry Division (Rock of the Marne) and the 82nd Airborne Division, in which the legendary Sgt. Alvin York served.
Several legends of the Second World War fought in the First
One of Pershing’s most trusted staff officers was a young colonel named George Marshall, later army Chief of Staff during the Second World War and the author of the plan to rebuild western Europe after the defeat of the Nazis. Working in the First Army’s G-3 section, Marshall planned and executed the movement of hundreds of thousands of men in 1917 and 1918. Then there was the AEF’s fledgling tank corps. It was commanded by a 33-year-old officer named George Patton. The future leader of America’s Third Army was even wounded in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Before America’s entry into the war in Europe, Pershing took Patton with him on campaign in Mexico and was even for a time informally engaged to his sister Nita. He legendary general Douglas MacArthur was in the 42nd ‘Rainbow’ Division, serving on the divisional staff, commanding a brigade and later the division. MacArthur saved the 42nd from Pershing’s chopping block. As a result, the general detested MacArthur for the rest of the war and often publicly berated him.
The AEF’s tactics were sometimes suicidal
Pershing believed British and French armies had become bogged down in trench warfare. His solution was “open warfare.” The concept involved using large divisions of 28,000 men – roughly the size of an Allied corps — to punch through German defenses and maneuver in enemy’s rear echelon. The general emphasized open-order formations and the rifle. In attack, American regiments were to advance in columns of three battalions, assault, follow-up and support. Similarly, each of these battalions were to advance in lines of three companies. In his defence,
Americans were great shots and their marksmanship proved devastating. But open-order formations were no more effective for the AEF on the Marne and Meuse then they were for the British at the Somme. The result was a slaughter. As the AEF gained experience American commanders wisely dropped Pershing’s open warfare tactics and mimicked the Allies “quick rushes.” Allied units advanced in small groups to concealing terrain under intricately timed artillery and machinegun barrages. These “bite and hold” tactics enabled British, French and later American units to achieve small objectives laying the groundwork for the next objective.
Pershing didn’t get along with the Allies
Pershing clashed constantly with Allied commanders Foch and Haig and the Supreme War Council. When America entered the conflict, the British and French governments urged the Wilson Administration to simply transfer American troops to European command. Later as the AEF was marshalling in Europe, the Allies pushed to “amalgamate” the U.S. units into their divisions. Throughout late 1917 and early 1918, Pershing slowly and deliberately trained the AEF for war in Europe, infuriating the Allies who demanded to know when the new troops would get into the fight. During that time, Pershing fought for an independent American army and withheld his troops from battle until the crisis on the Marne in the summer of 1918. Pershing and Foch also differed greatly on strategy. The French marshal wanted the AEF to attack into the southern belly of the Germans’ great salient in France. Pershing wanted to push east, on his own, into Germany.
The Meuse-Argonne Campaign began disastrously for the AEF
On Sept. 26, Pershing launched his grand offensive in the Meuse-Argonne sector. Unfortunately for the American general and the Doughboys who would fight there, the region was hilly, wooded, untouched by war and cut by four separate layers of German fortifications. The first two weeks of the offensive were a disaster for the AEF. Of the nine divisions participating in the opening assault, only three had any appreciable experience in France. In fact, the 79th Division, tasked with taking the lynchpin of German defences at Montfaucon, had only been in the country for seven weeks. Inexperienced Doughboys were slaughtered wholesale by German machine guns, pinned down in the open, and hammered by expertly laid German artillery. The AEF suffered 26,000 casualties in just four days of fighting. The American’s supply situation was equally horrible. The sector was serviced by three narrow roads under constant bombardment by the Germans and waterlogged by the autumn rains. After two weeks of fighting, the AEF was badly behind schedule, so much so that Foch visited Pershing’s headquarters and upbraided him declaring: “I judge only by results!”
Hunter Liggett won the Meuse-Argonne Offensive
Hunter Liggett is the unsung hero of the AEF. In June of 1918, his I Corps attacked up the center the German’s Marne Salient and advanced dozens of miles to the river. During the opening phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, When the Germans stopped the advance of Liggett’s corps into the Argonne Forrest, he ordered the 77th Division to remain in place, pinning the Germans. At the same time Liggett advanced the 82nd Division north along the wood’s flank. The All-American Division got behind German lines and forced them to pull back. Upon taking command of the American 1st Army on Oct. 16, 1918, Liggett fixed the army’s horrid supply situation. He put whole divisions to work repairing, draining, and widening roads. Liggett estimated that 100,000 stragglers, shirkers, deserters and men who had simply lost contact with their unit were roaming the rear echelon. To fix the problem he dispatched roving teams of MPs to return these men to their units. He toured each division and corps headquarters and emphasized the need for cautious tactics in attack and preparation for German counterattacks once a position had been taken.
Pershing was poised to invade Germany itself
In the north of the Meuse-Argonne sector Hunter Liggett’s 1st Army of nine divisions had made several bridgeheads across the Meuse and was preparing to advance east toward the fortress city of Metz. In the south General Robert Lee Bullard was being reinforced by five fresh divisions for his own push east across the Woevre Plain. Behind the Meuse, Pershing was activating the 3rd Army. But the grand push to the Rhine and beyond was not to be. Berlin capitulated before the AEF could unleash this final attack. Until the end of his days in 1948, Pershing wondered what might have been.
William Stroock is the author of Pershing in Command: A Study of the American Expeditionary Force in the Great War, among other books.
