“By the 1918 Armistice, Great Britain had built a powerful, modern tactical air force that was the envy of the world.”

By Greg Baughen

THE FIRST WORLD WAR was a proving ground for aerial warfare.

By the end of the conflict, the Royal Air Force, formerly the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), had achieved a level of sophistication in tactical air support it would not see again until the closing stages of the Second World War. Its innovations in the burgeoning field of air combat, reconnaissance and aerial bombing provided the blueprint for how to use air power to win a war. To be sure, it took time and effort to get it right and many errors were made along the way. But by the 1918 Armistice, Great Britain had built a powerful, modern tactical air force that was the envy of the world.

Unfortunately, much of what was learned over the Western Front was quickly forgotten – in Britain at least. Germany’s generals on the other hand paid a great deal of attention to RFC’s evolving methods and tactics. Much of what was gleaned would go on to inform Nazi thinking about air power. Even 100 years later, these early lessons are still relevant. Air operations today bear more relation to those flown a century ago than to the mass-destruction strategic bombing mindset that dominated British and American doctrine in the Second World War.

Here are seven fascinating facts about the Royal Flying Corps and the rise of aerial warfare.

At first, no one knew what air combat would even look like

It was 1911 and Britain’s aeronautical community was abuzz with speculation over what sorts of aircraft the country’s new air corps would use. High-speed, single-seat scouts for strategic reconnaissance seemed like a good idea. Short-range, tactical recon machines, each carrying a pilot and an observer, was yet another option. And since British fliers were expected to encounter opposing planes too, some type of aircraft would be needed to take on the enemy. But what would Britain’s air-to-air combat machines look like? At first, huge, multi-crew aircraft bristling with machine guns were envisioned – perhaps airborne versions of Dreadnaught battleships. But an officer named Colonel F.G. Stone had a different idea. He suggested using small, high-speed reconnaissance scouts to destroy enemy planes. What was needed, he argued, “corresponds more to the torpedo boat than to the armoured cruiser.” These new combat aircraft needed “manoeuvring power, in which is included speed, rapidity of ascent and descent, and power to turn sharply.” Stone wanted a plane that would “rely on its power to outpace and outmanoeuvre the enemy, to get above him and disable him.” It was an early vision of the dogfighter, planes like the Spitfire or even the F-16. Unfortunately, many thought he was crazy. There was one other snag. Stone was a bit short on ideas about how this nimble warplane would “disable” an enemy aircraft. Perhaps “by a hand grenade thrown on to him in passing,” he rather hopefully suggested.

The RFC coined the term ‘fighter’

Britain’s flying corps was the first to call its air-to-air combat aircraft “fighters.” Why? Because that’s what the British imagined that they’d do. The idea was for pilots to fly straight and level to give their gunners the best possible chance of hitting the enemy. Planners foresaw opposing aircraft, like battleships at sea, exchanging volleys until one of the combatants succumbed. With this in mind, the British were developing planes like the multi-seater Airco D.H.3.

The pilots at the front would have different ideas, however. Then one French pilot, Roland Garros, fixed a machine gun to his plane enabling him to shoot straight ahead and went out searching for enemy machines. The ‘avion de chasse’ (hunting plane) was born.

The Germans quickly followed suit with their jagdstaffel (hunting squadrons). Unlike the British, French and German pilots had no intention of slugging it out toe-to-toe with the enemy. Instead they stalked their prey, diving out of the sun and taking foes by surprise.

The Royal Flying Corps soon had its ‘hunters’ too. Pilots like Lanoe Hawker and Louis Strange also decided the way forward was single-seaters with fixed guns. The fastest aircraft around were the single-seater, high-speed reconnaissance scouts, so this was what they used. Col. F.G. Stone had been right after all.

French and German commanders were quick to see the advantages of their hunting tactics. At first, the British lagged behind. It wasn’t until the autumn of 1916 that the RFC leadership finally appreciated what the pilots at the front had known for some time. British fliers became hunters, but the term ‘fighter’ for the planes they flew stuck. We still use it today.

Synchronized guns were not that difficult to develop

Contrary to popular belief, developing synchronization gear – the technology that enabled machine guns to fire through spinning propeller blades — wasn’t particularly difficult. The problem was seeing that it might be useful. After all, why would anyone even want to shoot a gun through the arc of a spinning propeller?

Planes were difficult enough to fly as it was. The idea of fixing a gun to the nose of one and then trying to aim the entire aircraft at another machine that was moving all over the sky in three dimensions seemed so absurd the need to do it never occurred to anyone at first.

At the war’s outbreak, only a few engineers were working on synchronization gear and nose-mounted weaponry, and they did so with little urgency. It was only when Garros began shooting down German planes with a gun fixed to fire straight ahead with armoured wedges to deflect bullets away from the propeller blades that the penny finally dropped. When Garros was forced down in enemy territory, the Germans discovered his secret and realized the benefits of forward-firing machine guns. Only then did the Kaiser’s engineers make such aircraft designs a priority. The result was the Fokker Eindecker.

Even then, it was indeed extremely difficult to shoot another plane down with a fixed gun. Only a few had the knack. That’s why the vast majority of aerial victories in the First World War were won by just a small handful of pilots.

The “Fokker Scourge” was overrated

There is no doubting the psychological impact the Eindecker had on Allied aircrews when it first appeared in 1915. The monoplanes famously crept up on the enemy from behind and shot them in the back. It did not seem fair, nor a particularly gentlemanly way to fight. After all, you were supposed to face your enemy fair and square. At least that’s what British pilots thought.

In the opening 14 months of war, only 40 aircrew had been killed in action. But losses mounted quickly when the Fokker reached the front. In the first eight months of the ‘Fokker Scourge,’ 72 fliers lost their lives. Even so, the casualties were hardly excessive, particularly compared to what was happening on the ground. But it was the method of attack rather than the fatalities that was so demoralizing.

And while it’s true that during the intense air combat of the summer of 1916, 73 British aircrew lost their lives, of the 134 aircraft downed during the period, two-thirds were the result of anti-aircraft fire or other causes, not enemy monoplanes. In fact, RFC aircraft were hardly the ‘Fokker fodder’ we remember them as. Actually, in terms of losses inflicted, the Fokker did not really deserve its fearsome reputation. But of course, in war, psychology is everything.

The B.E.2 wasn’t actually a terrible aircraft

Sluggish and slow-to-turn, the Royal Aircraft Factory B.E.2c is one of those planes that has suffered its share of ridicule over the years. ‘Why put the observer in front of the pilot, where he can’t see much, then give him a gun and have him fire back over the pilot’s head!?!’ the critics demanded. Actually, the observer was in front so that the plane could be flown as a single-seater. He sat on top of the plane’s centre of gravity, so as not to upset the balance. It seemed a good idea at the time, but with hindsight it certainly sounds cumbersome.

The strange seating arrangement notwithstanding, the B.E.2c was, aerodynamically speaking, on the cutting edge of military aviation when it entered service. In fact, it was one of the first planes that did not require a pilot’s complete and undivided attention to prevent the aircraft from careering out of control. Few planes were as stable as the B.E.2c; a pilot could take his hands off the controls and it would still fly straight and level. This made it ideal for observing enemy lines. And provided it was only used for reconnaissance, the plane was an outstanding success, even as late as 1916. During the opening weeks of the Somme offensive, with faster and more agile Fokkers on the prowl, only 14 B.E.2c aircrew were killed on artillery observation duties.

It was only when the B.E.2 was used for bombing or other long-range missions that it suffered its first heavy losses. Trying to turn it into a fighter (the B.E.12) was an even worse idea.

WW1 saw the birth of airborne forward air control

What do observer planes like the L-3 Grasshopper, the Taylorcraft Auster and the Cessna O-1 Bird Dog have in common? All can trace their lineage back to the Royal Aircraft Factory R.E.8. of 1917.

Although First World War-era wireless equipment was far too bulky for ground troops to carry into battle, it could be loaded onto aircraft. Using radio sets, aerial observers could now report the size and positions of enemy units enabling commanders to rain artillery barrages down on them within moments.

By 1917, fighters began dropping bombs on targets too and observers could direct these attacks, as well. And when the observation plane reported an enemy position, army commanders had a choice: they could call in either artillery or bomb-laden Sopwith Camels waiting on nearby airfields. Which to use depended on the target. If the enemy was too close to friendly forces for a barrage or the target was moving, like a column of infantry on the road, a fighter-bomber could deliver the ordnance with surprising precision. All very impressive! So why did the British army not have this system in 1940? We dive into that issue in my books Blueprint for Victory, The Rise of the Bomber, The RAF in the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain.

The RFC actually pioneered Blitzkrieg tactics

The Stukas and Panzers of 1940 were initially inspired by British fighters and tanks working in tandem in 1918. During the First World War’s final months, planes like the Whitworth F.K.8 and armoured vehicles like the Mk. V tank offered a glimpse into the future of combined arms.

Cooped up inside their hulls, the British tank crews had little idea where the enemy was. However, F.K.8s hovering high above could see and attack any threat that presented itself on the ground. If there were too many targets for the armour, artillery support could be called in and tracked from the sky. And when enemy anti-tank batteries opened up on the ground vehicles at ranges too close for the artillery to engage, fighter-bombers could be directed to swoop in and silence the guns with bombs. By the end of the war, Britain’s Tank Corps even had its own Sopwith Camel squadrons permanently attached to it to knock out any enemy guns holding up the advance.

If something like this had been available for the counter attack at Arras in May 1940, it might not have been necessary to retreat to Dunkirk.

Greg Baughen is the author of several books about air power in the World Wars including Blueprint for Victory; The Rise of the Bomber, The RAF in the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain and The Rise and Fall of the French Air Force. His most recent book, RAF on the Offensive — The Rebirth of Tactical Air Power 1940–1941 hit the shelves in September 2018. Baughen has also published articles in RAF Air Power Review, Air Britain’s Aeromilitaria and The Aviation Historian. Some of the themes in his books now provide the basis for a series of lectures on various aspects of British military aviation. Follow him at www.facebook.com/gregbaughen